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ABSTRACT  
The  principal  claim  defended  in  this  thesis  is  that  for  Aristotle 
arousing the emotions of others can amount to giving them proper 
grounds for conviction, and hence a skill in doing so is properly part 
of an expertise in rhetoric. We set out Aristotle’s view of rhetoric as 
exercised  solely  in  the  provision  of  proper  grounds  for  conviction 
(pisteis) and show how he defends this controversial view by appeal 
to a more widely shared and plausible view of rhetoric’s role in the 
proper functioning of the state. We then explore in more detail what 
normative standards must be met for something to qualify as “proper 
grounds for conviction”, applying this to all three of Aristotle’s kinds 
of  “technical  proofs”  (entechnoi  pisteis).  In  the  case  of  emotion, 
meeting  these  standards  is  a  matter  of  arousing  emotions  that 
constitute the reasonable acceptance of premises in arguments that 
count in favour of the speaker’s conclusion. We then seek to show 
that Aristotle’s view of the emotions is compatible with this role. This 
involves opposing the view that in  Rhetoric  I.1 Aristotle rejects  any 
role for emotion-arousal in rhetoric (a view that famously generates a 
contradiction with the rest of the treatise). It also requires rejecting the 
view of Rhetoric II.2-11 on which, for Aristotle, the distinctive outlook 
involved in emotions is merely how things “appear” to the subject. 
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Introduction
The project of this thesis is to understand, with reference to Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric,  how  emotion-arousal  has  a  legitimate  role  in  rhetoric. 
Chapters 1 to 3 focus on Aristotle’s view of rhetoric itself; and one of 
their  principal  claims  is  that,  for  Aristotle,  the  legitimacy  of  using 
emotion-arousal in public speaking is closely bound up with whether 
such use is a genuine exercise of rhetorical expertise. The claim is that 
the  considerations  that  can  render  some  use  of  emotion-arousal  in 
public speaking improper would also render that same use deficient as 
an exercise  of  rhetorical  expertise.  Indeed,  legitimacy considerations 
can count decisively in showing that certain kinds of practice are not 
exercises  of rhetorical  expertise  at  all.  Thus, some legitimacy-related 
considerations  feature  in  the nature  of  rhetoric  itself.  This  seems to 
create  challenges  for  Aristotle’s  apparently  canonical  view  in  the 
Rhetoric that knowing how to arouse listeners’ emotions is a key part of 
rhetorical expertise. The challenges mainly concern what must be true 
of  the  emotions  for  their  arousal  to  have  the  role  that  Aristotle 
apparently assigns it in rhetoric. Before they are broached, chapter 4 
examines what potentially is  an even more severe difficulty for any 
proposal about Aristotle’s view of emotion-arousal in the Rhetoric. That 
is the apparent contradiction between I.1 and the rest of the treatise. A 
new solution is proposed. This difficulty removed, chapters  5 and 6 
return to Aristotle’s understanding in the Rhetoric  of the nature of the 
emotions. This is of course a topic of interest and controversy in itself. 
Here, however, there is the added concern about whether the nature of 
emotions will enable their arousal to meet the requirements set out in 
the  earlier  chapters,  requirements  which  bear  not  just  on  whether 
emotion-arousal is legitimate, but on its place in rhetorical expertise at 
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all. I will claim that Aristotle’s understanding of the emotions is such 
that emotion-arousal can meet these requirements.
The conclusion of  the thesis  raises  some residual  worries  about  the 
legitimacy of using emotion-arousal in rhetoric.
It is not part of the current project to argue for or against the unity of 
the Rhetoric, or to try to reach a verdict on the various developmental 
and redaction hypotheses that have been proposed. The present project 
simply assumes the unity of the  Rhetoric as a working hypothesis. To 
this  extent  only it  might be considered a contribution to  the debate 
about unity, in that a significant motivation for denying unity has been 
the apparent difficulties in finding a consistent treatment of emotion-
arousal throughout, and indeed in finding a consistent treatment of the 
norms that apply to rhetoric generally. If it can be shown that Aristotle 
has a coherent position maintained without inconsistency throughout 
the Rhetoric, this motivation for denying its unity is removed.
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Chapter 1 – Two normative claims about rhetoric in 
Rhetoric I.1
Introduction
The  emotions1 and  their  arousal  feature  prominently  in  Aristotle’s 
criticism of rival accounts of rhetoric. This chapter is concerned with 
establishing the precise grounds on which this criticism proceeds. We 
will show that the criticism is made on the basis of what the expertise 
of rhetoric is, and hence of what will and will not count as exercising it. 
As  a  result,  careful  examination of  his  arguments  against  his  rivals 
reveals important contours of Aristotle’s view of the nature of rhetoric 
itself.
A sketch of Aristotle’s view of rhetoric
Aristotle  distinguishes  carefully  between  what  counts  as  a  genuine 
exercise of the expertise – what is entechnon – and what does not.
The proofs are the only thing that is within the bounds of the expertise,  
the rest are accessories. (1354a13-14)
The  proofs  (pisteis)2 fall  inside,  everything  else  falls  outside.  The 
distinction seems to be between things that constitute (or play a part in 
constituting) exercises  of rhetorical expertise and things that do not. 
Exercises  of  rhetorical  expertise  may  always  be  accompanied  by 
accessory features, such as pleasing or arresting diction, and perhaps 
also any expertise in rhetoric will itself inevitably be accompanied by 
some corresponding abilities  related to these accessory features.  But 
their presence does not make for rhetorical expertise or its exercise and 
1I shall use the English words “emotion” and “passion” interchangeably throughout 
the thesis. There is some discussion of Aristotle’s Greek term “pathos” in chapter 5 
below.
2The meaning of pisteis will be discussed below.
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their excellence does not make for excellent rhetoric. This insistence on 
what does and does not truly make for rhetorical expertise is repeated 
numerous times at key moments throughout the treatise. 
It  is  obvious that the job of  the disputant is  nothing other than to  
demonstrate the issue at hand – that it is or is not the case, that it  
happened or did not happen. (1354a27-9)
Demonstrating the issue is a matter of producing pisteis, rhetoric is the 
expertise that enables someone in a forensic context to be an effective 
‘disputant’:3 the  claim  here  about  the  disputant’s  role  thus  directly 
supports the earlier claim that only the pisteis belong within rhetoric.
A number of further passages hammer home the same point.
At  1354b21-22,  as  part  of  a  passage  of  argument  criticising  the 
handbook writers, Aristotle concludes that 
they demonstrate nothing about the pisteis that belong to the expertise  
(peri  tôn entechnôn pisteôn),  i.e.  how one might  become good at  
enthymemes. (1354b21-22)
Then:
Since it is obvious that the method that belongs to the expertise (hê 
entechnos  methodos)  is  concerned  with  the  proofs  (pisteis)  … 
(1355a3-4)
3 Aristotle’s argument here has forensic speaking particularly in mind, but it is clear 
that he intends his argument to apply to all contexts where rhetoric is exercised. This 
is explicit at 1354b22f. in relation to deliberative rhetoric: we have no reason to 
suppose anything different of epideictic rhetoric.
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When, at Rhetoric I.2, Aristotle proceeds to lay out his view of what the 
nature of the expertise  itself  is,  his answer strengthens the view we 
have been setting out above.
Rhetoric is taken to be an ability on more-or-less any given subject to  
discern what is convincing (pithanon)… .
Of  the  proofs  (tôn pisteôn),  some require  no expertise  (atechnoi),  
some  fall  within  the  domain  of  the  expertise  (entechnoi)  … 
(1355b31-35)
The immediacy of the transition from specifying rhetoric as an ability 
to  discern  what  is  convincing to  a  taxonomy  of  the  proofs indicates 
firstly  that  the  two  are  very  closely  connected.  So  effortless  is  the 
transition  that  this  connection  must  be  part  of  an  everyday 
understanding of these concepts – it does not require an argument to 
justify it. The connection is surely this: to give a proof is to provide 
something that convinces. If that is so, then an expertise in proofs is just 
an  expertise  in  producing  convincing  things.  And  this  might  be 
plausibly  thought  to  consist  in  an ability  to  discern (i.e.  to  identify) 
precisely those convincing things. When someone produces a proof, he 
exercises  an  ability  to  ”identify  what  is  convincing”  (b25f.)  in  the 
relevant  subject  matter.  Thus  this  passage  indicates,  secondly,  that 
producing proofs is a genuine exercise of the expertise of rhetoric. And 
furthermore, it looks likely that nothing else within the realm of public 
speaking  will  be  an  exercise  of  this  ability  to  discern  what  is 
convincing. As the earlier passage stated, proofs are the only thing that 
falls under the bounds of the expertise.4
4 That this view is consistently held throughout the Rhetoric is suggested by, for 
example, the following passages in book III: 1404a1-12, 1414a31-37.
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There  is  a  further  important  strand to  Aristotle’s  view that  may be 
stated briefly here, but will be argued for in detail below. I claim that 
for Aristotle,  a  pistis is  something that  constitutes  proper  grounds for  
conviction.  In  fact,  even this  expression is  a  kind of  shorthand for  a 
more  complex  relation  wherein  one  thing  will  constitute  proper 
grounds on which to be convinced of some second thing. So, where an 
orator wishes to persuade his listeners to believe some conclusion, the 
claim is that something cannot be a pistis unless it provides a basis on 
which  they  would  be  (to  some  degree)  warranted in  believing  the 
conclusion of which it is offered as a pistis.5 In other words, if someone 
is presented with a pistis  by an orator, and forms a conviction for that  
reason, then he has acted properly – this is the kind of way in which 
convictions should be formed.
The English word “proof” has an implication, which the Greek “pistis” 
lacks, that the correctness of the orator’s conclusion is necessitated by 
the proof offered.6 Nevertheless, with that reservation, “proof” serves 
well as a translation because it conveys the important normative aspect 
of Aristotle’s understanding of  pisteis – a  pistis is  proper grounds for 
conviction. In what follows, therefore, the word will typically either be 
translated “proofs” or glossed as ‘proper grounds for conviction’.
Aristotle’s  view of  rhetoric,  then,  is  that  it  consists  of  an  ability  to 
discern what is convincing on a given topic. The exercise of this ability 
is  a  proof:  the presentation  of  what  is  discerned.  Proofs  are  proper 
grounds  for  conviction  –  they  provide  the  listener  with  a  basis  on 
which he may act  properly in forming a conviction.  What the orator 
presents  to  the  listener  should  give  the  listener  proper  grounds  on 
5The nature of this warrant is examined in detail in chapter 3 below.
6 See further chapter 2 below.
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which to form a conviction. Only to the extent that the orator meets 
this requirement is he exercising an expertise in rhetoric.
What is Rhetoric?
The above is  an initial  sketch of  the view that  is  here  attributed to 
Aristotle. It is not an uncontroversial interpretation.
Neither,  though,  on  this  reading,  is  Aristotle’s  view  itself 
uncontroversial. It will help to understand why. It is perfectly possible 
to give an account of what rhetoric is without any essential connection 
with  how  listeners  ought  to  behave,  or  indeed  with  any  other 
normative  concept.  And,  as  we  shall  see,  many  of  Aristotle’s 
predecessors seem to have known it. Rhetoric is a skill for using speech 
to get your listeners to agree with you and do what you want them to 
do. Defined thus, any means of using speech that systematically has 
the desired effect will be an exercise of the art of rhetoric, a successful 
rhetorical technique.
That Aristotle is not content to define rhetoric in this simple intuitive 
way is  significant.  We are claiming that  Aristotle  makes conformity 
with certain normative requirements a criterion of something’s being an 
exercise  of  rhetoric.  Indeed,  we  propose  that  this  view  performs  a 
pivotal role in the arguments of the  Rhetoric’s opening chapter. These 
exegetical claims have seemed controversial to many: it is the focus of 
this chapter to justify them. We have set out above a sketch of the view 
of rhetoric here being attributed to Aristotle, and an indication of some 
key  places  in  the  text  where  this  view is  asserted.  We should now 
briefly  establish  that  there  were  prominent  thinkers  in  the  relevant 
period whose view of rhetoric differed markedly from Aristotle’s. The 
aim here  is  simply to  throw into  relief  how distinctive  the  claimed 
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normative  aspect  of  Aristotle’s  account  was,  by  contrast  with  some 
rival views current among his contemporaries or near-contemporaries. 
Having thus set the scene, we will return to detailed exegesis of the 
text, to show that the proposed view is indeed Aristotle’s, and to show 
how  it  provides  the  key  to  understanding  the  main  arguments  of 
Rhetoric I.1.
Non-Normative Views of Rhetoric among Aristotle’s Predecessors
Perhaps  the  biggest  names  associated  with  an  ancient  picture  of 
rhetoric that is extremely different from Aristotle’s are Thrasymachus 
and Gorgias. 
These excerpts from Gorgias’s Encomium of Helen represent perhaps the 
most celebrated example.
But if it was speech which persuaded her and deceived her heart, not  
even to this is it difficult to make an answer and to banish blame as  
follows. Speech is a powerful lord, which by means of the finest and 
most  invisible  body effects  the  divinest  works:  it  can  stop  fear  and  
banish grief and create joy and nurture pity. I shall show how this is  
the  case,  since  it  is  necessary  to  offer  proof  to  the  opinion  of  my  
hearers: I both deem and define all poetry as speech with meter. Fearful  
shuddering  and  tearful  pity  and  grievous  longing  come  upon  its  
hearers, and at the actions and physical sufferings of others in good  
fortunes and in evil fortunes, through the agency of words, the soul is  
wont to experience a suffering of its own. But come, I shall turn from 
one argument to another.  Sacred incantations sung with words are  
bearers of pleasure and banishers of pain, for, merging with opinion in  
the  soul,  the  power  of  the  incantation  is  wont  to  beguile  it  and  
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persuade it and alter it by witchcraft. ...  What cause then prevents the  
conclusion  that  Helen similarly,  against  her  will,  might  have  come  
under the influence of speech, just as if  ravished by the force of the  
mighty? For it was possible to see how the force of persuasion prevails;  
persuasion has the form of necessity,  but it does not have the same  
power.  For  speech  constrained  the  soul,  persuading  it  which  it  
persuaded, both to believe the things said and to approve the things  
done.  The  persuader,  like  a  constrainer,  does  the  wrong  and  the  
persuaded,  like  the  constrained,  in  speech  is  wrongly  charged.  To  
understand that  persuasion,  when added to  speech,  is  wont also  to  
impress  the  soul  as  it  wishes,  one  must  study:  first,  the  words  of  
astronomers who, substituting opinion for opinion, taking away one  
but creating another, make what is incredible and unclear seem true to  
the eyes of opinion; then, second, logically necessary debates in which a  
single  speech,  written with art  but  not  spoken with truth,  bends a  
great  crowd  and  persuades;  and,  third,  the  verbal  disputes  of  
philosophers in which the swiftness of thought is also shown making  
the belief  in an opinion subject to easy change.  The effect  of  speech  
upon the condition of the soul is comparable to the power of drugs over  
the  nature  of  bodies.  For  just  as  different  drugs  dispel  different  
secretions form the body, and some bring an end to disease and others  
to life,  so also in the case of  speeches,  some distress, others delight,  
some cause  fear,  others  make  the  hearers  bold,  and some drug and  
bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion.7
The metaphors used to describe the power of speech involve magic 
spells  and potions,  exercises  of  political  power,  the  use  of  physical 
strength to coerce others, and the use of drugs in medicine. Another 
7Gorgias, Helen, translation from Sprague [1972].
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prominent  figure  in  the  history  of  rhetoric  at  this  period, 
Thrasymachus, picks up these images for rhetoric as a powerful force. 
The physical  force image appears in the reported title of one of his 
works  on  rhetoric:  “Knockdown  Speeches”,8 casting  the  power  of 
rhetoric in a forensic or political contest as akin to that of a wrestler. 
Likewise,  in  Plato’s  Phaedrus,  Thrasymachus is  described  as  a  great 
expert in calming the anger of a crowd, using terminology – “charming 
them  with  spells”  –  that  is  explicitly  attributed  to  Thrasymachus 
himself  (Phaedr.  267d1).  Put  that  together  with  the  picture  of 
Thrasymachus from Plato’s Republic I, where his view of “justice” is as 
a tool by which the powerful exercise their power over the weak.9 It fits 
nicely with that view to think that rhetoric was another such tool for 
exercising  power.  The  power  of  rhetoric  (or  of  speech,  logos)  is 
comparable to any other force acting powerfully on its objects, whether 
those objects are listeners (in the spells imagery, you spellbind your 
audience) or whether they are your opponents whom you overpower 
when  your  words  rob  them  of  the  allegiance  of  listeners  (in  the 
wrestling imagery, you throw you opponent).
It might turn out that Gorgias, Thrasymachus and others took the view 
that rhetoric is to be understood simply as a force, with no particular 
tendency of its own to good or ill, that one can harness to one’s own 
designs. If that were established, then one might plausibly interpret all 
of the above imagery as expressing that view. But that view is not yet 
established. As long as one cannot appeal to some general account of 
their views on rhetoric,  we should distinguish carefully between the 
differing implications of the above images. Several of them admit of a 
perfectly  benign  interpretation.  They  may  be  readily  interpreted  as 
8Thrasymachus DK 85B7.
9Here I follow Chappell [1993], [2000] pace Everson [1998].
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simply  striking  ways  of  talking  about  rhetoric,  that  are  perfectly 
compatible with the normatively constrained understanding of rhetoric 
that we are here attributing to Aristotle. Arguably those images, such 
as  the  wrestling  image,  in  which  one  exerts  the  power  of  rhetoric 
against those who are arguing for a different point of view are benign. This is 
because  the  image  does  not  even  purport  to  characterise  the 
relationship  between  orator  and  listener.  Images  of  this  kind 
characterise the interplay between the disputing parties, and it seems 
perfectly natural  to characterise in the language of physical force or 
violence  the  effect  on  one’s  opponent  of  arguments  that  (properly) 
count  decisively  in  the  eyes  of  others  in  favour  of  your  case.  An 
argument  can  be  in  that  sense  devastating,  inexorable,  irresistible, 
powerful or ‘knockdown’.
The language of spells and magic,  however,  is  more disturbing.  For 
imagery of  this  kind purports  to  characterise  the way in which the 
orator’s speech works in affecting the audience.  Part  of the point of 
such  imagery,  especially  as  part  of  Gorgias’s  display  of  the  power 
possessed by the  skills  he  offers  to  convey,  is  that  they  operate  on 
people whether they are willing or not. Just as a spell is supposed to 
bind someone and bring about change irresistibly, perhaps without its 
object  even  knowing,  so  an  orator  –  Gorgias  claims  –  is  able  to 
spellbind his audience.  The  Helen concludes with the revelation that 
although it may have been effective in improving the listener’s opinion 
of Helen (Ἑλένης μὲν ἐγκώμιον), it has in reality all been an exercise 
in amusement for Gorgias himself (ἐμὸν δὲ παίγνιον). I see no reason 
to suppose, as Wardy does, that Gorgias here hints that our enjoyment 
of this exercise shows our complicity in deception, or our consent to 
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Gorgias’s exercise of power over us.10 If that were so, Gorgias would 
have landed us in a strange state indeed – aware that we have been 
deceived, aware that we have had a hand in our own deception, and 
yet still persuaded. It is questionable whether such a state is possible,11 
and doubtful whether this was part of what Gorgias intended here. On 
Wardy’s  suggestion,  the  reader  has  been  foolishly  complicit  in 
consenting to Gorgias’s deception, and might be expected to reproach 
himself for this in retrospect. But this reading surely distorts Gorgias’s 
point. The speech is epideictic and the reader assesses it as such – no-
one is really trying to form a genuine verdict about Helen. It is rather 
Gorgias  himself  that  the  reader  is  assessing.  The  reader  does  this 
precisely by refusing his consent to be deceived, and assessing how well 
Gorgias  can  fare  in  advancing  his  case.  The  speech’s  success  then 
consists in our feeling the force of the case in Helen’s  favour,  being 
unable to  see how to answer it,  and yet  realising that  something is 
amiss  in  the  exoneration  of  Greece’s  most  famous  adulteress.12 The 
point is that the piece has exercised over us the very kind of power that 
forms such a theme in the speech itself. And it has done so flagrantly – 
even  when  advertising  the  fact  that  speech  is  being  used  to  wield 
power over its  listeners,  we are powerless  to  resist.  No matter  how 
little  consent  or  complicity  we  offered,  or  how  fore-armed  against 
Gorgias’s wiles we were, we were overpowered. In fact, this is a central 
point of the speech. The very choice of subject matter tells us that what 
is being defended is indefensible, the emphasis on exercises of power 
by the use of speech is prominent throughout, and in case it were not 
10Wardy [1996] 37.
11It would come close to the kind of self-deception whose possibility was plausibly 
denied in Williams [1973].
12 cf. Griffin [1980]: “the archetype of deceitful wives”, 78; “a legendary figure ... for 
her guilt and suffering”, 97-8.
Chapter 1 – Two normative claims about rhetoric in Rhetoric I.1 page 12 of 272
obvious, at the end we are told explicitly that Gorgias is not in earnest 
and is relishing his sway over us. Yet even with all these reasons for 
epistemic  caution  right  in  the  foreground,  we  still  find  ourselves 
beguiled.  So almost the reverse of Wardy’s claim is true – Gorgias’s 
speech has its way with us even when we consider ourselves to have 
most  reason  to  resist.  Gorgias’s  skills  have  the  power  to  make  the 
weaker case appear the stronger, even when the audience knows that 
this is what is happening. So much, at least, is Gorgias’s provocative 
claim.13
This  fits  with  Gorgias’s  assimilation  (well  charted  by  Wardy)  of 
philosophical  argument  to  political  demagoguery,  and to  witchcraft 
and magic spells.14 All are ways of using speech to exercise power over 
others, and represent processes in which – if they are executed skilfully 
– the listener is powerless to resist. Perhaps on their own, these power 
images  might  simply  be  a  metaphor  for  the  fact  that  one-way-or-
another  speech  influences  people  –  something  that  at  that  level  of 
generality nobody would wish to deny. Fitted into a larger picture of 
Gorgias’s  controversial  views,  it  seems  as  though  these  kinds  of 
imagery  have  a  much  more  specific  use,  as  expressing  a  view  of 
rhetoric in which the expertise does not in any way depend on whether 
or not what is  communicated in speech represents good reasons for 
conviction.  Indeed  even  the  making  of  such  a  distinction  by 
13It would require much more from Gorgias to show that his techniques actually have 
the power to get people to form beliefs against what they consider to be the balance 
of reasons to believe. All he actually succeeds in showing is that beliefs can be 
‘compelled’ even in circumstances in which a listener takes himself to have some 
substantial reason(s) not to believe.
14cf. also De Romilly [1975].
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philosophers is cast as merely their device for exercising power over 
others.
If  this is  a correct  understanding of what is  going on in the use by 
Thrasymachus and Gorgias of imagery of spells (and other kinds of 
power), it is clear how sharply it differs from the view of rhetoric that 
we are here attributing to Aristotle. For Aristotle, the sense in which 
rhetorical expertise gives the orator power over listeners to influence 
them is that it gives him an ability to show them that by their own lights 
they do well to be convinced. The power he has is limited by the extent 
to which he can show them this.
Hence,  at  one  level,  Aristotle  will  have  no  objection  to  the  use  of 
comparisons  with  wrestling  and  physical  force.  In  defending  the 
usefulness  of  rhetoric  at  1355a19-b7,  he  argues  a  fortiori from  the 
acceptability of being able to “defend yourself” with bodily force to the 
acceptability of doing so with argument.
But  at  another,  these  metaphors  are  used  by  Gorgias  and 
Thrasymachus to express a conception of rhetoric that is very much at 
odds with Aristotle’s. On his view, rhetoric is an ability to influence 
listeners  by  producing  in  speech  things  that  should15 bring  about 
conviction in them. On theirs, rhetoric is an ability to influence listeners 
by producing in speech things – indeed  anything  – that  actually  will 
bring about conviction in them.
The  kind  of  view  held  by  Gorgias  and  Thrasymachus  has  some 
similarities to our everyday – and generally pejorative – conception of 
15The exact character of this “should” will be clarified in chapter 3 below.
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what rhetoric  is.  It  may well  be a bad thing if  a  speaker  works his 
charm on an audience  but  fails  to  give  them any good reasons  for 
adopting his proposed point of view. But we scarcely think this means 
the speaker has failed to deploy a skill in rhetoric.
At this stage, it is enough to note that we are attributing to Aristotle a 
view that would have been surprising in his own day. It is not, on the 
face of things, the most instinctive and natural understanding of what 
rhetorical  expertise  is.  So  we need  both a  clear  case to  support  the 
claim that Aristotle held this view, and an explanation of why he did so. 
For both of these we turn in detail  to the text of the  Rhetoric.  It will 
become clear that this view emerges from, and explains the arguments 
in the text of the Rhetoric, especially Rhetoric I.1.
Analysis of Two Key Arguments
The core of the argument of I.1 is in the following passage.
νῦν μὲν οὖν οἱ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες οὐδὲν ὡς 
εἰπεῖν  πεπορίκασιν  αὐτῆς  μόριον  αἱ  γὰρ  πίστεις  ἔντεχνόν 
ἐστι μόνον,  τὰ  δ'  ἄλλα  προσθῆκαι,  οἱ  δὲ  περὶ  μὲν 
ἐνθυμημάτων οὐδὲν λέγουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, 
περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλεῖστα πραγματεύονται: 
(1354a11-16)16
16Ross [1959] with parentheses removed, see below and n. 18. Hereafter, unless 
otherwise indicated, the text quoted is Ross [1959]. Cf. also Kassel [1976].
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As  it  is,  those  who  put  together  Arts  of  Speaking  have  provided  
scarcely a part of it.17 For it is only the proofs18 that belong to the art,  
other  things  are  mere  accessories.  And they  say  nothing  about  
enthymemes, which are the body of proof; whereas they devote most of  
their treatment to things that are outside the issue.
This passage contains an outline of Aristotle’s arguments against his 
predecessors’ views of rhetoric, arguments that occupy him for much 
of the first  chapter.  That this is  so is  confirmed by the repetition of 
these points in the brief resumptive passages at 1354b16-22, 1355a3-4 
and 1355a19-20.
This passage presents a case in favour of the conclusion: that Aristotle’s 
predecessors,  “those  who  put  together  ‘Arts  of  Speaking’”,  have 
“provided scarcely a part of it” (a12f.).
The punctuation in Ross’s text is misguided,19 and the passage is best 
read  as  offering  two arguments,  with  a  shared  premise.  These  two 
arguments  are  (i)  that  the  handbook  writers  say  nothing  about 
enthymemes,  which  is  the  body  of  proof  (a14f),  and  (ii)  that  they 
mainly  treat  matters  that  are  not  relevant  (a15f.).  On  Ross’s 
17 There is a variant reading in the text here, which has been thought important to 
issues that form the subject of chapter 4 and will be discussed there.  cf. Ross [1959], 
Kassel [1976]. Here, little, indeed pretty much nothing, depends on whether it is 
‘little’ or ‘pretty much nothing’ that Aristotle’s predecessors have contributed to the 
art of rhetoric.
18 The meaning and correct English translation of πιστις is controversial: my view, 
outlined above, is defended in greater detail below. In this initial discussion of these 
sections of I.1, “proofs” may be taken as a placeholder for the Greek term.
19 “The parentheses Ross puts round αἱ γὰρ πίστεις ... προσθῆκαι are a disaster” 
Burnyeat [1990] 10 n.26.
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punctuation, with the sentence “For it is only the proofs that belong to the  
art,  other things are mere accessories” (a13f.)  in parentheses,  Aristotle’s 
remark  is  cast  as  relatively  unimportant  or  unconnected  to  these 
arguments.  But this is absurd.  For this sentence – premise 3 in both 
arguments below – surely contains the premise that is pivotal to each 
of the arguments, namely a premise connecting proof (or whatever will 
turn out to be the correct rendering of “πιστις”) with rhetoric.
Argument (i)
1. In  attempting  to  give  an  account  of  the  art  of  rhetoric,  the 
handbook writers say nothing about enthymemes (a14f.)
2. Enthymemes are the most important part of proof (a15)
3. The only  thing that  properly  belongs  to  the art  of  rhetoric  is 
proofs (a13f.)
We may infer:
4. The  handbook writers  say  nothing  about  the  most  important 
part of the only thing that properly belongs to the art of rhetoric
Which gives good reason to suppose:
5. In  attempting  to  give  an  account  of  the  art  of  rhetoric,  the 
handbook writers have produced scarcely a part of it (a11-13)
A key aim of this chapter is to uncover Aristotle’s view of pistis – thus 
far rendered “proof”. The above argument contains a premise (2) that 
might  be  illuminating  on  this  score.  If  we  can  understand  what 
enthymemes are, then this might shed light on the nature of  pistis.20 
However,  the  above  argument  will  not  tell  us  whether  Aristotle  is 
20Such an undertaking in detail is beyond our scope here. In brief, “enthymêma” 
literally means a consideration, and Aristotle’s view seems to be that enthymemes are 
pieces of reasoning (1355a8) that constitute considerations in favour of the speaker’s 
case. Cf. further chapter 3 below, and Burnyeat [1990].
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operating with a normatively constrained notion of  pistis  such as the 
one  sketched  above.  For  even  if  we  suppose  that  it  is  an  essential 
feature  of  enthymemes  that  they  meet  certain  normative  epistemic 
constraints, and that it is this very feature that makes them the main 
part  of  pistis,  still  some  kinds  of  pistis  do  not  require  enthymemes 
(indeed some kinds may be best pursued without enthymemes),21 and 
so nothing would follow from the epistemic probity of enthymemes 
about whether Aristotle’s view of  pistis generally was normative, and 
in what way.22
Nevertheless,  the  same  is  not  true  of  the  second  of  this  pair  of 
arguments.
Argument (ii)
1. The handbook-writers have spent most of their time on things 
that are outside the issue.
2. Only proofs belong to the expertise of rhetoric.
3. Therefore  the  handbook  writers  have  contributed  next-to-
nothing to the expertise of rhetoric.
As it stands, this second argument is rather elliptical. Its conclusion is 
that the handbook writers have said little about rhetorical expertise. 
21 As is confirmed explicitly at III.17.1418a9-17.
22 Suppose πιστις meant “something that gets people persuaded” – on something like 
the non-normative view held by Gorgias and others mentioned above. On this view, 
a πιστις does not necessarily make it the case that the listener has reason to get 
persuaded. It is nevertheless consistent with this view to suppose that in fact 
persuasion mainly happens through enthymemes, and even that this because 
enthymemes make it the case that the listener should be persuaded.
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The justification is that the pisteis alone fall under the expertise, and the 
handbook writers have spent most of their efforts on what is outside 
the issue, or irrelevant.
What, then is meant here by “outside the issue” or “irrelevant”? John 
Cooper  rightly insists that what is  at issue here is  the fact that the 
handbook writers  were “giving instruction on how to speak off  the 
subject, to speak about irrelevancies;” and that “περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ 
πράγματος τὰ πλεῖστα πραγματεύονται” does not  mean,  as  Cope 
thought,  that  they  were  labouring  at  things  lying  outside  the  art’s 
concerns,  “extra  artem  –  outside  the  limits  of  a  genuine  ‘Art  of 
Rhetoric’”,  in  the  kind  of  way  that,  for  example,  how to  dress  for 
making a speech might plausibly be thought to be.23
As  for  how  the  argument  works,  as  it  stands  it  is  incomplete.  It 
requires  an  unstated  premise  to  the  effect  that  speaking  about 
irrelevancies  cannot  constitute  producing  pisteis.  Whilst  most 
commentators perhaps take this linking premise to be too obvious to 
need spelling out, it seems to me that it is a substantial and contestable 
step  in  the  argument.  For  the  premise  is  only  obvious  if  you  take 
Aristotle’s view of what can count as producing a  pistis  and hence of 
the  nature  of  rhetoric.  And these  are  issues  on  which  views  differ 
between Aristotle and those falling under his criticism in this passage. 
On an alternative view of  pistis,  the unstated linking premise is  not 
available: there is no difficulty in supposing that irrelevant speaking 
could constitute producing pisteis. Presumably part of what motivates 
Aristotle’s argument in the first place is that it was part not just of the 
handbook-writers’ theories but also of the practice of many orators to 
23 Cooper [1999] 391, cf. Cope [1877] 4. Reasons for preferring Cooper’s view are 
important and are given more fully below. Cf. also Lanni [2005].
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gain a persuasive advantage by irrelevant speaking. That is, irrelevant 
speaking must actually work in getting people convinced (as, of course, 
it  does).  And such techniques,  as  well  as  working,  must  have been 
taken to be techniques in rhetoric. If orators’ irrelevant speaking was the 
means by which they changed the minds of their audience, wouldn’t 
this make it a means of persuasion, and hence a pistis? And isn’t it clear 
that an expertise in such speaking would be an expertise precisely in 
rhetoric? Thus, Aristotle’s conclusion, that those offering instruction in 
irrelevant speaking were not thereby conveying the art of rhetoric, is 
distinctive  and  controversial.  So,  it  seems,  is  the  unstated  premise 
about pisteis that this second argument requires.
These  two  arguments  promise  to  give  a  clear  signal  of  Aristotle’s 
understanding of what rhetoric is – for he thinks it clearly follows from 
his understanding of the nature of rhetoric that deploying enthymemes 
is an exercise  of  rhetoric,  and that speaking that is  irrelevant to the 
pragma is not.
Aristotle  is  clearly  here  not  merely  deploying  ordinary  notions  of 
rhetoric. He is arguing for a surprising and distinctive conclusion, and 
we should look carefully at this second argument to see how he does 
this, and how he is able to make his argument so persuasive that it is 
regarded  as  obvious  (indeed  often  passes  unnoticed)  by 
commentators.24
24 Cooper [1999] 391: “[the handbook writers] were doing nothing but giving 
instruction on how to speak off the subject, to speak about irrelevancies; and that 
[viz., presumably, speaking off the subject] obviously cannot be a true part of the art of 
oratory.” (emphasis and explanation mine) Most other commentators see in this step 
of the argument nothing significant enough to deserve comment – as we have seen, 
Ross puts the key sentence (1354a13) in parentheses.
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Here is how I think his argument (ii) should be made explicit.
1. The handbook writers have dealt mainly with what is outside 
the issue (i.e. irrelevant to it) (a15f.)
2. If  what  one  says  is  irrelevant  to  an  issue  then  it  contributes 
nothing  to  giving  someone  proper  grounds  for  conviction 
(roughly,  a  “proof”)  of  any  particular  view  on  that  issue. 
(premise supplied as obvious)25
3. The only  thing that  properly  belongs  to  the art  of  rhetoric  is 
giving proper grounds for conviction (a13)
We may infer:
4. Most  of  the  handbook  writers’  work  dealt  with  matters  that 
contribute nothing to the only thing that properly belongs to the 
art of rhetoric
This gives good reason to suppose:
5. The handbook writers have produced scarcely a part of the art 
of rhetoric (a11-13)
It  certainly  looks  as  though  the  sentence  (a13)  that  Ross  puts  in 
parentheses  –  premise  3  above  –  is  needed  to  play  a  key  role  in 
connecting the premises Aristotle gives with the conclusion he takes 
them to support, in the above argument (ii), just as it did in argument 
(i).
A Pivotal Premise
So, if these arguments are to be understood as I have laid them out 
above, then this sentence at a13 is integral to the arguments. I wish to 
25 How could one offer to somebody proper grounds for conviction of a particular 
view on some issue without saying something about that issue?
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claim  that  this  sentence  expresses  Aristotle’s  substantive  view  of 
rhetorical expertise, and – as suggested by the phrase “proper grounds 
for  conviction”  –  his  view  is  that  rhetoric  constitutively  involves 
conforming to some normative standards. It will be important to tease 
out exactly what norms are involved here,  and what can be said to 
recommend this distinctive view of rhetorical persuasion.
But first we should clarify the exegetical case for supposing that the 
sentence at a13 is pivotal to Aristotle’s argument here, that it expresses 
a  distinctive  view  of  the  nature  of  rhetoric,  and  that  this  view  is 
correctly represented in our translation of pistis as “proper grounds for 
conviction”.
The  sentence  in  question,  then,  is  “αἱ  γὰρ  πίστεις  ἔντεχνόν  ἐστι 
μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα προσθῆκαι” ( For it is only the proofs that belong to the  
art, other things are mere accessories. 1354a13). As we have seen, in the 
arguments in which it features, it serves to adjudicate what things do 
and don’t constitute  exercises of the expertise of rhetoric. It does so by 
expressing  a  substantive  view  of  what  is  essential  to  rhetorical 
expertise, such that then various candidates can be assessed against it 
to see whether they fit. Enthymemes fit perfectly. Things ‘outside the 
issue’ fail to fit. Enthymemes are clear cases of pistis. Irrelevancies are 
clearly  not.  Now,  in  rendering  ‘pistis’ into  English,  translators  have 
divided  roughly  into  those  preferring  something  like  “means  (or 
modes)  of  persuasion” and those preferring something like “proof”. 
Obviously  there  is  a  substantive  difference  at  stake  here.  Those 
preferring “means of persuasion” understand the term ‘neutrally’  to 
cover  any use of speech that is such as to help get the listener to be 
convinced.  Those  preferring  “proof”  understand  it  as  loaded  with 
Chapter 1 – Two normative claims about rhetoric in Rhetoric I.1 page 22 of 272
normative  content:  something  that  provides  proper grounds  for  the 
listener to be convinced. The difference and its importance will be clear 
if we set out the relevant parts of the argument separately using each 
of these ways of understanding  pistis. We may thus distinguish two 
different construals of premises 2 and 3 as follows.26
2a If what I say is irrelevant to whether p, then it contributes 
nothing to proper grounds for conviction (roughly, “proof”) as 
to whether p.
3a Providing proper grounds for conviction is the only thing 
that belong to the expertise of rhetoric.
2b If what I say is irrelevant to whether p, then saying it is 
not such as to help getting someone to be convinced (i.e. is not a 
“means of persuasion”) of p.
3b Helping, by saying things, to get people to be convinced 
is the only thing that belongs to the expertise of rhetoric.
So, the difference between the two different construals corresponds to 
the difference in the way “πίστις” has been translated at 1354a13 and 
elsewhere  –  i.e. “proof”  or  “means of  persuasion”? There  are  some 
relevant  linguistic  considerations,  but  let  us  first  consider  what  is 
philosophically at stake in how we construe the argument here.
I take it to be a general principle of interpretation that, in the absence of 
good reasons to do otherwise,  we should prefer  interpretations that 
attribute  to  the  author  premises  that  are  fairly  obvious  and 
26 For these purposes I consider “doxastic” persuasion – persuading someone to 
believe that p. But the arguments could be run equally well for practical persuasion – 
persuading someone to φ.
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uncontroversial. This will especially apply where, in reconstructing an 
argument, we supply premises that are not explicit in the text. Premise 
2  here  is  supplied  in  just  this  way.  We  should  therefore  prefer  a 
construal of this premise that is obvious and uncontroversial, so as to 
explain why Aristotle did not need to state it explicitly. In this case, it is 
2a that  is  obvious  and uncontentious,  whereas  2b is  certainly  much 
more contentious if not obviously false.
On the other hand, in relation to premise 3, it is surely 3b rather than 
3a that has the more obvious appeal. 3b could be taken as little more 
than elucidating what is meant by the “expertise of rhetoric” – it would 
be  widely  agreed,  and  not  denied  even  by  Aristotle’s  rivals  (an 
advantage in an argument criticising them). Rhetoric is an expertise in 
convincing people to believe things or do things, and so only things 
that contribute to this are part of it. The difficulty is that, construing 
premise 3 this way (as 3b) gives Aristotle a bad argument. It looks as 
though  premise  2b  is  false,  or  at  best  highly  contentious,  risking 
begging the question against those Aristotle is criticising. And if one 
combines 3b with any more plausible construal of premise 2, such as 
2a, the argument simply does not go through.
It is my view that the argument is best understood with premises 2 and 
3 construed as 2a and 3a. As such, the argument runs as follows.
1. The  handbook  writers’  techniques  are  predominantly  for 
presenting irrelevancies.
2. (2a)  Irrelevancies  make no contribution to proper grounds 
for conviction.
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3. (3a)  Proper grounds for conviction are the only thing that 
belong to the expertise of rhetoric.
4. Therefore:  the  handbook  writers’  techniques  are 
predominantly for things that make no contribution to the 
expertise of rhetoric.
5. This gives reason to think that: the handbook writers, for all 
their labours, have provided us with scarcely a part of the 
expertise of rhetoric.
I  wish  to  contend  that  (in  the  end)  this  is  fundamentally  a  good 
argument. It seems to me to be the one we find at 1354a11-16. If it is 
correct,  the  best  that  can  be  said  for  the  contribution  of  these 
predecessors  of  Aristotle,  the  handbook  writers,  is  that  they  have 
thought lots about accessory features of rhetorical practice. What they 
have failed to do is set out the essential features that explain success 
when  the  expert  rhetorician  persuades  through  deploying  his 
expertise.
However, the suggestion that this argument is good against its targets 
needs the following important clarification. The pivotal premise 3 – as 
construed here (3a) – merely asserts his own position over against rival 
views of rhetorical expertise. If it is correct that Aristotle’s predecessors 
held a purely causal view of the power of rhetoric, then they and any 
sympathetic  to  this  view  surely  would  not  grant  this  premise. 
Rhetoric’s power, on their view, is like that of a strong wrestler or a 
magic spell or a violent enemy: it produces its result without needing 
to render that result in any sense proper. Whether conviction has been 
properly produced is, on this view, an entirely separate question from 
whether  conviction  has  been  produced  by  an  exercise  of  rhetorical 
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expertise.  At  this  stage  in  the  treatise,  Aristotle  has  offered  no 
arguments  against  competing  views  and  in  favour  of  this  premise. 
Nevertheless,  if  the  premise  can  be  supported  appropriately,  the 
argument is good. In the next chapter we will try to show that Aristotle 
has good reasons for accepting it.
Aristotle’s Distinctive Conception of Rhetoric
The main claim of this chapter is that Aristotle’s arguments at the start 
of the Rhetoric turn on a substantive and normative view of rhetoric to 
which he is not obviously entitled by virtue of general agreement, and 
for which, at least initially, he offers no argument.
This distinctive view of rhetoric is expressed in Premise 3 above: 
Proper grounds of conviction27 are the only thing that belong to the expertise  
of rhetoric.
Aristotle’s view of rhetoric (1354a13) was surprising and controversial
This  premise,  expressing  his  view  of  rhetoric,  is  not  immediately 
obvious.28  By ordinary standards, those who rouse groups of people to 
do or believe things by clever use of tone-of-voice, choice of words, eye 
contact, smiling, etc. as they speak, rather than a skill in giving proper 
grounds for conviction, are nevertheless (perhaps even, on some views, 
pre-eminently)  examples  of  using  an  expertise  that  both  we  and the 
ancients would be likely to call “rhetoric”. So the premise is far from 
obvious.
27 Although this is the clearest way of formulating the sense of Aristotle’s pistis, we 
will continue to use “proofs” as a less clumsy shorthand in what follows.
28 pace Cooper [1999] 391.
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It  is  also controversial.  Someone who takes a purely  causal  view of 
rhetoric’s persuasive power would reject it. It seems that both Gorgias 
and Thrasymachus took just  such a  view.  And their  view seems to 
have much in its favour. It seems to capture a very natural sense of 
“rhetoric” in both English and Greek. It  straddles both positive and 
pejorative  uses  of  these  terms.  It  is  a  view  on  which  rhetoric  is  a 
substantial expertise involving systematic understanding of its domain 
(human conviction). And it seems to have been a view taken seriously 
around Aristotle’s time – just such a view comes under discussion in 
Plato’s  Gorgias, and is reflected still in the views of rhetoric discussed 
in  the  later  Phaedrus.29 Interestingly,  whilst  there  are  important 
differences  between  Socrates  and  the  other  characters  in  both  the 
Gorgias and the Phaedrus (and those historically who held similar positions)  
as to  what any rhetoric  worthy of  ‘technê’  status is  like,  there is  no 
dispute over the point at issue here.  A technique’s  credentials as an 
exercise of rhetorical expertise are purely a matter of its bringing about 
rhetoric’s  proper  product  (e.g.  rhetoric’s  equivalent  to  medicine’s 
health and strength, in Socrates’ view at Phaedrus 270b) and of its doing 
so  reliably  for  each  audience  on  each  occasion  (which,  in  Socrates’ 
view,  will  involve  –  amongst  other  things  –  a  great  deal  of 
psychological  knowledge,  Phaedrus  271b-272b).30 As  such,  the 
comparison  with  the  doctor’s  art  is  apt  (Phaedr 270b)  –  whether 
29Gorgias esp. 455d-457c, noting 456a where rhetoric’s power is described as 
“δαιμονία τις”, also 459b-c, “μηχανὴν τινα πειθοῦς”; Phaedrus 261a-e, esp. “ἆρ᾽ οὖν 
οὐ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων” (261a), 
“οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνῃ τοῦτο δρῶν ποιήσει φανῆναι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν 
δίκαιον, ὅταν δὲ βούληται, ἄδικον;”  (261c-d) with both of these in the mouth of 
Socrates.
30Of course, Gorgias and others might well have a different conception of what 
rhetoric’s proper product was, and of the kind of knowledge required to ensure a 
technique was reliably successful.
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administering a particular drug is good medical practice comes down 
simply to a matter of whether this will be most effective at bringing 
this  kind  of  patient  from  their  current  state  towards  the  desired 
(healthy) state.  This  stands in contrast  to  Aristotle’s  view that  there 
may be speech techniques that are reliably effective in bringing about 
the desired end result  but  still  do not count as  exercises  of rhetoric 
because their mode of operation does not proceed via offering  proper 
grounds for conviction.
So,  Aristotle’s  arguments  turn  on  a  pivotal  premise  expressing  his 
distinctive view of rhetoric.  His view is far from obvious and has a 
serious contemporary rival. It is asserted unargued, and he does not 
immediately defend it.
Inadequate Explanations of Aristotle’s Position.
Of  course,  Aristotle  may  simply  be  setting  out  his  position  to  his 
students on his own terms. Once granted his view about the nature of 
rhetoric,  he has a good basis  for arguing that  the handbook writers 
have said next to nothing about it. There is something less than fully 
satisfying about an argument made on this basis. Given the scathing 
criticism here of rival writers on rhetoric, one might expect Aristotle to 
offer reasons that either these rivals themselves or at least a neutral 
party would be likely to accept for preferring his account of rhetoric 
over theirs.
We might hope, that is, that he does after all offer a justification for this 
premise.  Or  alternatively,  perhaps  somehow  his  argument  can  be 
reinterpreted in such a way that the difficulty does not arise. Before 
putting  forward  my  own  approach,  I  will  consider  a  number  of 
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tempting but ultimately inadequate ways of trying to give Aristotle a 
satisfying position. Firstly, I consider and reject the possibility that our 
premise 3 represents a stronger claim than Aristotle intends to make or 
needs  to  make here.   I  contend that  he requires  precisely  the claim 
expressed above in premise 3. I then consider and reject one way in 
which it is suggested Aristotle does justify premise 3. Having done this, 
I  will  offer  my  own  view  of  how  Aristotle  justifies  the  claim 
represented in  premise  3,  a  claim which will  then  make good both 
arguments  against  the  handbook  writers:  argument  (i)  from  their 
silence on enthymemes and argument (ii) from their focus on irrelevant 
speaking.
So, first, one might argue that the phrase  “the proofs are the only thing  
that is within the bounds of the expertise” (a13) simply refers to the section 
of the speech called “proofs”. While this is quite plausible, it won’t help. 
Firstly,  even construed this way, the premise is  neither obvious nor 
agreed – on the views Aristotle is criticising, the persuasive effect turns 
crucially on the introduction, narrative and conclusion (and doubtless 
the other sections too), and skill in these sections is deemed at least as 
much part of rhetorical expertise as skill in delivering a good “proofs” 
section.31 Secondly,  in  order  to  get  clear  on  what  this  claim  –  thus 
construed – would be,  we need to understand what  features  of  the 
“proofs” section it is in virtue of which it belongs to the art, features 
which no other section of the speech has. The answer is obvious – it is 
the fact that the “proofs” section is the section of the speech in which 
the speaker gives the listeners proper grounds for the belief or decision 
that he is urging upon them. So, even if “the proofs” denotes a section 
of  the  speech,  it  still  includes  the  claim  that  proper  grounds  of 
311354b17-20.
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conviction are the only thing that belongs to the expertise of rhetoric, 
and hence still represents the same surprising and controversial claim.
If the controversial claim cannot be evaded in this way, let us consider 
how the claim could be justified.
Christof  Rapp argues32 that  premise 3 is  maintained on the basis  of 
what Aristotle has said about technê in the preceding lines. Aristotle, he 
claims,  argues  that  pistis (proof)  alone  can  be  combined  with  a 
methodical  procedure  (1354a8)  or  provides  an  explanation  of  non-
accidental  successful  rhetorical  performance  (1354a9-11).  But  this 
seems simply false. People can and do give methodical procedures for 
rhetorical persuasion that rely for effectiveness on features other than 
the proofs offered to the audience. Such features certainly purport to 
explain the non-accidental success of skilled orators. Plato has Socrates 
sketch just such a proposal at Phaedrus 271a4ff.. And we have seen that 
it was such a method that Gorgias, Thrasymachus and the handbook 
writers claimed to offer their pupils. Moreover, it seems hard to deny 
that   methods  of  this  kind  are  successful  in  bringing  about  non-
accidental successful prosecution and defence (a5ff.). It seems plainly 
false  to  suppose  that  proper  grounds  for  conviction  are  the  only 
materials  from  which  one  can  construct  a  method  for  successful 
prosecution  and defence  that  actually  works.  (And if  one  combines 
Rapp’s  suggestion  with  understanding  “pistis” as  simply  ‘means  of 
persuasion’,  then a13 becomes vacuous - “only means of persuasion 
are methodical ways to persuade someone.”) In short, it does not seem 
that Rapp has Aristotle’s argument correct here. There is no indication 
that the assertion at a13 is made on the basis of the claims about technai  
32 Rapp [2002] ad loc, vol II p.40
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at a8 or a9-11. And, as we have seen, even if there was this would not 
give Aristotle a good argument.
Curiously,  Rapp’s  appears  to  be the only positive suggestion in the 
commentaries  about  how  Aristotle  might  have  substantiated  this 
claim.33
It seems to me preferable to think that Aristotle rests his claim at a13 on 
other  justifications,  which  will  be  examined  below.  Prior to  a13, 
however,  he  has  given  no  justification  for  the  substantive  and 
important claim that proofs, or proper grounds for conviction, alone 
belong to the expertise of rhetoric.
I  propose that Aristotle thinks that rhetoric is solely concerned with 
providing proper grounds for conviction because it’s right, morally and  
politically,  that  the  practice  of  rhetoric  be  restricted  to  providing  proper  
grounds for conviction. This has the exegetical advantage that much of 
the argumentation immediately after 1354a13 is devoted to establishing 
just this, namely that it is  right that rhetorical practice be restricted to 
something like the giving of good evidential reasons. The arguments 
focus on speaking in forensic contexts, and there, where factual claims 
are  at  issue,  it  seems  only  good  evidential  reasons  will  constitute 
proper grounds for conviction.
Still,  this  will  not  be  enough  on  its  own  to  justify  the  view  that 
practices  that  violate  such restrictions  are not exercises  of  rhetorical 
expertise at all. At best, such arguments will show that these are uses of 
rhetorical  expertise  that  one  has  good  reason  to  avoid.  This  is 
33Despite Grimaldi’s careful distinctions between senses of pistis, ([1972] ch2), even he 
misses this issue entirely. Cope ([1877] ad loc.) has nothing on this point.
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important because of how Aristotle’s argument fits together. He argues 
that because his predecessors have given instruction mainly about how 
to speak irrelevantly, they have thereby delivered little or nothing of 
the art  of rhetoric  itself.  If  his  argument is  merely  that  morally one 
shouldn’t use irrelevant speaking, this will not support his case. For it 
would  be  open  to  those  he  is  criticising  to  concede  that  there  was 
something objectionable about this kind of  deployment of  rhetorical 
expertise, whilst maintaining (plausibly) that it was nevertheless still a 
deployment of rhetorical expertise.34
The next chapter will investigate in detail the arguments that Aristotle 
advances to support the claim that we have identified here as playing 
such a pivotal role in his arguments criticising the handbook writers. 
The aim of this chapter has been to show simply that Aristotle does 
indeed claim that it is only producing proofs that belongs to rhetorical 
expertise, and that “proofs” here should be understood normatively as 
‘proper grounds for conviction’. Further, it has been important to show 
that  this  claim  represented  a  very  distinctive  and  controversial 
conception of the nature of rhetoric, a conception which therefore calls 
for supporting argumentation.
Finally, in this chapter, we hope to demonstrate that the next argument 
Aristotle advances against the handbook writers  (1354a18-21) is  best 
interpreted  as  showing  that  if  something  is  a  genuine  exercise  of 
rhetorical  expertise,  it  should not be generically barred by the state. 
This corroborates our claim that Aristotle’s view of rhetoric is such that 
there are normative constraints on what will count as an exercise of 
this expertise and what will not.
34 Indeed, just such a point is part of what Gorgias appears to contend in Plato’s 
Gorgias 456c6-457c3.
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1354a18-21  follows  on  from  the  last  argument  explained  above:35 
speaking irrelevantly to the issue doesn’t count as giving proof, and 
hence doesn’t  count as exercising rhetoric.  Aristotle appears to back 
this up with an argument from the laws of well-ordered states.
The  result  is  that  if  all  judgements  were  conducted  the  way  they  
actually are today in a mere handful of cities – principally those that  
are  well-governed – they would  have  nothing to  say.  For  everyone  
thinks that this should be what the laws declare, whereas [only] some  
actually implement this and forbid speaking outside the issue, as they 
also do in the Areopagus, and they are quite correct to have this rule.  
(1354a18-24)
On one possible interpretation, the argument is a repetition of his claim 
that  the  handbook  writers’  techniques  are  for  speaking  outside  the 
issue, and a pointed observation of a consequence of it. On this view, 
Aristotle  offers  this  thought-experiment  simply  as  a  vivid  way  of 
pressing  his  claim  that  the  handbook  writers’  techniques  were  for 
irrelevant  speaking.  He  invites  us  to  imagine  places  like  the 
Areopagus, where speeches are governed by strict rules, and then to 
realise that in such situations the handbook writers would be left with 
nothing to say. Since this would be well-explained if their techniques 
are for irrelevant  speaking, this  thought-experiment  lends abductive 
support to his claim that their techniques are for speaking “outside the 
issue”.
35The interpretation of a16-18 will be considered in detail below, particularly in 
chapter 4.
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However, if this is his argument, it adds nothing to insist that it is right  
for  irrelevant  speaking  to  be  barred,  or  to  add that  the  contexts  in 
which irrelevance is barred are the well-regulated contexts. If Aristotle 
had  intended  this  passage  simply  as  abductive  confirmation  of  his 
claim about  the irrelevance  of  the handbook writers’  techniques,  he 
surely would not have been at such pains to bolster the argument in 
the way he actually does. Indeed, he is at great pains to emphasise that 
it is in states with good  laws (a20) that such a situation would obtain, 
that all agree that the laws should be that way (a21f), that they are thus 
in that paragon of  eunomia, the Areopagus (a23),36 that all are  right to 
think that the laws should be this way (a23f), and that one  should not 
use  irrelevant  techniques  to  corrupt  the  judge  (a24).  He  seems  to 
consider  it  important  to  offer  further  justification for  his  contention 
that it is in  well-regulated contexts that irrelevant speaking is barred 
(hence “γάρ” at a21 and a24). If this passage is nothing more than a 
pointed repetition of the claim that the handbook writers’ techniques 
were for irrelevant speaking, then it remains a mystery why so much of 
the text of this section is taken up with something that is not required 
to  support  this  point  –  namely,  the  insistence  on  the  correctness of 
prohibiting irrelevant appeals. That the handbook writers would be left 
with nothing to say if irrelevant speaking were prohibited will be true 
whether or not it is correct to prohibit irrelevant speaking.
Another  possible  interpretation  is  that  this  passage  sets  out  the 
conditions that are a pre-requisite “for rhetoric to be practised in the 
proper  way”.37 The  idea  has  proved  popular  that  Aristotle  here  is 
laying out a set of high ideals (either for the exercise of rhetoric or for 
the  conditions  of  its  exercise),  for  which  orator  or  lawgiver  should 
36See further below n.55.
37Schütrumpf [1994] 106.
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strive,  but that will inevitably be compromised and tempered in the 
actual business of public speaking in real-world situations.38
This  view  is,  however,  quite  problematic.  It  typically  has  difficulty 
showing  how  this  passage  is  connected  with  its  context,  and  in 
particular  with the sections immediately  prior which argue that  the 
handbook writers have set out next to nothing about rhetoric. It also 
has difficulty making 1354a18ff. a telling criticism of Aristotle’s rivals. 
It seems scarcely a devastating criticism that their techniques would be 
barred in an ideal state – they would probably agree! Nor is it a serious 
objection to their methods that they were for “realistic” rhetoric rather 
than  “ideal”  rhetoric,  or  that  rhetoric  as  they  conceived  it  was  a 
concession to the difficult realities of political and forensic life. Finally, 
this view faces the challenge of providing a satisfying explanation of 
why Aristotle should break off from his argument to speculate about 
what the exercise of rhetoric would be like in an ideal state.
Nevertheless,  the  unattractiveness  of  this  view  is  probably  best 
brought  out  by  showing  that  a  more  attractive  interpretation  is 
available. Aristotle here is not concerned with applying ideals  to  the 
exercise of rhetoric, nor to the conditions for its exercise. His thought 
38One form of this view involves distinguishing in Aristotle two contrasting views – 
an ideal view in I.1 and a realistic view elsewhere; cf. Sprute [1994] 119, who sees in I.
1 an “ideal rhetoric”, and he describes this section as constituting “a recommendation 
to lawgivers”; Engberg-Pedersen [1996] “austere” vs. “normal” rhetoric; Schütrumpf 
([1994] 115) contrasts the rhetoric of I.1, rhetoric “in its most valuable form”, with that 
described elsewhere in the work, “rhetoric as it is practised”. Engberg-Pedersen’s 
view is harder to categorise, because he seems to see that I.1 aims to show the nature 
of rhetoric, rather than ideals that apply to it. Likewise, Sprute sees that for Aristotle 
the idealised conditions envisaged in this passage of I.1 help to show what is essential 
to rhetoric generally, though he does not explain how.
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experiment  here  is  supposed  to  shed  light  not  on  what  the  ideal 
conditions are for practising rhetoric, nor on how it would be practised 
by a  morally  uncompromising practitioner,  but  on what  rhetoric  is. 
And in doing so, it helps to show that, for all their efforts in the name 
of rhetoric,  the handbook writers  have failed to elucidate it.  That is, 
a18-21 is a further argument for the conclusion at a11-13. The fact that 
they would have nothing to say in well-governed conditions shows 
that their techniques are not techniques  of rhetoric. Aristotle does not 
here  criticise  the  handbook  writers  for  setting  out  techniques  for 
exercising rhetoric in a morally (or otherwise) objectionable way. He 
criticises  them for  the fact  that  their  techniques  fail  to  constitute  an 
expertise in rhetoric at all. Aristotle may be concerned elsewhere with 
how  one  should  exercise  rhetorical  skill  responsibly  rather  than 
irresponsibly.39 But that is not his concern here. He is concerned here 
not with normative considerations,  external  to the nature of rhetoric, 
that apply  to it;  but rather with normative considerations, internal to 
the  nature  of  rhetoric,  violation  of  which  undermines  an  activity’s 
claim to be an exercise of rhetorical expertise at all.40
The  passage,  I  contend,  supplies  a  further  argument  for  Aristotle’s 
main  conclusion  in  these  opening  pages  of  the  Rhetoric,  that  the 
handbook writers have scarcely touched the art of rhetoric at all. The 
argument might be spelled out as follows.
1. If  the  handbook  writers’  techniques  were  for  exercising 
rhetorical  expertise,  then  they  would  not  be  such  as  to  be 
prohibited in a well-ordered state. (premise implicit)
39e.g. 1355a31.
40Pace Sprute [1994] 122-3.
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2. But they are such as to be prohibited in a well-ordered state. 
(1354a18-21)
3. Therefore (from 1 and 2), it is not the case that the handbook 
writers’  techniques  are  for  exercising  rhetorical  expertise.  (cf. 
a11-13)
Of course, the first premise is controversial. And yet, if Aristotle is able 
to  trade  on  such  an  assumption  it  is  immediately  clear  how  the 
argument represents a cogent and powerful criticism of the handbook 
writers. We will see in the next chapter how this unstated premise fits 
into an outlook plausibly shared by both Aristotle and his audience, 
and will suggest some reasons why even those Aristotle is criticising 
may have had difficulty denying it.  One obvious way in which one 
might  assent  to  this  first  premise  is  if  one  supposed  that  speech-
making was vital to the good functioning of a state, and rhetoric was 
simply a skill for doing this well (whatever that skill might turn out to 
consist in). On such a view, it would simply be inconceivable that a 
state  with  the  right kind  of  laws  would  prohibit  techniques  that 
enabled the excellent discharging of a vital public function. 
We  will  need  to  say  much  more  about  the  link  between  public 
speaking and good governance, and between their related expertises of 
rhetoric  and  ‘politikê’.  Here,  however,  let  us  merely  observe  the 
advantages  of  construing the argument  as  above.  It  makes sense of 
how the argument fits  into the criticism of the handbook writers.  It 
makes sense of why Aristotle is at such pains to justify his claim that it 
is  in  those  states  especially  that  are  well-ordered  (malista  tais  
eunomoumenais a20) that the rules apply that would put the handbook 
writers’  techniques in difficulty.  Hence it makes sense of the precise 
position in which we find these remarks, in a way that is hard to make 
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out on alternative interpretations. So, given these advantages, we note 
that this way of construing the argument involves supposing that it is  
in the nature of rhetorical expertise itself that its techniques comply with 
an insistence on relevant speaking that any well-ordered state should 
have. Complying with these particular normative requirements is built 
into the very nature of  rhetoric  itself,  such that  if  you are speaking 
irrelevantly, you simply cannot be exercising rhetorical expertise.
We have claimed, then, that there is a nest of arguments ranged against 
the handbook writers, all of which require for their interpretation that 
we  attribute  to  Aristotle  an  understanding  of  rhetoric  that  has 
significant normative content. Only the presentation of proper grounds 
for  conviction  counts  as  exercising  the  expertise.  This  is  stated  at 
1354a13  and  forms  the  basis  for  the  two  arguments  immediately 
following. And rhetorical expertise has a nature such that it is simply 
impossible  that  exercising  it  would  be  prohibited  by  correctly-
formulated laws. That using the handbook writers’ techniques would 
be utterly ruled out by such laws (1354a18-21) adds a further reason for 
concluding that they have – for all their efforts – told us nothing much 
about rhetoric. (1354a11-13)
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Chapter  2  –  Why  only  proper  grounds  for 
conviction belong to rhetoric.
In the last chapter, we highlighted a claim that seems to be a pivotal 
premise in Aristotle’s arguments in the opening chapter of the Rhetoric.
Only proofs [i.e. proper grounds for conviction] belong to the expertise  
[of rhetoric]. 1354a13.
On  this  basis,  Aristotle  argues  (a14-15)  that  to  neglect  expertise  in 
enthymemes  is  to  neglect  a  key  element  in  rhetorical  expertise. 
Similarly,  he  argues  (a15-18)  that  providing  techniques  in  speaking 
irrelevantly to the subject at hand does not amount to provision of any 
part  of  rhetorical  expertise.  He  bolsters  this  latter  argument  with  a 
thought  experiment  (a18-21)  about  how  the  advocates  of  such 
techniques would fare if every judicial context had – as properly every 
such  context  should –  a  prohibition on irrelevant  speaking.  But  the 
thought experiment itself seems to presuppose an equally surprising 
claim – equally surprising to us, at least. That is as follows.
Rhetorical expertise has a nature such that it is simply impossible that  
exercising it would be prohibited by correctly-formulated laws.
Whilst perhaps to us, these two claims seem equally unobvious and in 
need of arguments to  support  them, in  Rhetoric I.1,  they are treated 
rather  differently  from each  other.  From 1354a11  to  1355a20,  as  his 
summary at 1355a19-20 makes clear, his chief concern is to criticise the 
views  of  the  handbook  writers.  But  it  is  important  to  see  that  he 
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pursues this in such a way as also to justify his own view. He is clearly 
aware that it has not been enough simply to assert that “the proofs are 
the  only  thing  that  belong  to  the  expertise”  (1354a13),  he  needs  to 
argue for this. And by 1355a3, he considers this to have been achieved:
Since it is evident that the method belonging to the expertise has to do  
with  proofs (or proper grounds for conviction) ... (1355a3-4).
By  this  point,  Aristotle  considers  that  his  arguments  against  the 
handbook writers  have vindicated the first  claim: that rhetoric  is  an 
expertise in presenting proper grounds for conviction.
On the other hand, there is no indication that Aristotle is concerned to 
mount a defence of the second claim. He simply considers it obvious 
that  exercising rhetorical  expertise  could not fall  foul  of  a  correctly-
formulated law.
In what follows, we shall be examine how the arguments against the 
handbook writers work, and hence how they serve to justify Aristotle’s 
own view of rhetoric expressed in the first of the two claims above. The 
appeal of these arguments, as we shall see, is partly dialectical, where 
those with a  different  view of  rhetoric,  particularly   Thrasymachus, 
would be committed to the arguments’ premises.  But their appeal is 
also  based  on  a  highly  plausible  view  of  the  role  of  rhetoric  in  a 
successfully  functioning state.  We have seen indications that  such a 
view plays a crucial  role in Aristotle’s  arguments at the start of the 
Rhetoric. It will be an important concern of this chapter to show how 
such a view is adhered to throughout the Rhetoric. We will note that it 
is  consistent  also  with  some important  remarks  in  the  Nicomachean  
Ethics. Furthermore, such a view will be argued to be highly plausible. 
On this view of rhetoric’s role in the state, Aristotle does not need to 
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defend his assumption that rhetoric is such that its exercise could not 
be  prohibited  by  correctly-formulated  laws  (the  second  of  the  two 
claims  highlighted  above).  He  does  not  consider  that  it  requires  a 
defence, and I shall attempt to show that it is at least plausible that he 
is right.
So, as Aristotle sees it, the second claim set out above – crucial to his 
case but assumed unstated – does not require defending, but the first 
claim  –  explicit  at  1354a13-14  –  does.  Aristotle’s  arguments  from 
1354a13 to a21 against the handbook writers are devastating if they go 
through. I wish to suggest that having outlined his key arguments, he 
returns precisely to the task of justifying some key elements on which 
they depended. This occupies him from 1354a21 to 1354b16.
We  have  suggested  that  Aristotle’s  arguments  rely  on  unstated 
premises about the relationship between the proper functioning of the 
state and the nature of rhetoric. Let us therefore consider a sketch of 
this view that,  I claim, Aristotle assumes. It  is  a view very different 
from our own understanding of rhetoric. Frustratingly, his view of the 
relationship between rhetoric and the state is something he never sets 
out explicitly.  This might raise a worry about whether it is justified to 
attribute  such  views  to  Aristotle.  We  will  attempt  to  answer  these 
worries.  Firstly,  some  remarks  in  the  Nicomachean  Ethics show  that 
Aristotle saw an important connection between rhetoric and political 
expertise. However, these remarks fall short of asserting the stronger 
connection between rhetoric  and the proper functioning of  the  polis  
that his arguments in the Rhetoric require. Evidence for this is found in 
the Rhetoric itself. Secondly, therefore, we will show that Aristotle’s use 
of  some key pieces  of  terminology in the  Rhetoric seems to support 
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ascribing  to  him  the  views  sketched  here.  Thirdly,  and  most 
importantly, these views are needed to make sense of some of his key 
passages of argument. The fourth strategy is to show how the views 
attributed to Aristotle  about rhetoric  and the state cohere well  with 
what he says in the Rhetoric and elsewhere about the function and goal 
of rhetoric. 
A  sketch  of  Aristotle’s  view  of  the  relationship  between  rhetorical 
expertise and the proper functioning of the state.
States – plausibly all states, but certainly the Greek poleis of Aristotle’s 
day  –  need  orators  (public  speakers).  This  is  because  in  order  to 
function well it is necessary for citizens to confer, deliberate and come 
to  decisions.  This  includes  deciding  on  laws  and  state  policy,  and 
coming to verdicts in the lawcourts. For citizens to make judgements 
about the merits of courses of action, or of each side’s case in a law suit, 
the case for each of these has to be made. 
Rhetoric,  then,  is  an expertise  in  discharging public  speaking 
roles  in  the  state  –  specifically,  it  is  an  expertise  in  helping 
citizens to arrive at good publicly-deliberated judgements,41 by 
making  the  case  one  way  or  another  in  relation  to  some 
41 Reflection on what the technê of rhetoric serves to produce is suggested right at the 
start of the Rhetoric, when Aristotle says that, “as all would agree”, an expertise 
should account for non-accidental success (epitunchanousin 1354a9). But success in 
what? What exactly is the product whose successful production will be accounted for 
by this expertise? Aristotle’s answer seems to be that it is good publicly-deliberated 
judgements by citizens. Aristotle eventually says this explicitly at 1358b1-2, with the 
whole of I.3 devoted to explaining how this works in each kind of rhetoric. More 
briefly, at II.1, 1377b20-21, he says, “rhetoric is for the sake of a judgement (heneka  
kriseôs).” Cf. also I.2, 1357a1-2 where rhetoric’s function is discharged only in relation 
to things that are the objects of deliberation.
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proposal,42 so  that  a  judgement  can  be  made as  to  its  merits 
(often in comparison with the merits of some rival proposal).
If this view is correct, it suggests a basis for thinking that a genuine 
exercise  of  rhetoric  could  not  be  something  that  the  laws  should 
prohibit. This view of the relationship between rhetoric and the state 
could serve to underpin the unstated assumption in the argument at 
1354a18-21, highlighted at the end of the previous chapter.  The way 
this works is as follows. If the laws aim at the well-being of the state 
and its citizens then they should not prohibit anything that is necessary 
to  public  goods  like  the  well-being  of  the  state  and  its  citizens 
(certainly not insofar as it is necessary to these). Arguably the making 
of  good  judgements  by  citizens  in  roles  such  as  juror  (dicast)  and 
assemblyman (ecclesiast)  is  necessary to  the well-being of  state  and 
citizens in this way. Similarly, the laws should not prohibit anything 
that conduces either to public goods like the well-being of the state and 
its citizens or to something necessary for such well-being. If it is correct 
to think of rhetoric as an expertise in enabling good judgements, then 
exercises  of  rhetoric  are  of  this  kind.  The  laws  should  not  prohibit 
them.43
42“Demonstrating the matter, that it is or is not the case, that it happened or did not 
happen.” 1354a27-28.
43 The use of the Areopagus as an example (1354a23) recalls the role of persuasion and 
good laws in Aeschylus’ Eumenides. The prominence there of both persuasion (829, 
885-6, 968-75; cf. earlier Agamemnon 385ff.) and the rule of law in good civic 
governance (482-89, 681-710), in the way Orestes’ situation is resolved through the 
establishment of the Areopagus court, suggests that these features are seen not as 
conflicting but as interrelated. That is, persuasion is not at odds with good civic 
governance, but crucial to it.
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So, Aristotle’s strategy in the arguments from 1354a18 to 1354b22 is to 
make  clear  exactly  what  rhetoric’s  proper  role  in  the  state  is.  To 
uncover this role just is to uncover the nature of rhetoric. And to grasp 
the nature of rhetoric is to have the basis for knowing what activities 
will  and  will  not  count  as  exercises  of  this  expertise.  This  line  of 
reasoning can then be used to devastating effect against those offering 
rival accounts of the techniques of rhetoric. Indeed, this is exactly what 
we  find  in  the  passages  leading  up  to  the  double  conclusion  at 
1354b16-22. The argument may be sketched as follows. First, rhetorical 
skill in making the case for a particular view is supposed to assist in 
the production of good public judgements: once it is clear what kind of 
subject matter these judgements have, it is immediately obvious that 
the handbook writers’ techniques cannot possibly serve this purpose, 
since the techniques they set out do not even involve addressing this 
subject matter (b16-21). Secondly, it is obvious that putting a case to an 
audience of citizens with a view to good public judgements is a matter 
of producing proper grounds for conviction, and that this will centrally 
involve skill in enthymemes (b20-22). The complete absence of these 
skills from the “technai” of these writers constitutes a failure to identify 
and describe the art of rhetoric.
This should suffice as a sketch of Aristotle’s overall position and of his 
main lines of argument. We will see that this is consistent with some 
much  weaker  remarks  in  the  Nicomachean  Ethics.  But  the  principle 
grounds  for  supposing  this  to  be  Aristotle’s  view  are  from  three 
sources: his handling of some key terminology,  a detailed examination 
of  the  arguments  of  Rhetoric  I.1,  and   his  views  elsewhere  in  the 
Rhetoric.
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Aristotle’s Teleological View of Rhetoric in the  Nicomachean Ethics  
At the start of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explains how certain 
activities  and  forms  of  expertise  fall  “under”  a  larger  activity  or 
expertise, such that the goal of the first is pursued for the sake of the 
goal of the second larger (more “architectonic”) activity or expertise. 
The expertise of bridle-making aims at making good bridles, but since 
this is a case where bridle-making comes “under” a larger expertise, 
horsemanship, this end – good bridles – is itself desirable for the sake 
of the purpose of the larger activity, i.e. riding horses.44 Aristotle goes 
on to suggest that we see just this hierarchy of expertises in relation to 
political expertise, indeed that political expertise has all45 activities and 
forms of expertise under it – specifically including rhetoric.
If so, then one must try to grasp it [what is good and best] at least in  
outline,  that  is,  what  it  might  be,  and  to  which  sort  of  expertise  or  
productive  capacity  it  belongs.  It  would  seem  to  belong  to  the  most  
sovereign, i.e. the most ‘architectonic’. Political expertise appears to be like  
this, for it is this expertise that sets out which of the expertises there needs  
to be in cities, and what sorts of  expertise each group of  people should  
learn, and up to what point; and we see even the most prestigious of the  
productive capacities falling under it, for example generalship, household  
management, rhetoric; and since it makes use of the practical expertises  
that remain, and furthermore legislates about what one must do and what  
things one must abstain from doing, the end of this expertise will contain  
those of the rest; so that this end will be the human good. (Nicomachean  
Ethics I.1.1094a24-b7)
44 EN I.1.1094a9-16.
45 If, against Bywater, “πρακτικαῖς” is retained at 1094b4, then Aristotle may intend a 
restriction of the scope of this claim. 
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It seems clear that in the  Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle sees rhetoric as 
falling – like the other technai – under political expertise. Thus, the aim 
of rhetoric is choiceworthy for the sake of the aim of political expertise, 
namely the human good.46 If his view of rhetoric is unchanged between 
the Rhetoric and the Nicomachean Ethics, then it is clear that Aristotle has 
here part of the basis for the kinds of arguments we have been looking 
at in  Rhetoric  I.1.  If  rhetoric’s aim is choiceworthy ultimately for the 
sake of the human good, and if this is the aim of political expertise, 
then it is clear that anything that was a genuine exercise of rhetorical 
expertise  would  make  some  contribution  towards  a  good  that  was 
choiceworthy  for  the  sake  of  the  overall  human  good,  and  hence 
recognised as valuable by political  expertise.  Thus,  according to the 
Nicomachean  Ethics,  rhetoric  aims  at  some  good.47 Clearly,  also,  an 
activity that was prohibited by the exercise of political expertise (for 
example, by correct laws) because it made no contribution to any goal 
recognised as valuable by political expertise, could not be an exercise 
of rhetoric or of any other genuine expertise. Nevertheless, this still is 
some way from the kind of claim we need in the  Rhetoric. For all we 
have seen from the Nicomachean Ethics, rhetoric might aim at personal 
gain for the speaker – this being, of course, some good. And it might be 
that there are types of activity that are genuine exercises  of rhetoric 
(and aim at rhetoric’s good goal) which nevertheless are consistently 
prohibited by correct  laws because activities of that type have some 
disadvantage  that  outweighs  the  fact  that  the  activity  promotes 
rhetoric’s  good  goal.  To  this  extent,  what  is  said  explicitly  in  this 
46Rhetoric coming under politikê also means that it would be a matter of expertise in 
the latter to establish when and where rhetoric should and should not be practised, 
who should learn it, and to what extent, etc..
47 This, of course, was already entailed by the very first sentence of the Nicomachean  
Ethics. 1094a1-2.
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passage does not commit Aristotle to the position we need to attribute 
to him in the first chapter of the Rhetoric. Rhetoric’s goal need only be 
some good recognised by political expertise – and this seems to leave 
the field still  wide open to the kinds of goals envisaged by Gorgias, 
Thrasymachus and others. This is as much as the explicit argument of 
the passage seems to require. Rhetoric’s goal need not be the successful 
discharge  of  a  role  in the state,  enabling citizens  engaged in public 
deliberations to come to well-formed judgements.
And yet, although he does not specify here what he thinks rhetoric’s 
choiceworthy goal is,48 we have a hint of what Aristotle’s view is. He 
lists rhetoric amongst the “most prestigious” (1094b3) of the capacities 
alongside generalship and household management. The point seems to 
be that the most likely alternative candidates for being the science of 
the  human  good49 are  themselves  subordinate  to  politikê,  hence  the 
latter has a better claim to be the science to which the human good 
belongs. This certainly hints at a view of rhetoric’s goal that is closer to 
the one sketched above, than to that of Gorgias and Thrasymachus.
So,  rhetoric  in the  Nicomachean Ethics  aims at  a  good recognised by 
political expertise, and at one which makes rhetoric among the “most 
prestigious” of capacities.
48 Aristotle does specify rhetoric’s goal at EN III.3, 1112b14 as to persuade (“an orator 
does not deliberate about [his goal, namely] whether to persuade”), but this tells us 
nothing about how he understands the nature of persuasion, nor what it is about it 
that makes it choiceworthy.
49That some saw rhetoric this way is perhaps suggested also by Aristotle’s remark at 
Rhetoric I.2, 1356a27-30 about those who, for various reasons, mistakenly practise 
rhetoric in place of ‘politikê’.
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Aristotle’s View of Rhetoric – some philological considerations.
In the view sketched above, Aristotle’s distinctive view of rhetoric is 
that it is entirely a matter of providing proper grounds for conviction. 
This  view  is  justified  by  reference  to  wider  questions  of  how  the 
exercise of rhetoric, the practice of oratory, fits into the state as a whole.
Attributing to Aristotle this view both of what is involved in exercising 
rhetorical  expertise,  and  of  rhetoric’s  wider  relationship  with  the 
functioning of the state, finds corroboration in some striking features of 
the language he uses in the Rhetoric to set out his position.
Firstly, English translators of the  Rhetoric  tend to translate both peithô 
and pistis and their cognates with the English word “persuasion” and 
its  cognates  (pistis is  sometimes  translated  “means  of  persuasion”). 
This  masks  the  fact  that  the  two  words  have  very  different 
connotations and Aristotle seems to be very careful how he uses them. 
In  particular,  he  carefully  gives  prominence  in  his  definitions  of 
rhetoric, and his early arguments establishing what rhetoric is, to pistis, 
whereas cognates of  peithô do not appear in connection with rhetoric 
until  1355a30.50 This  is  particularly  surprising  given  how  closely 
connected in the minds of Aristotle’s audience the expertise of rhetoric 
would be with both peithô and peithein.51 Persuasion would simply be 
the natural concept for Aristotle to deploy to elucidate the nature of 
50 Πεῖσαι at 1355a25 appears to refer to teaching, not to rhetoric.
51 cf. 1355b10 where Aristotle goes out of his way to clarify that rhetoric’s task is not 
“to persuade”: he is surely right to think that this needs saying, indeed it would be a 
very natural thing for his audience to suppose that rhetoric’s task was precisely to 
persuade. cf. also, for example, EN III.3, 1112b14; Plato Gorgias 452e-453a; Phaedrus  
270b8, 271b4f..
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rhetoric. Despite this, Aristotle prefers pistis initially, and for very good 
reason. He wants to insist that rhetoric consists in the presentation of 
proper grounds for conviction, as we have seen, and  pistis expresses 
this much better than peithô does. Pistis means something that someone 
can rely on, a basis for trust. It has a financial usage, meaning a deposit 
or a pledge, something that offers some good grounds for trusting that 
a contract will be kept.52 It does not have a pejorative usage, in the way 
that  peithein certainly does.53 It  is  for these reasons that “proof” is  a 
much closer translation than “means of persuasion”, since it implies 
good  grounds  for  belief,  rather  than  merely  any  verbal  means  of 
getting someone’s beliefs changed. “Proof” is misleading to the extent 
that it has a factive implication – in English, someone who has proof 
has knowledge, and it cannot turn out that they are wrong after all. 
Whereas in Greek, you can have plenty of pisteis and still turn out to be 
mistaken,  in  just  the  same way that  someone may offer  a  financial 
deposit or pledge, yet still renege on a contract. With this reservation, 
“proofs”  seems an acceptable  English translation,  though the rather 
inelegant  “proper  grounds  for  conviction”  is  more  accurate.  More 
importantly,  Aristotle’s  avoidance  of  peithô and his  repeated  use  of 
pistis as he sets out his view of the nature of rhetoric signals a very 
significant feature of this view. That is that rhetoric is an expertise not 
simply  in  changing  listeners’  minds,  but  in  giving  listeners  good  
grounds for being convinced of the speaker’s claims.
A second indication in this direction is the phrase ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος 
(“outside  the  issue”).  This  would  have  been  familiar  to  anyone 
concerned with rhetoric in the fifth and fourth centuries in Athens.54 It 
52 LSJ s.v. II.1.
53 LSJ s.v. A.II.
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related to both the role  of  the juror55 and the role of  the orator – a 
connection  that  we  will  see  is  crucial  to  Aristotle’s  own  view.  As 
Aristotle tells us, orators were forbidden to speak “outside the issue” 
in the Areopagus,56 and other well-governed places. He does not tell us 
(although it should come as no surprise to us to learn this once we’ve 
read 1354a31-b16) that as part of the Heliastic oath that jury members 
swore each year, they swore to judge defendants on the basis of the 
charge alone, i.e. not to be swayed by matters irrelevant to the charge.57 
We know that the phrase “ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος” was a familiar way of 
referring to this restriction.58 The history of this phrase, in particular its 
use in the orators, thus re-emphasises that this phrase means “outside 
54 Orators frequently insisted on their own scrupulousness about avoiding what was 
irrelevant using this very phrase, “outside the issue” (ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος). Often 
this was as part of a contrast with their opponents or with the general run of orators. 
Aeschines I.170.1-2; Demosthenes LVII.33, 63, 66; Isaeus Frag III.1.6; Lycurgus I.11, 13, 
149; Lysias III.46. Cf. Lanni [2005].
55We will use the English “juror” for the Greek dikastês. The point about how the 
speaker’s role is related to the role of those whose function it is to form a verdict is 
not, however, confined to forensic contexts. This is clear from Aristotle’s use of kritês 
and cognates (related to krisis, verdict) from 1354a32 to 1355a3 to cover both jurors 
and assemblymen. Note the explicit assertion at 1354b22f. that rhetoric itself is the 
same for both kinds of speaking. Cf. also 1358b1-59a6.
56 This is confirmed by Lysias himself in a speech before the Areopagus. Cf. Lysias III.
46.
57 The text of the Heliastic oath is apparently preserved verbatim at Demosthenes 
XXIV.149-151, including the following, “καὶ διαψηφιοῦμαι περὶ αὐτοῦ οὗ ἂν ἡ 
δίωξις ᾖ.” (For whatever the prosecution is being made, I will cast my vote in relation 
to that.). There is some debate about the authenticity of the entirety of what 
Demosthenes purports to quote, but doubts are focussed elsewhere than this 
particular clause, cf. Hansen [1991] 182-3, MacDowell [1986] 43-44.
58 Cf. Aeschines I.170 “τὰς ἔξωθεν τοῦ πράγματος ἀπολογίας μὴ προσδέχεσθε, 
πρῶτον μὲν τῶν ὅρκων ἕνεκα” (Do not accept their irrelevant defences, firstly 
because of your oaths …).
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the issue under consideration”, not “outside the business, i.e. the art, 
[of rhetoric]”, as Cope thought.59 So, we have here a phrase, crucial to 
Aristotle’s  argument,  that  was  already  regularly  used  in  ways  that 
linked the roles of orator and juror in relation to the proper subject 
matter for public speeches. We shall see that this way of linking orator 
and juror is very similar to the way Aristotle himself links them: what 
is not the proper business of the juror to consider cannot be the proper 
business of the orator to speak about. His use of this phrase evokes a 
line of reasoning already familiar to his audience.
The sketch above of Aristotle’s position can thus draw initial support 
from  some  key  terminology  from  Rhetoric I.1.  More  importantly, 
though, this position can be seen to underlie the individual arguments 
of this section. Establishing this requires close consideration of these 
passages.
The Areopagus Argument (1354a18-24)
The  result  is  that  if  all  judgements  were  conducted  the  way  they  
actually are today in a mere handful of cities – principally those that  
are  well-governed – they would  have  nothing to  say.  For  everyone  
thinks that this should be what the laws declare, whereas [only] some  
actually implement this and forbid speaking outside the issue, as they 
also do in the Areopagus, and they are quite correct to have this rule.  
(1354a18-24)
We suggested in the previous chapter that the form of this argument is 
as follows.
59 Cope [1867] 4. cf. Cooper [1999] 391.
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1. If  the  handbook  writers’  techniques  were  for  exercising 
rhetorical  expertise,  then  they  would  not  be  such  as  to  be 
prohibited in a well-ordered state. (premise implicit)
2. But they are such as to be prohibited in a well-ordered state. 
(1354a18-21)
3. Therefore (from 1 and 2), it is not the case that the handbook 
writers’  techniques  are  for  exercising  rhetorical  expertise. 
(1354a11-12)
If the general view of rhetoric attributed to Aristotle above is correct, 
we can see this as a kind of shorthand for the following.
1A.If  something  (e.g.  using  the  techniques  from  the  handbook 
writers’  technai) is a way of exercising the expertise of rhetoric, 
then  that  thing  contributes  to  producing  good  public 
judgements.
2A.If something contributes to producing good public judgements 
then that thing enables the state to run properly.
3A.If  something  enables  the  state  to  run  properly  then  the  laws 
should not prohibit that thing.
4A.(from  the  above)  If  something  is  a  way  of  exercising  the 
expertise  of  rhetoric,  then  the  laws  should  not  prohibit  that 
thing.
5A.But  the  laws  should  prohibit  using  the  handbook  writers’ 
techniques (1354a20-21 “they would have nothing to say”).
6A.Therefore  it  is  not  the  case  that  using  the  handbook writers’ 
techniques is a way of exercising the expertise of rhetoric.
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On  the  view sketched  above  of  rhetoric’s  purpose,  namely  helping 
citizens to make good public judgements, this argument starts to look 
more convincing.  Premise 1A is supplied by this view of rhetoric, and 
plausibly premises 2A and 3A are obvious. If we are right to attribute 
this view to Aristotle, and if this view is correct, then it is starting to 
seem as though he has a good argument showing the inexpertise of the 
handbook writers.
Still, the formulation of the premises is not quite adequate. Premise 3A 
seems suspect. For something might contribute to the well-being of the 
state and be the object of legitimate legal prohibition on other grounds. 
For example buying and owning foreign slaves would be legitimately 
prohibited as an injustice against those enslaved even if they enabled 
the state to run properly. So, we should reformulate the argument as 
follows.
1B. Insofar as something is a way of exercising the expertise of 
rhetoric,  to that  extent  that  thing contributes  to producing 
good public judgements.
2B. Insofar as something contributes to producing good public 
judgements, to that extent that thing enables the state to run 
properly.
3B. Insofar as something enables the state to run properly the 
laws should not prohibit that thing.
4B. Insofar as something is a way of exercising the expertise of 
rhetoric, the laws should not prohibit that thing.
5B. The  laws  should  prohibit  using  the  handbook  writers’ 
techniques (1354a20-21 “they would have nothing to say”).
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6B. Therefore it is not the case that using the handbook writers’ 
techniques  is  a  way of  exercising  the expertise  of  rhetoric 
(1354a11-13).
The problem is that on this more precise formulation of the first three 
premises,  although  3B  now  seems  true  and  4B  follows  from  what 
precedes,  the  inference  to  6B  is  not  legitimate.  Again  –  albeit  at  a 
different point in the argument – the possibility is left open that the 
handbook writers’  techniques are ways of exercising the expertise of 
rhetoric,  but  the  laws  should  prohibit  their  use  because  of  other 
features of these techniques than the features that make using them an 
exercise of rhetoric.
The point is especially important because, as we will see, at least one 
key  figure  in  the  handbook  writers’  tradition60 –  Thrasymachus  – 
although  unlikely  to  have  endorsed  premise  1B  and  Aristotle’s 
conception of  rhetoric  and its  aims,  would nevertheless  have found 
premise 4B difficult to deny. Moreover, since steps 1 to 4 of the above 
argument  are  not  stated  in  the  argument  at  a18-21,  but  are  our 
supposition  of  the  background,  it  would be  particularly  good if  4B 
were  a  premise  that  might  have  seemed  plausible  on  a  variety  of 
different conceptions of the nature of rhetoric, including especially that 
of Aristotle and of those who are targets of his criticism here. If 4B is 
acceptable in this way, then a valid inference to 6B would make for a 
very powerful argument against the handbook writers’ claims to have 
set  out  the  art.  So,  it  would  be  disappointing  if  the  above 
reconstruction  of  Aristotle’s  argument  were  correct,  and  this  final 
crucial inference failed.
60Chapter 4 below contains an extensive argument that he is among those in view in 
this passage.
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Furthermore,  even  if  this  suggested  dialectical  nuance  were  not 
present, on the above reconstruction Aristotle’s argument fails  even if  
he  is  granted  his  opening  premise about  the  nature  and  purpose  of 
rhetoric.
Can the argument be made good? I believe it can.
Aristotle  states  confidently  (1354a20-21)  that  under  a  proper 
prohibition of  irrelevant  speaking the handbook writers,  using their 
own techniques, would have nothing to say. This bold claim implies not 
merely  that  their  conception  of  rhetoric  disposes  them  towards 
techniques  that  carry  a  risk of  irrelevant  speaking.  Rather  the 
suggestion  seems  to  be  that  there  is  something  about  how  they 
envisage  rhetoric  itself,  and  hence  how  they  envisage  what  its 
techniques have in common, such that all of their techniques are sure to 
be prohibited by a properly-run state.
We may venture a conjecture as to what the view of rhetoric might be 
that Aristotle is attacking here. The view could well be one in which 
rhetoric gives the orator a power to bring about his desired verdict, 
whatever the merits  of  his  case,  in much the same way as a wrestler’s 
power  (or  a  magician’s)  is  not  dependent  on  whether  this  or  that 
opponent ought to be defeated. If this was the handbook writers’ view, 
then  clearly  the  effectiveness  of  their  techniques  needed  to  rely  on 
features other than the facts and evidence relevant to the issue at hand. 
And Aristotle explicitly says something very close to this at 1354a15f.: 
“they busy themselves predominantly with what is outside the issue at 
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hand.”61 It will be part of the burden of chapter 4 below to flesh out 
more  fully  what  these  techniques  might  have  been.  It  is  enough to 
notice here that techniques for bringing about conviction whatever the 
merits of your case must operate through causal mechanisms that are 
independent of (and hence invulnerable to) the particular facts of the 
issue  at  hand.  Two  conclusions  seem  to  follow.  Firstly,  since  their 
techniques were aimed to have this kind of effectiveness,  they were 
bound to involve speaking about things outside ‘the issue at  hand’. 
Secondly,  if  we are  right about  Aristotle’s  position here,  then those 
very  features  that  in  the  eyes  of  the  handbook  writers  make  their 
techniques  good  rhetoric,  are  precisely  the  features  that  Aristotle 
claims show that these techniques are not part of rhetoric at all.
If this is right, the reasoning at 1354a18-24 proceeds as follows. Steps 1 
to 4 are unstated,  but show how, given some plausible background 
assumptions (2C and 3C), 4C follows from 1C, i.e. from an Aristotelian 
view of rhetoric’s nature and purpose. We have noted that one might 
have other  reasons to  endorse 4C.  Hence the most crucial  steps  are 
from 4C to 9C. 
1C.Insofar  as  something  is  a  way  of  exercising  the  expertise  of 
rhetoric, to that extent that thing contributes to producing good 
public judgements.
2C.Insofar  as  something  contributes  to  producing  good  public 
judgements,  to  that  extent  that  thing enables  the state  to  run 
properly.
61We note the minor discrepancy between what Aristotle’s argument at 1354a18-21 
requires and what is asserted at a15f., regarding whether it was all or merely most of 
the handbook writers’ methods that involved speaking outside the issue at hand.
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3C.Insofar as something enables the state to run properly the laws 
should not prohibit that thing.
4C.(from 1C, 2C and 3C) Insofar as something is a way of exercising 
the expertise of rhetoric, the laws should not prohibit that thing.
5C.Insofar as using some speaking technique influences the listener 
irrespective of the merits of their case, the laws should prohibit 
the use of that technique. (“the laws should ... prohibit speaking 
outside the subject” 1354a21-4)
6C.All  of  the  speaking  techniques  of  the  handbook  writers  are 
techniques for influencing the listener irrespective of the merits 
of the speaker’s case. (background information about what the 
handbook writers taught, under the title “rhetoric”: ‘they busy 
themselves  predominantly  with  things  outside  the  subject’ 
1354a15f.)
7C.(from 5C and 6C) The laws should prohibit all of the speaking 
techniques  of  the handbook writers.  (1354a20-21 “they would 
have nothing to say”).
8C.(from 4C and 5C) Using speaking techniques that influence the 
listener irrespective of the merits of the case is not exercising the 
expertise of rhetoric.
9C.(from 6C and 8C) The handbook writers  have told us next to 
nothing about rhetoric. (1354a11-13).
The  position  we  propose  should  be  attributed  to  Aristotle  about 
rhetoric’s role in the state thus suggests a way in which what Aristotle 
says at 1354a18-24 fits together and contains a good argument for the 
claim that the handbook writers  have told us next to nothing about 
rhetoric (1354a11-13).
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Thrasymachus’ View of Rhetoric, and  Eunomia  
In  the  line  of  reasoning  we  have  been  considering  in  relation  to 
1354a18-24, arguably Aristotle’s own commitment to the background 
premises  1-4 stems from what he takes to  be deep truths about the 
nature  of  rhetoric  and  its  place  in  public  deliberation.  But  these 
commitments are not explicit  in the text,  and this  passage seems to 
appeal simply to an intuitive sense of the relationship between rhetoric 
and good governance, one that Aristotle is able to presuppose in his 
audience. 
However,  the  argument  at  1354a18-23  may  additionally  display  a 
clever dialectical nuance in how it engages with the position of those 
who are being criticised, the handbook writers themselves. The reason 
is that the apparently contentious key background premise is in fact 
one  that  the  handbook  writers  themselves  would  probably  have 
thought true.
If  the  handbook  writers’  techniques  are  for  exercising  rhetorical  
expertise,  then  they  are  not  be  such  as  to  be  prohibited  in  a  well-
ordered state. (premise implicit)
This premise needed to be construed (as in 4C above) in such a way as 
to combine with what Aristotle actually says:
“The  result  is  that  if  all  judgements  were  conducted  the  way they  
actually are today in a mere handful of cities – principally those that  
are well-governed (Gk. eunomoumenais) – they would have nothing  
to say.” (1354a18-21)
 to produce a cogent argument against his targets.
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These  premises  clearly  appeal  to  the  way  the  laws  should  be.  The 
Greek concept, deployed here at a20, for the laws’ being the way they 
should be is “eunomia”. This term, Aristotle elsewhere insists, refers to 
two  things,  the  correctness  of  the  laws  that  are  in  place,  and 
compliance with them by those within the state.62 In some hands, the 
concept had a somewhat conservative, anti-democratic flavour.63 But at 
1354a20 “eunomoumenais” simply seems to mean that it is in states that  
get their laws right that there is a prohibition on irrelevant speaking.64
We shall see in chapter 4 that there is a strong case that Thrasymachus 
and those  who saw themselves  as  heirs  to  his  view of  rhetoric  are 
among the writers of technai that Aristotle has in mind in this opening 
passage. Indeed they are perhaps his principal target. Thrasymachus 
would have been likely to  endorse a key premise of  this argument, 
even though his view of rhetoric, legality (νόμος) and of politics seems 
to have been very different from Aristotle’s. If so, then this argument 
from well-governed states has the dialectical subtlety of using premises 
acceptable not only to Aristotle and his audience but also to the targets 
of criticism themselves. Thrasymachus, fragment B7a,65 testifies to his 
having written  a  technê,  and ascribes  to  “Thrasymachus and several 
others”  the  claim  that  they  possessed  “such  arts  of  political  or 
rhetorical  speeches”,  and  interestingly  goes  on  to  criticise  them  for 
achieving nothing of the things of which they claimed to possess the 
technê.  What  is  important  for  our  case  here  is  the  close  association 
62Aristotle Politics 4.6, 1294a1ff.
63Demosthenes 24.139.
64This is why Aristotle appeals to a general view how “the laws should stand” (a21f.), 
and why such a formulation was preferred for premises 4C, 5C and 7C in the 
argument above.
65 DK 85B7a, Philodemus, Rhet II.49.
Chapter 2 – Why only proper grounds for conviction belong to rhetoric. page 59 of 272
between  rhetoric  and  politics.  Whilst  it  is  possible  that  this  phrase 
distinguishes two types of speeches, the most natural way to interpret 
it seems to me to be that it offers “political speeches” and “rhetorical 
speeches” as two different ways used by Thrasymachus and the others 
for referring (as they saw it) to the very same thing. Rhetoric to him is 
part of political expertise. If Thrasymachus’ view of political processes 
is like the view of laws and of justice ascribed to him in Plato’s Republic  
book  I,  then  it  might  run  something  like  this.  In  politics,  parties 
compete  for  power,  using  any  and  all  means  available  to  them. 
Rhetoric  is  one  way  of  doing  this.  Whoever  emerges  as  the  most 
powerful also appropriates other tools of power, including the notions 
“just”,  “lawful”  and  the  like.66 Political  expertise  would  amount  to 
simply a way of gaining power and getting your way in public affairs. 
On this basis, exercising rhetorical expertise might naturally be seen as 
exercising a skill which is part of a wider business of getting, wielding 
and retaining power in the state – i.e. exercising political expertise. So, 
if his view of  eunomia  is similar to his view of justice,67 then  eunomia 
will  always tell  in favour of those whose expertise  in politics  is  the 
greatest  –  the  winners  define  what  will  count  as  eunomia,  the 
manipulation of the concept itself is one of the tools of their expertise. 
So it would be very surprising if eunomia turned out to bar the exercise 
of some constituent of political expertise itself. The thought would be 
this: if you are having eunomia used against you, it must be that you are 
in a position of weakness, and have not yet fully exploited the tools of 
power, such as rhetoric. Genuine rhetoric, fully exercised, appropriates 
notions like  eunomia and uses them to its  own advantage, such that 
they will  never  be  in  conflict.  If  Thrasymachus held something like 
these  views,  then  it  is  easy  to  see  why he  would be  committed  to 
66 Here again I follow Chappell [1993], [2000], pace Everson [1998].
67 As is strongly suggested by Republic I.338d-339a.
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affirming the key background premise – i.e. that there could not be any 
conflict  between  eunomia and genuine  rhetorical  expertise.  Hence,  if 
Thrasymachus  wishes  to  resist  Aristotle’s  conclusion,  that  his 
techniques in irrelevant speaking are no part of rhetoric, then he must 
deny that correct laws would prohibit the exercise of these techniques.
If we have the unstated background premise of Aristotle’s argument 
right, then it looks as though this premise has the dialectical subtlety of 
being  acceptable  to  the  handbook  writers  in  the  tradition  of 
Thrasymachus. They will be committed to denying another premise, 
on pain of conceding that their techniques are not part of the expertise 
of  rhetoric.  If  they  were  unwilling  or  unable  to  deny  that  their 
techniques were for speaking outside the issue (perhaps this was too 
well-known to deny?  perhaps it  was  vital  to  their  position that  the 
effectiveness  of  their  techniques  did  not  depend  on  the  particular 
details  of  the  case?),  then they must  deny that  a  well-ordered  state 
would prohibit irrelevant speaking. Yet at this point Aristotle seems to 
be  at  his  strongest:  indeed  he  cites  universal  public  opinion  in  his 
support,  “everyone  thinks  that  this  should  be  what  the  laws 
declare” (a21-22). He also cites the practice of the Areopagus in favour 
of the view that it is  precisely in a  well-ordered state that irrelevant 
speaking would be prohibited. If the handbook writers wish to deny 
the second premise, then they are bound to deny that the Areopagus is 
an example of eunomia. Perhaps for them, no state would be any better 
ordered than any others, since in all, the powerful appropriate the laws 
and other  tools  of  power.  Or  perhaps it  is  tyrannies  that  are  better 
examples of eunomia than the Areopagus in Athens. On either of these 
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options,  the  view  is  rather  counter-intuitive  compared  to  the  view 
Aristotle appeals to here.68 
I  do not think that Aristotle’s primary aim is to engage dialectically 
with  those in this  Thrasymachean tradition,  as  he might  if  he were 
addressing  them directly  (which he is  not)  and hoping  to  convince 
them. In fact,  in stating his position and in criticising the handbook 
writers, many of his arguments proceed from premises that would not 
have been acceptable to those with a Thrasymachean view of rhetoric.69 
That said, it is a nice result if Aristotle’s argument is such that its force 
cannot be evaded even by those he is criticising. In this short argument 
(1354a18-24), he corroborates his main conclusion – that the handbook 
writers  have  told  us  nothing  much  about  rhetoric  –  in  a  thought-
experiment that makes appeal to assumptions that would have been 
shared  not  only  by  Aristotle  and his  audience,  but  by  those  in  the 
Thrasymachean tradition – the tradition (we claim) of the handbook 
writers.
The arguments that follow show how well Aristotle’s own framework 
makes sense of his claim that these writers had failed to shed light on 
the expertise of rhetoric.
Mini-Argument 1354a24-25
68 That the Areopagus is a paradigm of eunomia is suggested by its role in Aeschylus’ 
Eumenides as the place for the proper resolution of disputes by appeal to law. 
Additionally, there is considerable evidence that (even aside from the period around 
462 and Ephialtes’ reforms) the Areopagus was considered, as a court, a paradigm of 
just arrangements: Lysias 3.2; 6.14; Ober [1989] 141; MacDowell [1963]; Hansen [1991] 
295.
69 “Only the proofs belong to the expertise,” would be an obvious example (1354a13).
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There is, just after the argument from well-ordered states, a very short 
argument  that  deserves  examination  for  what  it  reveals  about 
Aristotle’s view of rhetoric. Strictly speaking, it seems to be more like a 
stage  in  a  more  extended  argument,  connecting  both  with  what 
precedes and with what follows. It is partly for this reason that it is 
important.
For everyone thinks that this is what the laws ought to urge [viz. that  
speakers not speak outside the subject at hand], while some actually  
put this into practice ... and they are right. For one ought not to warp  
the juror [Gk.  dikastên], leading him on to anger or resentment or  
pity.
The  focus  of  my  discussion  here,  what  I  am  calling  the  “mini-
argument”, is the last sentence just quoted. It comes after Aristotle’s 
appeal to public opinion and esteemed practice in support of his claim 
that  the  laws  should  prohibit  irrelevant  speaking  in  public 
deliberation. This mini-argument, then, introduced by “for”, purports 
to be a reason to think that public opinion and esteemed practice are 
right:  the laws should indeed prohibit  irrelevant  speaking in  public 
deliberation. The argument, I think, is simple and plausible and runs as 
follows.
1. You shouldn’t warp the juror. (1354a24f.)
2. Speaking irrelevantly is warping the juror. (implied)
3. (from 1 and 2) You shouldn’t speak irrelevantly. (implied)
This is some reason to think that:
4. The laws should prohibit speaking irrelevantly. (1354a21-24)
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Understood thus, I  think this fits  well  with what precedes.  And we 
would  expect  it  to  fit  equally  well  with  what  follows,  since 
immediately after the passage just quoted, we have a further argument 
(the  “Carpenter’s  Rule”  argument)  introduced  by  “for  ...”.  The 
Carpenter’s Rule argument ought to support the claim in the argument 
above, namely that you shouldn’t warp the juror.
The Carpenter’s Rule
In the sketch of Aristotle’s view of how rhetoric is related to the proper 
functioning of the state, we saw that Aristotle views the purpose of the 
orator  qua  orator70 as intimately related to the task of the juror. At I.
3.1358b1-2 (and throughout 1358b1-59a6) he will explicitly say that the 
orator’s  purpose  is  related  to  the  listener,  and  specifically  that  the 
orator’s purpose in each kind of rhetoric is given by what kind of thing 
it is on which the listener is trying to form a judgement. Naturally, this 
differs  between  forensic,  deliberative  and  epideictic  contexts.  For 
example, in a forensic case, the listener is judging whether such-and-
such  a  crime  was  or  was  not  committed  as  alleged:  the  speaker’s 
purpose will thus be the proper formation of that very judgement in the 
particular direction he is urging (which will depend on whether the 
speaker is prosecuting or defending). It is clear that on this view, the 
role of the orator is inextricably related to the role of the listener.
Furthermore, if oratory is about fulfilling a necessary and important 
role in the proper functioning of the state, this perhaps suggests that 
the orator’s role is ancillary to that of the listener. The orator’s role is to 
70That is, the speaker in the context of public deliberation, where rhetoric is the 
expertise relevant to their role. The situation in practice is complicated by the fact that 
in forensic contexts, often the speech would have been composed by someone other 
than the person delivering it.
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enable the listener to discharge his role successfully, and so play his 
part successfully in proper public deliberation and decision-making. 
If we take this to be Aristotle’s position, it may come as a surprise that 
he supports in the way he does his objection to warping the juror using 
emotion-arousing techniques.
For one shouldn’t warp the juror by bringing him into anger or envy  
or pity. For that would be like someone warping the ruler he is about  
to use. (1354a24-26)
Whereas Aristotle’s general position seemed to be that the role of the 
orator  is  ancillary  to  that  of  the  juror,  the  comparison  with  the 
carpenter’s ruler seems strongly to suggest the converse. The ruler is 
the  juror,  the  carpenter  is  the  orator  –  so  seemingly  the  juror  is  as 
ancillary to the orator’s purpose as the ruler is to the carpenter’s. We 
might be puzzled at this tension. Nevertheless,  this is surely not the 
point of the comparison. The suggestion of the simile is that warping 
the juror defeats the orator’s own purposes, just as warping his ruler 
defeats  the carpenter’s  purposes.  It  is best not to hang too much on 
whether there is some kind of priority to the role of orator or of juror. 
One can make sense of the passages by seeing the roles and purpose of 
each  as  interdependent.  The  jurors’  purpose  is  to  make  a  justified 
judgement  on the matter  in hand – for this  they need justifications, 
proofs, things that bear one way or the other on the matter in hand, 
and this is why the orator is useful to them – as a supplier of these 
things.  The  orator’s  purpose  is  that  the  jurors  form  a  justified 
judgement on the matter at hand, and that this judgement be the one 
he is urging! It will defeat this purpose if his approach prevents the 
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jurors from making a justified judgement at all. Crucially, however, if 
the jurors’ verdict is – as hoped – in the orator’s favour, this confirms 
the correctness of the orator’s position in just the same way that a ruler 
can confirm the straightness of the carpenter’s handiwork. A ruler is a 
cognitive  instrument;  it  tells  the  carpenter  something  about  his 
handiwork.  Similarly,  the  jurors’  verdict  is  germane  to  the  orator’s 
purpose,  confirming  the  correctness,  the  likely  truth  of  the  orator’s 
position. Even though a bent ruler or warped jurors can announce a 
verdict  of  a  kind,  such  a  verdict  has  lost  its  cognitive  value  as 
confirmation that joints are straight, or that the orator’s contention is 
correct.  The carpenter’s  rule simile suggests  that  the purpose of the 
orator is not just to get a particular verdict, but to get it in such a way 
as to validate the correctness of his position.
If  the  cognitive  competence  of  the  jurors  is  needed  to  achieve  the 
orator’s aim, then this illuminates both why “warping the juror” fails 
to  promote  that  aim,  and  also,  more  widely,  why  saying  anything 
outside the issue will fail to promote that aim.
This account – which seems a very natural way of making sense of this 
passage – involves supposing that the orator aims at a  properly-formed 
judgement in his favour, rather than just any judgement in his favour. 
This  might be thought contentious.  It  would hardly be agreed by a 
Gorgias or a Thrasymachus. On their view, rhetoric is about exercising 
power over others, and this can be achieved just as well regardless of 
whether  the  listener  is  “warped”  by  the  speaker.  Likewise,  if  one 
considers the kinds of motivations that many individual orators might 
actually  have  when  they  speak,  there  will  be  many  examples  of 
speakers whose purposes – winning, for example – would not be in 
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any way compromised by the listener’s being warped. Considered in 
relation to the purposes of the Thrasymachean or Gorgianic orator, or 
in relation to the various motivations that actual individuals have for 
public speaking, the point of the comparison seems shaky – these goals 
are not necessarily undermined by the warping of the listener.  Thus 
warping the listener often is simply  not like a carpenter warping his 
ruler  before using it.  By contrast,  on the view of  rhetoric  attributed 
above  to  Aristotle,  the  point  of  the  comparison  holds.  Rhetoric’s 
purpose in the state is to produce (or contribute to producing) justified 
judgements,  and  the  orator’s  purpose  in  any  particular  case  is  to 
produce a justified judgement. It certainly undermines  this purpose if 
the listener is warped by the speech. The fact that the comparison with 
the  carpenter’s  ruler  makes  very  natural  sense  on  our  proposed 
Aristotelian view of rhetoric, along with the fact that it makes much 
better sense on this view than on some obvious alternatives, serves to 
confirm this view. In short, the proposed view makes best sense of this 
argument.
Before  leaving  the  carpenter’s  rule  analogy  (1354a25f.),  we  should 
return to how it fits into the sequence of thought in  Rhetoric I.1. For 
there is a potential difficulty here. We saw that it purports to support 
the  claim  required  by  the  “mini-argument”  (a24-5)  preceding  it, 
namely that you shouldn’t warp the juror. The worry is that it appears 
to provide the wrong kind of support for the way in which this claim is 
used in the mini-argument. In the mini-argument, the claim that one 
should not warp the juror is proposed as a reason to have laws that 
prohibit  irrelevant  speaking.  But  the  claim  supported  by  the 
carpenter’s rule is not that one should not warp the juror, but rather 
that given the orator’s purposes, he should not warp the juror. If you have 
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those purposes, you shouldn’t warp the juror. It looks as though the 
carpenter’s rule comparison supports only a hypothetical imperative, 
but the mini-argument requires a categorical imperative.
Two  ways  of  resolving  this  suggest  themselves.  The  first,  and  my 
preferred option, is  to suppose that the mini-argument is  elliptically 
stated,  and that where Aristotle has said, “one should not warp the 
juror ...” (1354a24f.), this is simply short for “if one has such-and-such a 
purpose (the purpose that orators have), one should not warp the juror 
...”.  This  way,  the  mini-argument  is  properly  supported  by  the 
carpenter’s rule comparison. We then face the task of understanding 
how  such  a  hypothetical  imperative  could  serve  as  a  reason  for 
supposing that the laws are correct to forbid irrelevant speaking. But it 
is  not  impossible to conjecture how this  might be.  After  all,  on this 
interpretation, the “if ...” clause ought to be something so obvious it 
did not need stating. Some purpose, shared by orator and lawmakers, 
might relate to a basic concern for the proper functioning of courts. 
One such purpose that  would be frustrated by warping the juror  is 
avoiding  distorted  (or  improperly  formed)  judgements.  This  would 
make “if  one  wants  to  avoid  distorted  judgements,  one  should not 
warp the juror  ...”  a  reason for prohibiting irrelevant  speaking;  and 
furthermore  the  desire  to  avoid  distorted  judgements  might  be 
supposed to be sufficiently ubiquitous to be left unstated in the mini-
argument at a24f..
An  alternative  is  to  suppose  that  the  hypothetical  imperative 
supported  by  the  carpenter’s  rule  comparison  is  conditional  on  a 
purpose  that  any  citizen  ought  to  have.  If  this  were  the  case,  then  a 
hypothetical imperative of that kind would be a reason to accept an 
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equivalent  imperative  that  was  categorical.  Again,  the  proposed 
Aristotelian view of rhetoric  readily supplies  the conjecture that  the 
orator’s purpose on which the hypothetical imperative is conditional is 
to avoid distorted judgements.
Note that  the proposed view of  rhetoric  attributed here to  Aristotle 
offers these resources for removing a potential difficulty in Aristotle’s 
argument.  Without  our  proposed  close  connection  between  the 
purpose of rhetorical expertise and the good functioning of the state, 
this worry about Aristotle’s sequence of argument here will be more 
difficult to resolve.
The brief argument from the speaker’s role: 1354a26-31.
Moreover it is obvious that the job of the disputants is nothing beyond  
demonstrating the matter at hand – that it is the case or that it isn’t,  
that  it  has  happened or  that  it  hasn’t.  Whether  it  is  important  or  
trivial,  or  legal  or  illegal,  to  the  extent  that  the  legislator  has  not  
defined these things, surely the juror should find these things out for  
himself, not learn them from the disputants.
The argument  at  1354a26-31 fits  the  pattern  we have established.  It 
purports to be a corroborating reason (“Moreover ...” a26) supporting 
some claim made earlier in the passage. It is not completely obvious 
which claim, but the best candidate is probably the claim at a21-24 that 
it is rightly thought that the laws should prohibit irrelevant speaking. 
Whatever claim it supports, though, it expresses Aristotle’s view of the 
speaker’s  role  –  the  role  that  rhetorical  expertise  enables  him  to 
discharge  well.  Whereas  the  carpenter’s  rule  simile  looked  at  this 
through the eyes of the orator and his professional goals, this section 
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looks at the role of the speaker from the point of view of the state and 
its  citizens  generally.  What  is  the  speaker’s  role?  Why do  we have 
parties  speak  in  courts?  The  answer  is  that  they  have  a  valuable 
contribution to make in establishing the fact of the matter in dispute, 
but – as though to clarify – this does not extend to assisting in knowing 
its legality or its seriousness. Common to this and the carpenter’s rule 
passages  is  that  Aristotle  is  not  attempting  to  appeal  to  a  view  of 
rhetoric that would be accepted by those he is criticising. He started 
with something like that strategy in the thought experiment about the 
Areopagus,  and he is  now corroborating the picture by offering his 
own explanation.71 He is explaining, on his own terms, why it is that 
this is the case, and does so by substantiating his claim that they have 
told  us  nothing  about  how  rhetorical  expertise  helps  its  possessor 
successfully discharge the role of a speaker in contributing to public 
deliberation. Having told us that their techniques actually hinder the 
task of the speaker, he makes the related point that once one reflects 
more generally on the role of the speaker,  it is obvious (“φανερὸν” 
a27) that it  does not extend beyond helping the jurors to come to a 
verdict on the facts at issue.
As with the previous parts of this passage, I am claiming that it is hard 
to  make  sense  of  why  Aristotle  says  what  he  says  here  without 
supposing that he connects the nature of rhetorical expertise with the 
proper  functioning  of  the  state  in  the  way  I  have  suggested.  This 
becomes clear from reflection on how establishing something about the 
speaker’s role (a27) could warrant a conclusion about what the laws 
71 The transition occurs at a23-24, “they are right about this, for ...”: from that point, 
Aristotle is not trying simply to render plausible his assertion that the handbook 
writers have said next to nothing about rhetoric. 
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are right to prohibit (a21-24). The underlying argument of this section 
(1354a26-31) should, I suggest, be understood as follows.
1. If something is inconsistent with the successful discharge of the 
speaker’s  role,  then  the  laws  should  prohibit  it.  (premise 
implicit)
2. Speaking  irrelevantly  to  the  issue  is  inconsistent  with  the 
successful discharge of the speaker’s role. (a26-31)
3. Therefore the laws should prohibit speaking irrelevantly to the 
issue. (a21-24)
The section under discussion is taken up with establishing the second 
premise. But it aims to provide further support (“Moreover” a26) for the 
earlier  claim  about  what  the  laws  should  prohibit.72 It  does  this 
successfully only if the first (unstated) premise is allowed; but we note 
that this is a very natural thing to think on the proposed Aristotelian 
view of rhetoric. It is also a rather strange thing to think otherwise – it 
might  be  that  taking  a  bath  is  inconsistent  with  the  successful 
discharge of the role of cabaret entertainer (i.e. you can’t manage much 
cabaret  whilst  taking  a  bath),  but  it  would  be  strange  to  take  this 
obvious  fact  to  be  a  reason  for  a  legal  prohibition  against  cabaret 
entertainers taking baths. The law should only be concerned with roles 
that serve certain public goods – and the view we are proposing as 
Aristotle’s is that the role of speaker in a public deliberation is just such 
a role.
Moreover it is obvious that the job of the disputants is nothing beyond  
demonstrating the matter at hand – that it is the case or that it isn’t,  
that it has happened or that it hasn’t.
72The carpenter’s ruler analogy (a25f.) had also been offered in support of this claim.
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The first part (a26-28) of this little section (a26-31) counters a line of 
thinking that might support a denial of the second premise above. The 
line of thinking is this. One might think that speaking about  anything 
could form on occasion part of the speaker’s  role,  if speaking about 
that  thing  would  make  the  speaker  more  effective  in  getting  his 
listeners to accept his proposed view. Aristotle insists against this that 
“the role of the speaker (lit. the party in a dispute) is nothing beyond 
demonstrating the issue, that it is so or is not so, that it happened or 
did not happen.” (a27f.). He does not offer an argument to this effect, 
he simply takes this to be “obvious” (a26). Once again, we should note 
that this view is indeed obvious when the role that rhetorical expertise 
enables  its  possessor  successfully  to  discharge  is  understood  as 
promoting a particular public good.
Whether it is important or trivial, or legal or illegal, to the extent that  
the legislator has not defined these things, surely the juror should find  
these things out for himself, not learn them from the disputants.
The second part  (a28-31) requires  the proposed Aristotelian view of 
rhetoric  for  different  reasons.  These  claims  about  where  the  juror 
should  and  should  not  seek  the  speakers’  contribution  to  his 
deliberations,  are  offered  with  the  clear  implication  that  they  will 
determine  what  is  and  is  not  part  of  the  speaker’s  role.  Indeed, 
although the correlative clauses at a26-31 purport to be concerned, one 
with the role of the speaker and the other with the role of the juror, 
arguably the point of both clauses is about the role of the speaker. The 
suggestion is that Aristotle uses “the juror should not learn x from the 
speaker” as simply a way of saying that the speaker should not speak 
about  x.  This  passage  suggests  that  Aristotle  accepts  the  following 
principle:
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If it is part of the speaker’s role to speak about something, that 
thing  must  be  both  (a)  a  proper  object  of  deliberation  and 
judgement  for  the  listener,  and (b)  something  on  which  it  is 
right  for  the  listener’s  deliberations  to  be  assisted  by  the 
speaker’s contribution.
Or its equivalent:
If something either (a) is not a proper object of deliberation or 
judgement for the listener, or (b) is not something on which his 
deliberations should be assisted by the speaker’s contribution, 
then it is not part of the speaker’s role to speak about that thing.
But a principle of this kind is not simply self-evident.73 It would have 
been denied by Thrasymachus and seems at  odds with the point  of 
view  of  Gorgias’  Helen.74  But  it  becomes  a  pretty  natural  thing  to 
accept, as soon as you suppose, as we are proposing Aristotle did, that 
the proper functioning of the juror in deliberation and judgement is 
73 It is not obvious that the success of the speaker in his role is constrained by the 
preservation or promotion of the success of the listener in his. In cricket, the fact that 
the batsman ought not to play deliveries wide outside the off-stump, and that he 
would be playing poorly if he did, does not mean that it is not part of the bowler’s 
business to bowl deliveries there. The contrast between this example and Aristotle’s 
orator is precisely that in cricket the bowler aims at the batsman’s failure in his role, 
whereas Aristotle’s orator aims at the listener’s success. 
74 As suggested in the last chapter (see references there) Gorgias – at least from the 
evidence of the Helen – could happily allow Aristotle’s claim that the juror ought 
properly to take his view of the legality and seriousness of an action directly from the 
laws themselves, or use common sense to “figure it out themselves” (1354a30), and 
even that they ought not to allow the disputing parties to be involved in the 
deliberations about these things. All of this Gorgias might happily concede. In his 
view, even if the juror ought to resist their contribution, still it might be the mark of an 
expert speaker that he successfully overcomes this resistance so as to exert influence 
on their deliberations by speaking about these things.
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central to the role and purpose of the speaker.75 It is against precisely 
such a background that we suggest 1354a26-31 can most naturally be 
understood.  So  understood,  the  second  part,  a28-31,  is  aimed  at 
resisting a position that might be argued as follows. If the jurors are 
inclined to deliberate  about  things other  than “the issue”,  then it  is 
acceptable  for  the  speaker,  by speaking about  such  things,  to  assist 
them. Hence speaking about these things cannot be inconsistent with 
his role. An argument of this kind would provide a basis for denying 
the crucial  second premise above – that speaking irrelevantly to the 
issue is inconsistent with the speaker’s role. The argument has some 
plausibility  –  one  might  plausibly  think  that  the  speaker  could 
legitimately try to inform  whatever deliberations the jurors happen to 
be undertaking. Against this, Aristotle insists (a28-31) that even where 
the juror needs to form a judgement on things other than “the issue”, it 
is not right for him to be assisted by the speakers (the parties to the 
dispute), and it is not right for the speakers to attempt to address the 
jurors on such subjects. This insistence shows very clearly that Aristotle 
is proceeding on the basis of a very particular conception of the role 
that this kind of public speaking has in the successful functioning of 
the state.
75 Conceivably, one might read a26-28 and a28-31 as two more-or-less independent 
reasons for thinking that the state is right to ban irrelevant speaking. Even on this 
suggestion, the first of these reasons still seems to require the kind of view of rhetoric 
I am suggesting. But the second might not: that the juror has an important role in the 
state, and that this might be threatened by speakers addressing topics other than the 
issue at hand (specifically the legality and severity of the issue), is already good 
reason for the state to deploy laws to prevent this threat, specifically laws forbidding 
irrelevant speaking. No view of the speaker’s role need be presupposed. Still, this 
does not strike me as a preferable reading of the passage.
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The section 1354a26-31 as a whole, thus, contains Aristotle’s insistence 
on the following two points. Firstly, there is no part of rhetoric’s goal 
that  is  promoted  by  speaking  outside  the  issue  (a26-28).  Secondly, 
doing so in fact undermines the achievement of rhetoric’s goal, because 
it causes the jurors to deviate from deliberating about the case in the 
way  they  should  (and  hence  it  risks  corrupting  their  judgement) 
(a28-31).
So, in relation to what comes before it, this section offers support for 
the Areopagus rules argument, in particular for the claim that it is right 
for the laws to prohibit speaking outside the issue. It does so on the 
basis of a clear conception of the role and purpose of the speaker,  a 
conception  of  just  the  kind  we  outlined  above  when  setting  out 
Aristotle’s understanding of rhetorical expertise.
But the section also invites doubt about whether Aristotle is right to 
gloss as he does the “issue” (to pragma), proving which is the speaker’s 
whole business, and deliberating about which is the main business of 
the jurors (assisted only by the laws, and – failing that – by common 
sense).76 He  glosses  “the  issue”  in  a  forensic  setting  as  whether 
something  “is  the  case  or  is  not,  has  happened  or  has  not 
happened” (a28), i.e. the factual claims involved in the charges. So, one 
might wonder whether this is unduly restrictive. If it is, and the scope 
of  rhetorical  speaking  and  judicial  deliberation  ranges  much wider, 
then  Aristotle’s  case  against  the  handbook  writers  would  be 
significantly undermined. For then, even though they had said nothing 
about  proving  the  factual  claims  of  a  legal  charge,  their  techniques 
would turn  out  after  all  to  be  relevant  to  “the  issue”,  and so  they 
76This seems to be the thrust of a29-31.
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would not be vulnerable to the Areopagus rules argument after all, nor 
would  they  be  vulnerable  to  Aristotle’s  first  argument  (a13-16)  in 
which the fact that all their techniques were for speaking “outside the 
issue” was used to show that they had said nothing about proofs (and 
hence nothing about rhetoric). Relevance and irrelevance are relations. 
We  may  properly  ask,  “irrelevant  to  what”.  To  know  whether  the 
handbook writers’ techniques were for irrelevant speaking (in the kind 
of way that would undermine their claim that these were techniques of 
rhetoric), we need a clear and defensible account of what “the issue” is 
to which they ought to be relevant.
Aristotle addresses just this important point in the section that follows 
(1354a31 – b22). Correct laws allow and even encourage the role of the 
public  speaker  in  assisting  public  deliberation  –  the  role  in  which 
rhetoric enables its possessor to excel – but they also circumscribe the 
kinds of public deliberation that should take place and hence77 restrict 
the role of  the public  speaker.  One claim certainly  defended in this 
section is that the laws should restrict the deliberation of “judges”78 to 
as narrow as possible an area – noting that this area is bound to include 
whether the factual claims made in the charge in a court case79 are true 
77 Though note that 1354a29-31 indicates that there may be additional restrictions on 
the speaker’s subject matter applying even to things that are proper subjects of 
judicial deliberation: thus, potentially, some matters the juror “ought to figure out 
himself and not learn from the disputants” (a30).
78For our discussion of 1354a31-b16, we will use “judge” as an English equivalent to 
Aristotle’s kritês, which means roughly ‘those whose function it is to form a verdict 
(krisis)’ and covers decision-makers in both courts and assemblies. Note that in each, 
there would be several hundred such people.
79 We have seen already that Aristotle’s primary focus in this first chapter is on 
forensic contexts, but there are hints that he sees his arguments as applying to 
deliberative and epideictic contexts as well. The assemblyman as well as the dikast is 
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or not – and that everything else should be dealt with by the lawgiver 
and written into the laws. This is clear from the way the section both 
starts  and ends  (1354a32-33;  b11-16).  For  our  purposes,  the  reasons 
Aristotle offers in support of this conclusion are not so important as the 
fact that he devotes space to arguing for it at all.  After all,  Aristotle 
does not suggest that it is somehow impossible that actual judges in 
actual courts might deliberate about things other than the facts of the 
charge.  He  leaves  open  the  possibility  that   the  handbook  writers’ 
techniques  are  relevant  to  the  kinds  of  things  that  judges  actually 
consider. Hence, for any given subject on which the judges will form a 
judgement, these might be techniques for getting judges persuaded to 
take your preferred view of it. Thus, they would qualify as techniques 
of  rhetoric,  under  many accounts  of  what  rhetoric  is.  But  not  under 
Aristotle’s account. For him, if the judges are forming a judgement on 
something on which they ought not to be forming a judgement, it will 
not  be  part  of  the  designated  role  of  the  speaker  to  assist  them  in 
coming to a judgement on that thing. And since rhetoric is an expertise 
in  discharging  that  role,  techniques  for  speaking on subjects  of  that 
kind will not be techniques of rhetoric.
This  suggests  a  way  of  reading  the  conclusion  of  this  passage  of 
argument (1354b16-22) that is more integrated than those suggested by 
previous  commentators,  and  which  helps  to  make  sense  of  how 
Aristotle has achieved by 1355a2, not just a devastating criticism of the 
mentioned at 1354b7. And the idea that the judges will need to assess claims about 
past, future and present (1354b13f.) hints that all three kinds of context fall within the 
scope of his argument. In all three kinds of context, the listeners can be seen as 
deliberating the truth or falsity of some factual claim – that the accused did such-and-
such a deed; that such-and-such proposal is best for the city; that this person 
possesses (or possessed) such-and-such a virtue.
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handbook writers, but (as he claims) a justification of his own position. 
He  claims  at  1355a3f.  that  it  is  now  obvious  that  the  expertise  of 
rhetoric  is  concerned with providing proper grounds for conviction. 
The extent to which he has argued for this conclusion we will consider 
below. But we propose here a reading of 1354b16-22 that shows how 
the passage of argumentation concerned with the proper role of judges 
contributes to his basis for the claim at 1355a3f..
If this is correct, then it is obvious that it is an expertise in irrelevance  
that  is  the  subject  discussed by those  who give  definitions  of  other  
things, such as what the introduction or narrative should contain or  
each  of  the  other  parts  of  the  speech  –  since  in  them  they  busy  
themselves with nothing except how to put the judge into a certain  
condition, and they set out nothing about the proofs that belong to the  
expertise, that is to say the means of becoming good at enthymemes.
(1354b16-22)
Exactly what is claimed and on what basis in this passage has sadly not 
received much scholarly attention.80 This is surely not because it is all 
luminously clear.  In looking carefully at this passage,  and how it  is 
connected  to  its  surrounding  context,  I  hope  to  substantiate  the 
following claim. Aristotle here concludes not just that the handbook 
writers’  techniques  were  for  irrelevant  speaking,  but  also  the 
correctness of his previous contention81 that the handbook writers have 
80 The passage is cited twice in the Symposium Aristotelicum volume (Furley & 
Nehamas [1996]), but on both occasions this is little more than a passing mention. 
Cope [1877] has nothing on this except a misunderstanding mentioned below. 
Neither Grimaldi [1980] nor Rapp [2002] offers help on these points.
81 This claim is, in my view, announced at 1354a11-13, argued for between that 
passage and the passage currently under discussion, 1354b16-22, at which point his 
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told  us  next  to  nothing  about  the  proper  constituents  of  rhetorical 
expertise, since these are concerned with giving proofs, and turn out to 
consist, largely or wholly, in a skill in enthymemes.
Some features of this passage are relatively uncontroversial. As part of 
earlier  arguments,  Aristotle  has  charged  the  handbook writers  with 
setting out techniques for speaking outside “the issue” (τὸ πρᾶγμα), 
i.e. irrelevantly. Irrelevantly to what is initially left unspecified – that is, 
it  is  initially  left  unstated  what  the  range of  “issues”  is  that  might 
properly be addressed by a speaker. Substantiating this claim required 
an account of what “the issue” – the proper subject matter for speakers 
– is. For something to be a proper subject matter for speakers, it turned 
out that it must also be a proper concern of judges’ deliberations and 
judgement. Hence, as soon as one grants that the proper concerns of 
judges  were  confined  to  the  subjects  Aristotle  sets  out  (“If  this  is  
correct ...” 1354b16, referring back to b11-16), it is clear that speaking on 
other matters is speaking irrelevantly, and hence that artful techniques 
for doing so are artful techniques in irrelevance (1354b16-18). In other 
words, once it is clear what “the issue” is, it is immediately obvious 
that  the handbook writers’  methods were  for  speaking “outside” it. 
Anyone who knew their work (and the fact that they are the immediate 
target of criticism at the start of the treatise suggests their works were 
widely  known) would know that  it  did  not  include  instructions  on 
speaking about the range of subjects to which Aristotle confines both 
judge and speaker. Aristotle’s remarks at b17-20 are a reminder of the 
kinds of things that did occupy them, with perhaps a note of mockery 
demolition of their work is complete. They had set out an expertise not in rhetoric but 
in irrelevance. There is then a brief passage about how all this sheds light on their 
(otherwise puzzling) preference for forensic over deliberative speaking. These 
conclusions then appear in the summary passage 1355a19-20.
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at  their  careful  definitions  (diorizousin b17f.)  and laborious  attention 
(pragmateuontai  b19f.)  to  things  that  turn  out  to  be  irrelevant  to  the 
proper concerns of a public speaker.
This much is common to most commentators.
Less attention has been given to how b21-22 fit into the argument.
“and they set out nothing about the proofs that belong to the expertise,  
that is to say the means of becoming good at enthymemes.”
There are perhaps three options here. One is that Aristotle here simply 
repeats  his  assertion  (uncontroversially)  that  the  handbook  writers 
have  set  out  nothing  on  proofs  and  enthymemes  and  (more 
controversially) that it is in these things that the expertise of rhetoric 
consists  (entechnôn b21).  A  second  is  that  he  is  claiming  that  the 
handbook writers’  silence about proofs and enthymemes is a further 
reason  to  suppose  that  they  were  setting  out  an  expertise  in 
irrelevance.82 A third, and my preferred, option is that Aristotle was 
here drawing a second conclusion from the preceding argument: if he 
is right in what preceded, then not only is it clear that the handbook 
writers’ techniques were techniques in irrelevance, but also it is clear 
they were therefore failing to set out the constituents of an expertise in  
rhetoric.
The first interpretative option is not impossible but seems unattractive. 
We  have  seen  in  the  previous  chapter  how  unobvious  and 
controversial  Aristotle’s  view  was  that  only  the  proofs  belong  to 
rhetorical  expertise.  1355a3-4  suggests  that  Aristotle  has  not  merely 
asserted but argued for this crucial contention. 1354b21-22 looks like a 
82On this reading, ‘gar’ at b19 introduces two reasons: a19-20 and (‘de’ a21) a21-22.
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plausible candidate for the conclusion of an argument to that effect. 
But  the  first  option  construes  b21-22  instead  as  an  unsupported 
assertion, separate from what precedes it.
The second option is unattractive for a number of reasons. Like the first 
option it has Aristotle offering no argument in support of his crucial 
claim  about  the  nature  of  rhetoric.  Moreover,  this  second  option 
construes b19f. (“since in them ...”) and b21f. (“and they set out ...”) as 
coordinate reasons both introduced by that initial  “since” (gar,  b19); 
and yet the positions they occupy in the argument are very far from 
coordinate with each other.  The first of these supposedly coordinate 
reasons  (b19f.)  seems  to  require  the  correctness  of  the  preceding 
section, as “if this is correct” (b16) implies, and combines closely with 
the “those who ...” clause at b17-19. Whereas the second requires neither 
and seems to stand entirely on its own as a reason for thinking that 
these writers had offered an expertise in irrelevance. They simply do 
not seem to be coordinate in the way this reading requires.
A final reason against this way of construing the role of b21-22 is that it 
seems  to  suggest  a  worrying  circularity  in  Aristotle’s  thinking.  At 
1354a13-16, as we saw in the preceding chapter, his argument relied on 
taking the fact  that  their  techniques  were for  irrelevant  speaking as 
obvious  evidence  that  their  techniques  contributed  nothing  to  the 
provision  of  proofs.  It  would  rather  undermine  that  argument  if  it 
turned out that here he was supposing that the fact that they had told 
us nothing about providing proofs were evidence that their techniques 
were for irrelevant speaking.
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The  third  interpretative  option  for  1354b16-22  leaves  the  earlier 
argument  intact,  and  offers  Aristotle  a  superior  argument  in  this 
section  itself.  This  option  involves  supposing  that  b21-22  offer  an 
additional conclusion. The argument as a whole then goes as follows.
1. It had previously been shown that (a) the orator’s role involves the 
judges successfully discharging their role (1354a25f.); and (b) the 
orator’s  role  is  solely  to  offer  proof  of  some particular  view of 
those subjects on which judges may deliberate and be assisted by 
orators (1354a26-31).
2. It is correct [that the proper subjects for the judges’ deliberations 
and hence for an orator are restricted to x,  y and z].  (“if  this  is  
correct” b16)
3. The handbook writers spent all their time defining what each part 
of  the speech should contain (b17-19),  and in doing so covered 
exclusively  emotional  techniques  [not  involving  x,  y  and  z]. 
(b19-20)
4. Therefore (from 2 and 3) the handbook writers’ techniques are for 
speaking that is irrelevant to the only proper subjects for judges 
and orator. (b16-17)
5. What is irrelevant to a subject cannot constitute any kind of proof, 
and specifically proof by enthymeme, of a particular view of that 
subject. (presupposed as obvious)
6. And therefore (from 4 and 5) they have said nothing about how to 
give proofs on the only subjects that are proper for an orator. (b21)
7. (from 1 and 6) They have said nothing about how to do the only 
thing  that  “belongs  to  the  expertise”  (b21).  i.e.  They  have  said 
nothing about successfully discharging the one activity in which 
the orator’s role consists.
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8. This in fact is a matter of being good at enthymemes (b21-2.).
On this reading, b21-22 combines together what have been separated 
above,  namely  the  conclusions  6  and  7.  This  might  seem  illicit: 
considered on their own, 7 does not straightforwardly follow from 6. 
But  given 1,  the background understanding of  the speaker’s  role,  if 
rhetoric  is  an expertise  in discharging this  role,  7  can be seen to be 
equivalent to 6.  The background understanding of the endeavour in 
which  rhetoric  is  the  relevant  expertise  was  given  at  1354a25-31 
(speakers  offer  judges  proofs  to  assist  their  deliberations),  and  that 
picture of the speaker’s role was importantly filled out by 1354a31-b16 
(the relevant deliberations relate to a carefully circumscribed range of 
subject matter). Appropriately, we find that once this elucidation of the 
orator’s  role  and hence  of  rhetorical  expertise  has  been  set  out,  the 
conclusions Aristotle is able to draw from 1354b16 onwards not only 
demonstrate  negatively  the  failure  of  the  handbook  writers  to  say 
much about rhetoric, but also confirm more positively the correctness 
of Aristotle’s own position on the nature of rhetoric.
On this view, the argument to b21-22 in many ways recapitulates the 
argument of 1354a11-16. There are a number of reasons why this is 
important.  One is that on this way of understanding the argument, 
Aristotle has made progress not just in negative polemic, but,  more 
positively, in justifying the central tenet of his own view of rhetoric. 
The claim that rhetoric is an expertise in giving proofs, a claim that – 
we should recall  – played such a pivotal role in Aristotle’s opening 
arguments  (and  for  which  no  supporting  argument  was  initially 
offered), has now been given much more substantial support since its 
original  assertion  at  1354a13.  On  the  proposed  interpretation, 
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1354b16-22 highlights just this point. Specifically, the use of the word 
“entechnôn” (‘that belong to the expertise’) at b21 is a reminder that all of 
the careful argument  from 1354a25-b16 about the roles of the judges 
and the orator had been aimed at elucidating precisely what the technê 
(‘expertise’)  of  rhetoric  consisted  in.  And hence  it  is  a  much more 
carefully fleshed-out and justified account of this expertise Aristotle is 
deploying in order to determine that the handbook writers’ techniques 
contribute nothing to it, and that in fact it is a matter of getting good at 
enthymemes.  Aristotle’s own proposed account of rhetoric has thus 
been placed on a firmer footing. How successful he has been in doing 
so  is  obviously  an  important  matter  to  investigate,  and  will  be 
considered in detail below.
The principal conclusion (7 above, 1354b21-22) on this interpretation is 
still  polemical  and negative.  It  is  (as  earlier  at  1354a11-16)  that  the 
handbook writers have offered an expertise in irrelevance and hence 
not in rhetoric. This is nicely confirmed by the way it supports what 
immediately follows (1354b22-55a3).
The  argument  of  1354b22-55a3:  expertise  in  irrelevance  rather  than 
rhetoric explains the preference for forensic over deliberative speaking.
For this explains why, despite the fact that speaking to the assembly  
and forensic speaking share the same method, and despite the fact that  
the  business  of  politics  is  finer  and  more  statesmanlike  than  the  
business of people’s interactions, nevertheless they say nothing at all  
about political speaking, whereas they all attempt a technical account  
of prosecuting your case at law. The reason is that irrelevant speaking  
is less use in assembly debates [than in the lawcourts], and political  
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debate is less of a corrupt business than forensic speaking because it is  
more a matter of common interest. For here [viz. in the assembly] the  
judge is judging about his own interests, hence there is no need to do  
anything else besides demonstrating that things are as the deliberative  
speaker says they are. Whereas in the lawcourts this is not enough: it  
pays to win over the listener. For the judgement is being made about  
the affairs of others, hence looking to their own interests and listening  
with  partiality  they  give  in83 to  the  disputants  rather  than form a  
judgement. That is  why in many places,  as we said before, the law 
prohibits speaking outside the issue. There [in the assembly] the judges  
themselves guard against this sufficiently. (1354b22-55a3)
The thought is that having got clear what rhetoric consists in helps us 
to understand why the handbook writer tradition has a preference for 
forensic. If their skills were in rhetoric, they would work equally well if 
not better in political contexts as in forensic contexts. There are good 
reasons  for  preferring  political  to  forensic  speaking  (it  is  “nobler”, 
“more  statesmanlike”,  “less  corrupt”  b23f,  24,  28).  Hence,  if  the 
handbook writer’s skills were genuinely in rhetoric, we would expect 
them to  have  a  strong preference  for  devoting attention to  political 
speaking. But actually they have the opposite preference. This suggests 
that their skills are not in rhetoric.
In  fact,  the  non-rhetorical  ‘expertise  in  irrelevance’  offered  by  the 
handbook writers84 works well  in forensic contexts  because it  is  not 
83Didoasi here probably suggests a surrender, cf. Cope [1877] ad loc., LSJ II. esp 4, V, 
and McCabe [1994] 141; but it may simply mean that they grant the speaker their 
case, cf. LSJ III.2. 
84Involving appeals to private self-interest (1354b8-11, b33f.) or for sympathy and 
favour (“pros charin” 1354b34).
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directly in the listener’s own interests to form the correct judgement. In 
political deliberation, what is at stake is more a matter of interests that 
the citizens have in common (Gk. “koinoteron” b29, e.g. the success of 
their state, the general well-being of its citizens, etc.), so the citizens’ 
own interests lead them to be sufficiently concerned to form the correct 
judgement.85
The  handbook  writers  have  described  a  set  of  skills  that  are  not 
rhetoric. Hence their skills are no use when judges are judging as they 
should and when what is needed is genuine rhetoric. Their skills come 
into their own when surrendering to pressure or inducements from the 
disputing parties has replaced the forming of judgements. And that is 
something that Aristotle says doesn’t happen in the assembly but often 
does in the lawcourts.
So, the proposed interpretation of 1354b16-22 nicely prepares the way 
for  this  final  piece  of  polemic  (1354b22-55a3)  against  the  handbook 
writers.
We must return to our claim that Aristotle uses his complex conclusion 
at 1354b16-22 to underline the additional support he now has for his 
earlier central claim about the nature of rhetoric – that the only thing 
that belongs to the expertise is proofs.
Support for the claim that only proofs belong to rhetoric
Although there is no passage where Aristotle has argued directly in 
support of this claim, we have seen that throughout the intervening 
85cf. Cope [1877] ad loc.
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passages of argument, he relies on and gradually makes visible of his 
underlying view of what the expertise of rhetoric is. We suggested that 
his view was as follows.
Rhetoric is an expertise in discharging public speaking roles in 
the state – specifically,  it is an expertise in helping citizens to 
arrive at good publicly-deliberated judgements, by making the 
case one way or another in relation to some proposal, so that a 
judgement can be made as to its merits.
If  this  view,  as  it  has  been  progressively  unveiled  throughout 
1354a18-1354b16, is found plausible, then it offers support to Aristotle’s 
contention that it is only the production of proofs that constitute an 
exercise of the expertise of rhetoric. The way it does so is as follows.
Firstly,  if  rhetoric  is  a  skill  in  assisting  the  listener  towards  good 
judgements,  in  ways  properly  sanctioned  by  the  state,  then  this  is 
reason to suppose that supplying proper grounds for those judgements 
is what it will consist in.
Secondly,  if  (as  Aristotle  clearly  presupposes  throughout  1354a24-
b1686)  the  judges’  task  is  specifically  the cognitive task  of  forming  a  
judgement as to the truth of certain claims, rather than (say) some more 
general task of dispute arbitration or deciding whose side to take in a 
conflict, then this is reason to suppose that supplying proper grounds 
for such judgements is what the expertise consists in.
Thirdly, if (as Aristotle explicitly claims in the section 1354a31-b16) the 
proper scope of the judgements that judges make is confined to specific 
86cf. especially 1354a25-26, a30-31, b3-4, b10.
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factual  claims,  rather  than  including  general  evaluative  claims  or 
universal principles or even legal precepts,  this is reason to suppose 
that proofs will be central to the kind of assistance the speaker might 
properly supply. To illustrate, if the judges consider the question, “Did 
this person commit such-and-such a murder?” all they would need are 
a  clear  definition  of  murder  and  then  relevant  evidential 
considerations.  The former should be supplied by the laws, and the 
latter  are,  in  Aristotle’s  terminology,  pisteis  –  proper  grounds  for 
conviction.  Whereas  if  they  considered  the  questions,  “Is  murder  a 
crime?” and “How serious a crime is murder?” one might think that 
helping them offered much more scope for things other than providing 
proofs  or  information.  Perhaps  (we  may  speculate)  the  kinds  of 
techniques that work on the emotions directly and do not function by 
addressing the subject at hand would be an example: Aristotle himself 
allows that there is a role for such approaches in moral education,87 and 
it  seems that this kind of technique was espoused by the handbook 
writers.88 However, the combination of supposing that the expertise of 
rhetoric enabled the speaker successfully to assist the judge in making 
judgements,  together  with  supposing  that  these  judgements  were 
confined  to  addressing  specific  factual  claims,  makes  it  natural  to 
suppose that this expertise should consist largely if not wholly in the 
provision of proper grounds of conviction.
Aristotle’s justification of his key premises
So,  the  claim  here  is  that  Aristotle  does  succeed  in  providing 
justification for the two claims highlighted at the start of this chapter.
Only  proper  grounds  for  conviction  belong  to  the  expertise  [of  
rhetoric]. 1354a13.
87 Nicomachean Ethics 1104b16, 1172a20-21.
88 1354a15-18, b17-20; 1356a16-17. 
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and
Rhetorical expertise has a nature such that it is simply impossible that  
exercising it would be prohibited by correctly-formulated laws.
However, these claims are justified by appeal to a picture of rhetoric as 
an  expertise  in  contributing  by  public  speaking  to  the  proper 
functioning of the state. While Aristotle argues carefully from this basis 
to the details of what the proper contributions of public speakers are, 
he does not argue for this basic account of what rhetoric is. He assumes 
it.
We have seen (in relation to the “Areopagus argument”) that Aristotle 
could perhaps lay claim to some dialectical entitlement to this position 
–  some  of  those  he  is  criticising  would  have  agreed  not  only  that 
correct laws would not prohibit the exercise of genuine rhetoric, but 
perhaps also that rhetoric is an expertise in taking part in public life. 
This may well be part of the explanation for why Aristotle does not feel 
the  need  to  argue  for  his  basic  position  on  the  nature  of  rhetoric. 
Nevertheless,  it  seems  better  to  suppose  that  Aristotle  simply 
considered his view of rhetoric  to be obvious,  and to have intuitive 
plausibility, such that it did not stand in need of justification.
We will return below to the non-exegetical  question of whether this 
represents  a  weakness  in  Aristotle’s  argument,  i.e.  is  this  view  of 
rhetoric and the state so plausible as not to require justification?
First, however, it will be useful to see that the position here attributed 
to Aristotle on the nature and purpose of rhetoric, is not only based in 
detailed exegesis of Rhetoric I.1, but also coheres nicely with his views 
elsewhere in the Rhetoric.
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Support from the rest of the  Rhetoric  for the proposed Aristotelian view   
of rhetoric
Aristotle’s view is that rhetoric is an expertise that helps the state to 
function  well.  As  such,  of  course,  it  will  fall  within  the  ambit  of 
political expertise – the expertise that aims at the well-being of the state 
and its citizens – or, in Aristotle’s terms – “the human good”.89 So, on 
this  view,  Aristotle’s  view  of  rhetoric  is  (perhaps  unsurprisingly) 
teleological.
Nevertheless, our proposal is that rhetoric has the specific purpose of 
making a very particular kind of contribution to the success of the state 
and of its people. We proposed that rhetoric is an expertise in helping 
citizens to arrive at good publicly-deliberated judgements, by making 
the case one way or another in relation to some proposal,  so that  a 
judgement  can be made as to  its  merits.  As we shall  see,  this  finds 
corroboration in several places in the Rhetoric.
Aristotle’s Teleological View of Rhetoric elsewhere in the  Rhetoric  
At  several  points,  Aristotle  explicitly  states  what he takes  to  be  the 
purpose  aimed  at  by  an  orator  in  speaking.  This  purpose  is  to 
demonstrate that things are as he claims, and this can be made more 
precise in each oratorical situation by attending to what judgement is 
at issue, that is, what kind of judgement the listener is to make.
Moreover  it  is  plain  that  the  job  of  the  disputants  is  nothing  beyond 
demonstrating the matter at hand – that it is the case or that it isn’t, that  
it has happened or that it hasn’t.  (1354a26-28)
89See above on rhetoric in Nicomachean Ethics I.1.
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For here [in deliberative contexts e.g. the assembly] the judge judges about  
his own affairs, such that all there is to do is demonstrate that things are  
as the speaker says. (1354b29-31)
Let us take rhetoric to be an ability in relation to each thing to observe  
what is potentially persuasive. This is the function (ergon) of no other  
expertise. (I.2.1355b26-28)
The forms of rhetoric are three in number. For that is the number of kinds  
of listeners that there are for speeches. Indeed it is from three things that a  
speech is composed: the one who speaks, what is spoken about, and the one  
spoken to, and the purpose (telos) is in relation to the latter – the listener,  
I mean. Necessarily the listener is either a observer or a judge, and a judge  
is either a judge of things past or of things future. The one who makes a  
judgement about future things is, for example, the assemblyman; the one  
who makes a judgement about things past is, for example, the juror; and  
about ability,  the observer.  So there must necessarily be three forms of  
rhetorical  speeches  –  advisory  [or  deliberative],  forensic,  epideictic.  … 
Each of  these has a different purpose (telos),  three [purposes] for three  
[forms of speech]. For the advisor it is the advantageous and the harmful  
(indeed,  someone proposing something advises  it  on grounds that  it  is  
better; the opposition opposes it as being worse), and he marshals other  
matters in relation to this – whether it is lawful or unlawful or fine or  
shameful. To forensic speakers it is what is lawful and unlawful90 – these  
90This need not imply that the forensic speaker should address questions of what 
types of thing are (or should be) lawful or unlawful (cf. 1354a29), nor any tension with 
our earlier claim that the forensic speaker should be confined to the facts of the issue 
at hand. Given a clear understanding of the laws, it is a purely factual matter 
whether, in a given lawsuit, the laws were breached in the particular way set out in 
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too  marshal  everything  else  in  relation  to  these.  To  those  praising  or  
blaming it is what is fine and what is shameful – these also refer other  
matters back to these. (I.3.1358a36-b8, b20-29)
The above passages seem to present a consistent view. The function 
(ergon) of rhetorical expertise is enabling the orator to see what features 
of  the  situation  offer  a  proper  basis  for  convincing  listeners  of  his 
preferred view of the issue. The latter is the aim (telos) – to prove his 
case as securely as the situation permits. These passages offer various 
formulations of this aim “to demonstrate the issue, that it is the case or 
isn’t …” (1354a27f.),   “to demonstrate that things are as the speaker 
says” (1354b30f.), and more bluntly for each kind of rhetoric, the aim is 
stated as “the advantageous and the harmful  … the lawful  and the 
unlawful … the fine and the shameful” (1358b22, 26, 28). Aristotle is 
careful  to  point  out  at  1355b10-1491 that  the  function  of  rhetorical 
expertise  is  not  to  persuade  but  to  observe  the  persuasive  features 
offered by the situation, and the wording is reflected also at 1355b26ff. 
(cited above). This should be understood entirely in line with what he 
understands  the  aim  of  rhetoric  to  be  in  the  passages  just  noted. 
Rhetoric’s  aim  is  to  prove  a  particular  view  of  any  given  issue; 
rhetoric’s function is to pursue that aim as best the situation permits, 
by bringing to light whatever features of the situation count in favour 
of that particular view of the issue. Where the situation does not have 
much to offer, the final result may be that the orator has not convinced 
the listener, despite having exercised a flawless rhetorical expertise.
All of this is familiar fare in the interpretation of the Rhetoric. But what 
is important here is to draw attention to the way in which the role and 
the charge.
91 On the basis of comparison with other technai, particularly medicine.
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purpose of the orator is determined by its relationship to the role of the 
listener.  The  two  are  intimately  interrelated,  as  1358b1f.  makes 
explicitly  clear.  Indeed,  it  makes  sense  additionally  to  suppose  that 
Aristotle thought that the role and purpose of both orator and listener 
are determined by their place in a larger political arrangement aimed at 
the proper functioning of the  polis.  In our examination above of the 
Carpenter’s  Rule  analogy,  it  was  clear  that  there  is  no  conflict  or 
tension between the orator’s  aim of proving  his case,  the aim of the 
listener, and indeed the aim of this part of the political arrangement – 
for instance the aim of the judge and of the courts to return the best 
possible  verdict.  It  is  therefore  no  surprise  to  find  the  same  view 
elsewhere in the Rhetoric.
These passages on rhetoric’s function and aim confirm the picture that 
we put together painstakingly from the texts of I.1. The expertise of 
rhetoric enables the speaker to succeed in helping the listener to a well-
formed  judgement  –  a  judgement  he  hopes  will  be  the  one  he 
recommends for the reasons he recommends.
Rhetoric as an expertise in discharging a valuable role in the state: is 
this sufficiently obvious that it needs no justification? 
In English usage, there is a familiar pejorative use of “rhetoric” and its 
cognates92 which  perhaps  makes  it  hard  for  the  modern  reader  to 
appreciate the initial  appeal of Aristotle’s  understanding of rhetoric. 
Our own conception of rhetoric perhaps owes more to Gorgias than to 
Aristotle.  We  tend  to  see  rhetoric  as  associated  with  obscuring  the 
truth,  and promoting  personal  gain  at  the  expense  of  careful,  clear 
reasoning. So, the prospects might look dim for defending as obvious 
92See, for instance, OED v. sub “rhetoric” 2.b, sub “rhetorical” 1.b, sub “rhetorician” 
2.b.
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Aristotle’s  underlying  view  –  a  view  he  simply  presupposes  in 
advancing  the  arguments  of  Rhetoric  I.1  –  that  rhetoric  is  a  skill  in 
contributing to public deliberation by putting the case for a particular 
side of the debate or dispute.
Nevertheless, Aristotle’s position can be defended very simply.
On any account, rhetoric is a skill that enables its possessor to achieve 
non-accidental  success93 at  something  related  to  public  speaking. 
Perhaps  there  are  a  number  of  candidates  for  such success,  skill  in 
attaining  which  the  Greeks  might  plausibly  have  called 
“rhetoric” (rhêtorikê technê). But since there is in the context of the polis  
one obvious candidate that more than any other makes the associated 
skill  worth  having,  and  worth  valuing  in  others,  Aristotle  may  be 
forgiven  for  presuming that  this  is  the  proper  object  of  discussions 
about  rhetoric.  On  his  view,  rhetoric  is  the  skill  that  enables  its 
possessor to be successful in contributing to the public deliberations of 
citizens.
Such a skill is what states – particularly Greek poleis – value and make 
provision for by cultivating the contribution of public speakers to the 
deliberations  of  the  assembly  or  courtroom,  and  to  other  state 
occasions (e.g. public funerals in ancient Athens). Likewise, when an 
audience in a courtroom or assembly pays attention to a speaker, and 
hopes that the speaker will speak well, they do so on the basis that they 
will gain from the speaker a contribution to their deliberations on the 
issues before them. And what the speaker himself often hopes for is to 
succeed in convincing his listeners by the force of his arguments, such 
93 cf. 1354a9-11.
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that their adoption of his proposed view constitutes an independent 
endorsement of that view.
In the case of the speaker, of course, there are rival skills that might be 
called  “rhetoric”,  that  would  be  of  value  to  the  speaker.  One  such 
would  be  an  ability  simply  to  bring  about  in  listeners  whatever 
judgements  the  speaker  chose,  without  his  having  necessarily 
contributed anything to their deliberations. It seems to me that even 
considering the perspective of the speaker alone, this is a much less 
valuable skill, because its successful use wins no endorsement of the 
speaker’s position. Of course,  as soon as one considers the skills the 
state values in a public speaker, and those listeners value in a speaker 
addressing them, it is clear that an ability to bring about in listeners 
whatever judgement the speaker chooses is a good deal less valuable 
than an ability to contribute to the deliberations of citizens.94 The latter 
is far and away the kind of rhetoric most worth having, most worth 
recognising,  and  most  worth  talking  about.  Something  like  this  is 
hinted at when Aristotle lists rhetoric among the “most prestigious” 
kinds of expertise in EN 1094b3, and there are indications at a number 
of points in the Rhetoric that Aristotle can simply take it as obvious that 
rhetoric is a skill whose exercise relates to certain particular kinds of 
context – most obviously lawcourts and assemblies.95 
94 Arguably it is part of the burden of Plato’s Gorgias to show that the skill that 
Gorgias calls “rhetoric” – a skill simply in bringing about in listeners persuasion of 
whatever the speaker chooses – is not worth valuing in oneself or in others. 
Seemingly, Aristotle in the Rhetoric simply presupposes this conclusion, but (as Plato 
had done before him in the Phaedrus) he appropriates the name “rhetoric” for his own 
theory.
95  e.g. I.1,1354a4-6, b22-3; I.3, 1358a36-7. It is harder to characterise the context 
occupied by an epideictic speech, but perhaps the paradigm might be a funeral 
oration, or campaigns for election to office, where what is at issue is someone’s fine or 
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If  this  is  right,  then it  seems unobjectionable for Aristotle  simply to 
presume that it is this expertise that is under discussion in a treatise on 
rhetoric.
Conclusion:
In this chapter, I have sought to set out how Aristotle justifies his view 
of the nature and purpose of rhetoric – a view which, as we saw, plays 
such a pivotal role in his opening arguments. His justifications turn out 
to appeal to a conception of rhetoric that is partly argued for and partly 
presupposed. Nevertheless, it coheres with his views elsewhere in the 
Rhetoric, and elsewhere in his work. And the attribution of this view to 
Aristotle opens up ways of understanding his arguments in I.1 as good 
arguments,  where  in  the  absence  of  this  view they  are  flawed and 
puzzling. We argue that not only do his arguments have merit, but also 
he is entitled to the assumptions he makes about the kind of success 
that rhetorical expertise enables.
This  clears  the  way  to  investigate  what  exactly  Aristotle  means  by 
pistis   - glossed here as ‘proper grounds for conviction’, and how he 
can  claim  that   there  can  be  proper  grounds  for  conviction  in  the 
emotions of the listeners.
base character.
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Chapter  3  –  What  are  “proper  grounds  for 
conviction”?
In  the  preceding  chapters,  we set  out  a  particular  view of  rhetoric, 
arguing both that it is correct exegetically to attribute it to Aristotle in 
the  Rhetoric,  and that  this  view is  itself  plausible.  The  view is  that 
rhetoric aims at the good judgement of the listeners, and is exercised 
solely in the provision of proper grounds for conviction. Rhetoric has 
this nature because it is an expertise in discharging a valuable role in 
the functioning of the state.
Clearly, however, this is simply an outline of an expertise in rhetoric. 
The  present  chapter  is  devoted  to  providing  a  more  substantive 
account of what these proper grounds for conviction are with which 
rhetoric is concerned. Specifically, we will need to clarify in what way 
grounds for  conviction must be  proper for  the providing of  them to 
qualify as a possible exercise of rhetoric.96 As we shall see, this raises 
some constraints  on  how Aristotle  could  make  good his  claim that 
arousing the emotions  of  listeners  amounts  to  providing them with 
proper grounds for conviction.
We will first propose a general theory of  pistis, and attempt to show 
how this fits  what Aristotle says in the  Rhetoric.  We will  then show 
how this general account works for Aristotle’s three kinds of technical 
pistis,  based  on  argument,  character  and  emotion.  Some  prominent 
96Thus this chapter offers the promised explanation of the sense in which the listener 
is warranted in believing a conclusion on the basis of a proof offered by a speaker 
(above n.4). Our account is expressed in terms of the listener’s good judgement, 
rather than in terms of warrant.
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counter-examples to this account, involving ‘argument-’ (logos)  pisteis, 
will  be  considered.  The  last  part  of  the  chapter  considers  some 
difficulties and apparent difficulties in fitting emotion-arousal into this 
account.
Non-Technical Proofs and Technical Proofs of three kinds
It will be useful to set out first, with reference to the text of the Rhetoric,  
Aristotle’s general framework for the place of pisteis in rhetoric. 
For Aristotle,  pisteis  are the basis provided by the orator’s speech on 
which  someone  might  form  or  hold  a  conviction  about  something 
(1403a9-13).  Some  pisteis are  simply  there  to  be  used  (e.g.  witness 
evidence, torture evidence, and written contracts), and do not require 
rhetorical  expertise  to generate  them  (“atechnoi  pisteis”),  whereas the 
very production itself of other pisteis requires the exercise of rhetorical 
expertise  (“entechnoi  pisteis”,  cf.  1355b35-9).  These  ‘technical  proofs’ 
come in three kinds: those from the character of the speaker (ethos), 
those  involving  arousing  the  emotions  of  the  listeners  (pathos)  and 
those  that  work  through  the  argument  itself  (logos)  (1356a1-20; 
1377b16-28;  1403a9-13).97 It  is  to  these  technical  pisteis  that  we  now 
direct our attention.
A theory of  pistis:   what constitutes proper grounds for conviction? 
It is clear from early on in the Rhetoric that material that is irrelevant to 
issue at hand does not qualify as proper grounds for conviction of  the 
orator’s  proposed  view  of  it.98 Irrelevance  is  an  impropriety  that 
97Obviously our concern is primarily with the technical proofs, and hence in 
references to proofs or pisteis, it may be presumed that unless stated otherwise it is 
the technical proofs that are in view.
98 Cf. e.g. 1354a13-16, and chapters 1 and 2 above.
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excludes  material  from  being  a  possible  pistis.  On  the  other  hand, 
Aristotle  seems  to  allow that  there  are  things  that  would  count  as 
exercises of rhetorical skill despite being sufficiently objectionable that 
they should not be done.99 Thus, not every way of lacking propriety 
rules something out as a pistis.  So, what is required for something to 
count as a pistis? The answer I propose might be crudely summarised 
thus: an orator presents listeners with proper grounds for conviction of 
his conclusion just if what he presents to them is – by their lights – 
good reason for the conclusion he is recommending.100 A more precise 
formulation is as follows.
Proposed Characterisation of Aristotelian  Pistis:  
Orator A gives listener B a pistis P for judgement J iff 
1. P  is  so  related  to  J  that,  if  B  regards  the  elements  of  P  as 
reputable and is correct to do so, then it would be an exercise of 
good  judgement  on  B’s  part  if  B  were  inclined  to  make 
judgement J because of P.
2. A presents P to B as 
a. comprised of things B is disposed to regard as reputable, and 
b. as so related to J that, if B does regard these as reputable, B 
should make judgement J because of P.
3. A pistis  aims at B’s sincerely making judgement J because of P, 
i.e. taking himself to be right to make judgement J because of the 
reputability for belief of those things of which P is comprised 
99 cf. 1355a29-31: Rhetorical expertise involves being able to argue both sides of the 
case, even where actually to do this shouldn’t be done because it would be to 
persuade people of things that are inferior or base “οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα 
πείθειν” (a31). Cf. also 1355b2-7: rhetoric can be used wrongly and cause great harm.
100 This rough summary is intended only as an approximation to the view I am 
recommending.
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and P’s relation to J. Hence a good pistis will have the following 
additional features:
a. P is comprised of things that B is actually likely to regard as 
reputable.
b. P is such that B is actually likely to see that it stands in the 
relevant kind of relations to J.
c. Presenting P to B  as a basis for judgement J is actually likely 
to lead B to make judgement J because of P.
Our  main concern  in  this  characterisation  is  to  state  more  precisely 
what it is about a pistis that makes it  proper grounds for conviction. A 
pistis proceeds from certain premises (protaseis) – that this is true of all 
three technical kinds of pistis can reasonably be inferred from its being 
explicitly  said  of  those  involving  both  logos (‘argument’,  1359a6-10, 
26-9;  1377b16-20)  and  pathos  (‘emotion’,  1378a26-9).  We will  hope to 
show  from  a  crucial  passage  that  the  above  formulation  correctly 
characterises what it is about these premises and their relation to the 
judgement  in  support  of  which  they  are  offered  that  makes  them 
proper grounds for conviction.
We have already seen that for Aristotle the orator’s exercise of his craft 
should not corrupt the listener in certain ways, indeed it should assist 
him in making good judgements aimed at the truth.101 On the above 
formulation, it is clear that the orator’s presentation of pisteis does this 
by helping the listener to undertake a process of reasoning that has two 
important features. One is that the premises be ones that the listener 
finds reputable. The other is that the reasoning process itself proceed 
101Such a view undeniably has significant normative content, but will also prove 
considerably less high-minded than some competing views of rhetoric attributed to 
Aristotle. The merits of such views will be considered briefly below.
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correctly  so that  the reputable  character  of  the premises  contributes 
towards  giving  the  conclusion  a  similar  character  –  that  is,  correct 
reasoning from reputable premises serves to make the conclusion more 
reputable.
Rhetorical, Dialectical Expertise and the Nature of  Pisteis  : 1355a3-18.  
This  passage  seems  to  help  with  generating  a  clearer  picture  of 
Aristotle’s view of what a pistis is. 
Since it is plain that the expert method is concerned with the proofs  
[Gk. pisteis], and proof is demonstration of a kind [Gk. apodeixis tis]  
(for we are convinced most of all whenever we think a thing has been  
demonstrated), and a rhetorical demonstration is an enthymeme, and  
this  is  pretty  much  the  most  important  of  the  proofs,  and  the  
enthymeme is reasoning of a kind [Gk. sullogismos tis], and it is the  
job  of  dialectic  (either  dialectic  generally,  or  one  of  its  parts)  to  
consider alike all reasoning, and it is clear that the one who is best able  
to discern this – from what and how a piece of reasoning comes about –  
would also be best skilled in enthymemes, provided he also grasped the  
subject matter of the enthymeme and how it is different from cases of  
logical reasoning. For what is true and what is like the truth belong to  
the same capacity to see. And at the same time people are to a great  
extent naturally inclined towards what is true and generally find the  
truth. This is why having a canny eye for reputable views is the mark  
of  the  same  kind  of  person  as  having  a  canny  eye  for  the  truth.  
(1355a3-18)
This is a difficult passage. Consideration of the difficulties over how 
the arguments work must be postponed to another occasion. For our 
purposes,  not  much  hangs  on  this.  Whatever  the  argumentative 
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structure  of  the  passage,  and  whatever  precisely  is  the  correct 
understanding of the key terms apodeixis, tis, and sullogismos, a number 
of points seem clear about the nature of rhetorical pisteis.
Firstly, Aristotle is concerned to show that it is experts in in dialectic 
who are best placed to possess an expertise in rhetoric. This is clearly 
the  emphatic  conclusion  announced  at  a10-14.  One  might  see  the 
entirety of the present section as making the same point102 (indeed also 
the very opening slogan of the treatise, “Rhetoric is the counterpart to 
dialectic!” 1354a1). Hence the section serves as a kind of sales pitch for 
his  own  teaching,  with  Aristotle  suggesting  that  one  should  learn 
rhetoric  from  someone  like  him  whose  expertise  makes  him  well 
placed to furnish the necessary background in dialectic. The basis for 
his argument is  the nature of rhetoric  (as concerned with providing 
pisteis)  and hence the nature of  the  pisteis.  The crucial  point  for our 
purposes is that Aristotle’s argument here – however we trace it out in 
detail – starts from the nature of pisteis (a3-5). A pistis is of such a kind, 
and the most important of the pisteis, enthymeme, is of such a kind that 
it is experts in dialectic that are best placed to master them. What is it 
about expertise  in dialectic  that helps with enthymemes and  pisteis? 
Aristotle explicitly says at a11 that it is a matter of being able to discern 
“from what and how a piece of reasoning comes about” (ἐκ τίνων καὶ 
πῶς γίνεται συλλογισμός).  So,  pisteis are  such that  their  successful 
102This is confirmed by the clear echoes at a14 of Plato Phaedrus 260-273, especially 
273d2-6. Aristotle’s care at 1355a14-18 to insist against Plato’s Socrates that the expert 
orator need not know the truth about his subject matter is best explained by 
supposing that his main point in a3-18 was that expertise in dialectic enables 
expertise in rhetoric. Since Socrates had said something very similar, Aristotle might 
easily have been misunderstood as endorsing the Phaedrus position, hence the need 
for clarification.  
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production  is  a  matter  of  knowing something about  how reasoning 
works,  and  something  about  the  selection  of  propositions  for 
reasoning. Our contention is that the crucial aspect of understanding 
“how  reasoning  comes  about”  is  understanding  the  inferential 
relations  that  may  obtain  between  propositions:  particularly, 
understanding how propositions may stand to one another as premises 
to conclusion such that if one accepts (and persists in accepting) the 
premises,  one  is  urged  towards  accepting  also  the  conclusion.  This 
feature is precisely what is needed for skill in producing enthymemes 
and pisteis  generally, i.e. for being good at rhetoric. And it lies within 
the province of dialectic. The other aspect of dialectical skill that is a 
key  requirement  for  rhetorical  expertise  is  an  ability  to  select 
propositions that will serve as premises in an argument to the desired 
conclusion – an ability “to discern ...  from what ... a piece of reasoning 
comes  about”.  Obviously  part  of  an  ability  to  discern  the  right 
premises is an ability to see their inferential relations to the conclusion. 
But if this were all that was intended by this phrase, it would make the 
“from what” and the “how” of a11 almost identical. It is more likely 
that what Aristotle has additionally (and perhaps principally) in mind 
here is the dialectician’s ability to identify premises that not only stand 
in the right inferential relations to the conclusion, but that are acceptable  
to  the  listener.  These  two  features  of  dialectical  skill  mentioned 
specifically by Aristotle here help to illuminate the nature of the pisteis 
with which the passage starts. They confirm what was proposed in our 
definition of  pistis set out above. A pistis consists of premises that are 
acceptable to the listener and that stand in the right kind of relations to 
the judgement for which they are offered as a pistis.
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A second feature that sheds light on what a pistis is is the claim that a 
pistis is  “a  demonstration  of  a  kind”,  or  “some  sort  of 
demonstration”  (a4-5).103 For  on  any  plausible  interpretation  of  this 
claim,104 a demonstration (even a less than full-blooded specimen) will 
be  a  device  by  which  the  reputability  of  the  premises  confers 
reputability on the conclusion. It is for this reason that demonstration 
is a suitable instrument for teaching, learning and persuasion (An Post.  
I.1,  71a1-2,  a9-11;  Rhetoric I.2,  1355b26-35).  This  is  an  important 
addition to what we have already seen. For in dialectical reasoning, the 
practitioner’s  purpose  can  be  merely  to  get  their  “opponent”  to 
abandon their  starting position:  that  is,  abandon their  acceptance  of 
propositions  that  they  had  found  acceptable,  by  showing  that  they 
entailed an unacceptable conclusion. Reasoning can have this limited 
function,  even when it  uses  acceptable  premises.  But  demonstration 
aims at something more. Demonstration aims at the acceptance of the 
conclusion. So, in claiming that  pistis is some kind of demonstration, 
Aristotle is saying that it is comprised of things that are reputable, and 
that it is a device by which they confer reputability on something else, 
namely the conclusion.
Thirdly,  it  seems  that  we  can  say  something  stronger  about  the 
connection between  pistis  and demonstration. We see this in the way 
Aristotle supports his claim that  pistis  is  apodeixis tis. The supporting 
reason given is that we are convinced (pisteuomen, a5) most of all when 
103 cf. Burnyeat [1990] 13-30. For the present point, nothing depends on the 
intepretation of tis.
104The original sense of apodeixis to mean simply ‘show’, ‘make public’ or ‘reveal’ (cf. 
Barnes [1975] 78) is not a plausible candidate here. However stringent, technical or 
otherwise the sense is in this passage, it is a case of “showing that”, and this is 
sufficient for the above point to go through.  
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we take it  that  something has been  demonstrated.  On a very literal 
interpretation, Aristotle has a rather weak argument here. He appears 
to be making an inductive generalisation from the cases of greatest or 
best pistis (pisteuomen malista, a5) to a conclusion about pistis generally. 
The argument, on this construal, is relaxed, to put it mildly. On a more 
plausible  reading,  however,  Aristotle’s  argument  is  about  what  is 
essential  to  pistis.  What  he seems to  have  in  mind is  that  the  most 
successful cases of pistis illuminate what it is about a pistis that makes it 
successful or unsuccessful, i.e. what makes it a  good example of  pistis. 
The view thus illuminated is that a pistis is successful to the extent that 
the  conclusion  is  demonstrated,  and this  shows us  that  every  pistis 
must involve some degree of demonstrative success on pain of being so 
bad  as  a  pistis that  it  is  not  a  pistis at  all.  If  this  is  a  correct 
understanding of the argument of a5-6, we must understand “apodeixis  
tis” (a5) in the conclusion of that argument – “pistis is demonstration of 
a kind / a species of demonstration” – in such a way that Aristotle is 
not  here  affirming  that  every  case  of  pistis  is  a  defective  case  of 
demonstration. Otherwise, cases of the kind he cites apparently as the 
most successful  kind of  pistis at  a5-6 would risk  not only failing to 
attain  that  accolade,  but  failing  to  be  cases  of  pistis at  all,  making 
nonsense  of  the  argument.  It  is  obvious  that  no  such affirmation is 
involved  if  one  reads  the  conclusion  as  ‘pistis is  a  species  of 
demonstration’,  but  Burnyeat  has  presented  a  powerful  case  for 
preferring taking ‘tis’ as  alienans over just such a reading.105 Still, the 
105Burnyeat [1990] 13-39. It is not obvious that this reading cannot accommodate the 
merits of the alienans reading by reading ‘apodeixis tis’ not as “some [particular] 
species of demonstration”, but – indefinitely (cf. LSJ v.sub ‘tis’ I.A) – as 
“demonstration of some kind or other”, and allowing that the kinds of demonstration 
over which this expression ranges might include the less-than-full-blooded kinds of 
demonstration that are central to the alienans reading, defective demonstration 
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otherwise  preferable  reading  of  ‘tis’ as  alienans does  seem to  face  a 
difficulty  here,  since  it  seems  to  have  Aristotle  saying  that  pistis  is 
“demonstration of a kind”, i.e. demonstration that is defective in some 
way.106 The  difficulty  is  avoided  if  we  take  the  force  of  Aristotle’s 
assertion here to be not the negative claim that pistis is no more than a 
defective  demonstration,  but  rather  the  positive  claim  that  pistis  is 
demonstration of at least that relaxed,  less-than-full-blooded kind. If 
his  assertion  states  the  minimum  standard  of  demonstration  that  a 
pistis must attain, then there is no difficulty in accommodating cases of 
fully-fledged demonstration as examples of the most successful kind of 
(genuine)  pistis. After all,  when we have a demonstration that is not 
defective or non-standard in any way, but is a full-blooded specimen of 
demonstration,  it is indeed the case – in this case most clearly of all 
(malista a5) – that we ‘are convinced’, i.e. we are in the state that results 
from  proof.  The  suggestion  must  be  not  simply  that  being  a 
demonstration is  one thing among many that  make a proof a good 
proof, but that what it is to be a good proof is (at least in part) a matter of 
its  credentials  as  a  demonstration.  This  would  constitute  a  good 
justification for a conclusion about the nature of proof itself: that it is 
demonstration of some kind (a5). What might Aristotle intend by such 
an assertion? Clearly  this  is  not the point  at  which to  reach for  his 
technical account of demonstration from the Posterior Analytics.107 What 
is appealed to here is an everyday understanding of what it is to have 
something demonstrated. On the most obvious conjecture, two aspects 
are central: one relates to the way the premises are grasped, and the 
perhaps, but demonstration in some sense nonetheless.
106“only a sort of apodeixis, ... not as it were your full-blooded specimen, not 
something from which you can expect everything that you would normally expect 
from an apodeixis ...” Burnyeat [1990] 13.
107Burnyeat [1990] esp. 13-14.
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other concerns the way the demonstration proceeds from them to the 
conclusion.108 If  this is right, then – as in our proposed definition of 
pistis – the more reputable the premises are to the listeners,  and the 
tighter the inferential  relation between premises and conclusion, the 
better the pistis.
Together these features of Aristotle’s argument at  1355a3-18 suggest 
that the understanding of  pistis proposed above is indeed Aristotle’s. 
They also make clearer the sense in which pistis is ‘proper grounds for 
conviction’, and support our earlier contention that “proof” – while not 
perfect – has considerable merit as an English translation of “pistis”.
Support elsewhere for the proposed characterisation of Aristotle’s view 
of  pistis.  
The view may be further supported by reflection on what is involved 
in ‘being convinced’ (pisteuein). It seems as though Aristotle here thinks 
of being convinced as involving taking oneself to have proper grounds 
for conviction – at 1355a5-6 he seems to take it as simply obvious that 
the best cases of ‘being convinced’ (pisteuein) can illuminate the nature 
of a pistis, and precisely because of the kind of grounds for conviction 
that we take ourselves to have in these best cases. For him, it seems to 
be part of the meaning of ‘being convinced’ that one takes oneself to 
have some proper grounds for conviction. This would put his views in 
line with those we find at  De Anima III.3, 428a17-23. Aristotle there is 
concerned  to  show  that  phantasia is  not  doxa,  and  he  does  this  by 
showing  that  doxa involves  what  we  are  here  calling  ‘being 
108These do, in fact, have their more stringent counterparts in Aristotle’s technical 
account in the Posterior Analytics (71b20-24): the self-explanatory character of the 
axioms, and the necessity with which what is demonstrated follows from them.
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convinced’  (pisteuein,  or  pistis109).  The  argument  then  proceeds  by 
appealing to the fact that some brutes  have  phantasia,  whereas none 
have  pistis (a19,  a23)  –  hence  none  have  doxa,  and hence  phantasia  
cannot be doxa. Whether or not the last sentence (a21-3) in this passage 
is authentic, it seems that the explanation it offers for why brutes do 
not  have  pistis is  Aristotelian  and  is  that  brutes  are  not  open  to 
persuasion as is required for  pistis because they do not have  logos.  I 
take it the point is not that conviction only exists where there has been 
an actual prior episode of someone undertaking to persuade the person 
in question. The point is rather that conviction is a matter of being in 
the kind of state – affirming something on the basis of some grounds 
for doing so – that is both the typical result of persuasion, and the kind 
of state that is open to further persuasion (someone who is convinced 
of something takes it that if there were better grounds for denying that 
thing, they would cease to be convinced of it). States of conviction in 
the  De Anima as in the  Rhetoric are a matter of taking oneself  to be 
responding to proper grounds for conviction.
We see this account of proper grounds for conviction reflected in what 
Aristotle  says elsewhere  in the  Rhetoric about the kinds of  premises 
needed  for  rhetorical  argument.  Premises  need  to  be  persuasive  or 
reputable110 to the kind of people being addressed (1356b34), and this is 
a matter of their either being intrinsically plausible to them (pithanon  
109 It is clear that pistis can refer either to a state of mind, a state of conviction, as it 
must at e.g. De Anima III.3, 428a17-23, or to the grounds for someone’s conviction, as 
it must e.g. at Rhetoric I.1, 1355a3-5. In some instances, a case could be made for either 
meaning, e.g. Rhetoric I.2, 1356a13; II.1, 1377b25.
110 Endoxon at 1356b34 appears to be used as simply a synonym for pithanon, used 
immediately before this at b28. It seems to be given a slightly more precise sense at 
1357a12-13 where having premises that are ‘agreed’ seems to be distinct from and 
correlative to having premises that are ‘reputable’ (ex endoxôn).
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kai  piston,  b29)  or  being  shown  to  follow  from  things  that  are 
intrinsically plausible (b29f.). This, typically, is a matter of the premises 
being recognisable to listeners as the kind of thing they are accustomed 
to using in sound deliberation (1356b37f.). Seemingly, for premises to 
be  reputable  and  for  them  to  be  agreed  are  distinct,  but  both  can 
contribute  to  making  an  argument  persuasive  (1357a12-13).  Such 
premises may consist in likelihoods of various kinds (1357a34-b25) or 
of  examples  with  a  similarity  to  the  case  in  question  (1357a7-21). 
Interestingly,  although  premises  for  rhetorical  proofs  could  be 
intrinsically plausible or inferred from things that are, Aristotle deems 
it necessary to clarify that this does not require the orator to go back to 
first principles in the relevant subject  matter.  To do so would either 
confuse the listener  with an argument  too long to follow (1357a3-4, 
a10-12, a16-23), or would in fact involve a departure from exercising 
rhetorical expertise into the exercise of an expertise in some particular 
subject  area  (1358a2-26).  Premises  should  be  such  that  listeners  are 
disposed to regard them as reputable, either by their being intrinsically 
plausible to them already, or because they can be quickly inferred from 
things  that  are.  Finally,  there  is  the  obvious  point  that  Aristotle’s 
phrases  “to  (endechomenon)  pithanon”  –  the  (possibly)  persuasive 
(1355b15f.,  b26,  b33f.;  1356a12f.,  a20,  b28-9;  1403b19)  and  “ta  
hyparchonta  pithana”  –  the  existing  persuasive  things  (1355b10-11)  – 
typically refer simply to features of the circumstances surrounding the 
forensic case or political proposal with which the orator is concerned. 
On  our  proposed  account  of  pistis these  are  those  features  (or 
combinations of features) that the listeners are disposed to regard as 
reputable, and which stand (and can be presented as standing) in the 
relevant  kind  of  relation  to  the  speaker’s  conclusion.  In  this  way, 
Aristotle  can  insist  that  “the  things  referred  to”  (τὰ  ὑποκείμενα 
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πράγματα) by the speakers have an influence on the effectiveness of 
their case. Things that are “true” and “better” will generally yield the 
better  argued  and  more  persuasive  side  of  a  debate  (1355a36-38). 
Indeed,  he summarises his treatment  of the  pisteis as  a  treatment  of 
“what  things  give  the  facts  themselves  (αὐτὰ  τὰ  πράγματα)  their 
persuasiveness” (1403b19), and insists that it is right for the speaker to 
‘fight with the facts themselves’ (1404a6; cf. also 1416a37).
The  proposed characterisation  of   pistis   and the  use  of  premises  not   
believed by the speaker
It  will  have  been  noted that  the  proposed account  of  proof  offered 
above does  not  exclude the use by the speaker  of  premises  that  he 
himself does not take to be true or reputable. All that is required is that 
proofs consist of material that the listeners are disposed to regard as 
reputable, and that if true are good grounds for judging the conclusion 
true.  It  might  be  worried  that  this  leaves  open  the  possibility  that 
speakers pervert the course of justice or lead the assembly astray by 
appealing  to  popular  beliefs  that  they  know  to  be  misleading 
misconceptions. In so doing, they would not serve the civic goals that 
rhetoric is supposed to serve. The worry is justified, but only up to a 
point. Aristotle is optimistic about the extent to which popular views 
track the truth  (1355a14-18),  and is  happy to  allow that  even  if  the 
fallibility  of  popular  beliefs  allow  the  unscrupulous  practitioner 
opportunities  for leading the citizens astray, that same set  of beliefs 
will generally be affording  more and  better opportunities to the other 
side of the debate to persuade the citizens of what is true and right 
(1355b36-8).
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However  worrying  or  otherwise  this  is,  it  certainly  seems  to  be 
Aristotle’s  view.  There  is  a  much-discussed  example  at  Rhetoric  I.9, 
1367b22-27  of  the  kind  of  unscrupulous  practice  in  question,  an 
example which is sometimes cited as showing that Aristotle’s view of 
rhetoric  had  no  normative  content.111 In  fact  this  passage  creates  a 
difficulty  only  for  more  idealised  accounts  of  rhetorical  expertise 
sometimes attributed to Aristotle,112 and fits  nicely with the view of 
pistis offered here.
Since praise is made on the basis of actions, and what is distinctive of  
the good man is what is done from choice, you are to try to show that  
he acts from choice, and it is useful that he be taken to have done these  
actions on many occasions. This is why coincidences and things that  
happen by chance are to be taken as if they were by choice, for if many  
similar things are produced, they will be thought a sign of virtue and  
choice. (I.9, 1367b22-27)
This  is  probably  the best  example  of  such underhand practice.  It  is 
difficult to deny that Aristotle is endorsing the practices described in 
this  passage:  his  use  of  the  gerundive  ‘to  be  taken’  (lêpteon)  seems 
clearly a prescription to the orator to proceed in this way.113 But does 
111e.g. Sprute [1994] 123-7. His list of “morally questionable tricks” includes also II.24 
(discussed below) and II.21, 1395a8-10, where Aristotle’s point is surely just that it 
can sometimes be important to state something more crudely or sweepingly than is 
really the case, presumably in order to convey the force of the point. Note that even 
here, Aristotle is careful to confine such a strategy to the opening or closing 
summary, not the proofs section.
112 e.g. Irwin [1996] esp. 142-46. Irwin even cites this passage at 163 but seems not to 
see the difficulty for his position.
113 A gerundive that is undeniably prescriptive occurs 3 lines earlier ‘you are to 
try’ (peirateon), and there are myriad other examples throughout the Rhetoric. 
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this violate Aristotle’s earlier restrictions on what can count as a pistis  
and hence on what counts as an exercise of rhetorical expertise? It is 
possible  to  read  this  instruction  charitably  simply  as  advice  to  the 
orator  not  to  be  too  fussy about  whether  each  action in  a  series  of 
apparently similar actions was by chance or by choice. Or it may be 
that  the  advice  concerns  cases  where  it  is  hard  to  know  the  exact 
motives for a series of similar actions: Aristotle advises the orator to 
allocate the ‘benefit of the doubt’ in the way that suits his case. Still, let 
us adopt a less charitable reading for the sake of testing our proposed 
account of pistis,  since this passage has sometimes been read so.114 To 
take an example, I praise Helen as being compassionate (having the 
virtue  of  compassion),  and  cite  her  numerous  trips  to  the  hospital 
visiting the sick – despite the fact that I know that in several of these 
cases the fact that the people she visited were sick and in hospital was 
a matter of coincidence – she was in fact collecting debts from several 
of them.
Aristotle here describes this kind of case as a sign-argument (1367b27 
semeion),  where the sign in question is in fact a sign for two related 
things:
Sign: that Helen went often to the hospital and visited the sick.
Signified 1: that Helen makes fully-fledged prohaireseis to visit the 
sick in hospital, i.e. that she chooses these actions because they 
are cases of visiting the sick in hospital, and chooses them from 
a character-disposition.
Signified 2: that Helen is compassionate
For this argument to be a pistis, and to be the kind of thing that counts 
as an exercise of the expertise of rhetoric, it must on our account satisfy 
114e.g. as “direct instructions to lie” (Sprute [1994] 125).
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two  requirements. The first is that the ‘persuasive feature’ (to pithanon) 
in this case be presented as itself something that the listener will find 
reputable, and as something that, if true, makes it an exercise of good 
judgement to suppose that Helen is compassionate. In this case, absent 
any special reason to disbelieve it, the listeners are likely to regard the 
sign,  that  Helen  went  often  to  the  hospital  and  visited  the  sick,  as 
believable simply on the basis of the speaker’s testimony. The problem 
is supposed to arise in the way this fact is related to the beliefs that 
Helen is compassionate and that she makes prohaireseis to visit the sick 
in hospital. For simplicity, we will refer only the former of these. The 
difficulty is that there is potentially a deception here: the implication is 
that Helen’s coincidental visits were caused by her compassion, when 
in fact they were not, and the speaker knows they were not.115 Aristotle, 
on this reading, comes very close to endorsing lying (“are to be taken 
as in the realm of choice”, 1367b25f.), since it sounds as though he is 
suggesting that the orator assert directly what he knows to be false, 
namely that  these  occurrences  were  a result  of  the relevant  kind of 
choice.  So,  there  would  be  plenty  here  to  count  objectionable,  by 
Aristotle’s own lights116 as well as our own. Still, I think that even on 
this  uncharitable  reading we do not have a violation of  the specific 
normative conditions  proposed above for  something’s  being  a  pistis 
and hence being an exercise of rhetoric. The reason is this. The fact that 
Helen  has  visited  the  sick  in  hospital  many  times  simply  is good 
grounds  for  supposing  that  she  is  compassionate.  The  move  from 
believing  the  sign  to  believing  the  signified  is  wholly  proper,  even 
though  there  is  no  guaranteed  connection  at  all  between  sign  and 
signified, and certainly the sign does not guarantee the truth of what it 
115Note that on the more charitable interpretations of this passage, such contexts 
would not be among those that Aristotle has in mind for what he advises here.
116 Nicomachean Ethics II.7, 1108a19-23; IV.7, 1127a17-26.
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is appropriately taken to signify. It is an exercise of good judgement on 
the listeners’ part if they judge Helen compassionate on the basis of 
this  sign.  Aristotle’s  language here  is  non-committal  about  whether 
this  is  genuine case of  a  sign (sêmeion)  –  he says that  many similar 
things “will be believed to be” (doxei) a sign of virtue and choice. This 
might imply that he thinks this is not a genuine case of a sign, since the 
coincidences were not caused by virtue or choice. But equally he may 
simply be showing that what is important in deploying this kind of 
proof is what the listener thinks. The listener (quite properly) registers 
something  like  the  following:  that  the  likelihood  of  Helen  being 
compassionate,  given  her  many  hospital  visits,  is  higher  than  it 
otherwise would be. On something like this basis, he takes her visits to 
be a sign of her compassion. Even though, in fact, these visits are not 
caused,  as  perhaps is  implied,  by her  compassion,  still  it  is  entirely 
proper for the listener to move from believing that Helen has made 
many  visits  to  the  sick  in  hospital  to  believing  that  she  is 
compassionate. So it is entirely compatible with producing genuinely 
rhetorical  proofs  that  these  use  material  that  the  speaker  does  not 
himself believe.
Quite aside from these exegetical considerations, one should note that 
although this kind of behaviour on the part of a speaker may often be 
objectionably insincere or deceptive this need not always be so. Indeed, 
the use of premises one believes to be flawed need not even involve 
insincerity at all. An atheist might use genuinely rhetorical proofs in 
persuading  an audience  of  Christians  by appeal  to  the authority  of 
Christ  or  the  Bible,  whilst  freely  avowing  that  he  himself  did  not 
recognise their authoritative status.
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A “weaker” view of   pistis   considered,  and the problem of apparent   
enthymemes in  Rhetoric  II.24.  
In case it is thought that this leaves Aristotle’s account of pistis  rather 
weak,  and inadequate to  promote the civic  goals  set  out earlier,  we 
should contrast  our proposed account of  pistis with another  weaker 
possibility.  That is  that  a  pistis involve something that  the audience 
merely  take  to  be proper  grounds  for  inferring  the  conclusion.  This 
really  seems  too  loose,  and  seems  not  even  to  rule  out  the  use  of 
irrelevant speaking that Aristotle specifically excludes in Rhetoric I.1. In 
cases where folk are swayed by irrelevant speaking, at the time they 
endorse  the  conclusion,  they  typically  (mistakenly)  take  it  that  the 
speech has constituted good grounds for believing it.
Perhaps there is a plausible version of the loose view  that would rule 
out irrelevant speaking. Some exegetical support for a looser view than 
the one I have proposed comes from passages seeming to allow that 
apparent enthymemes can constitute genuine  pisteis, and hence find a 
place in the art  of  rhetoric.  Still,  1356a35ff.  seems inconclusive here, 
and the evidence of II.24 is not conclusive either. Many of the topoi of 
II.24  are  unobjectionable.  In  relation  to  those  that  are  not,  while 
“chresimon” (‘useful’,  1401a9)  and  “touto  dei  poiein”  (‘one  should  do 
this’,  1401a27f.)  seem  to  suggest  that  Aristotle  endorses  these 
techniques  as  part  of  rhetoric,  1402a26-28  possibly  implies  that  he 
excludes  them  from  the  art  of  rhetoric  and  confines  them  to  the 
practices of non-artistic, manipulative ‘rhetoric’ (in the pejorative sense 
recognised at 1355b19f.) and of eristic. Arguably, Aristotle’s position at 
1355b15-21 and 1356a35-b8 is this. It is part of the knowledge involved 
in  rhetorical  expertise  to  know  how  to  use  merely  apparent 
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enthymemes effectively.117 But exercising the expertise involves having 
particular aims (involving the listeners’ good judgement) which could 
not be furthered by the use of  techniques  that  led listeners  to  form 
judgements improperly.
More “high-minded” views of  pistis   considered 
A  passage  like  1367b22-27  shows  clearly  what  is  misleading  about 
more  high-minded  views  of  Aristotelian  rhetoric,  such  as  that  of 
Irwin.118
“The view that  considerations  of  what  is  “fine”  and morally 
right enter into deliberation about means fits Aristotle’s claim 
about  rhetoric.  When he says that  the orator  must  not try  to 
persuade every audience and must not be unscrupulous in the 
choice  of  means  to  secure  persuasion,  he  implies  that  moral 
considerations  should  influence  the  orator’s  decisions.  Since 
moral considerations belong to political science, the relevance of 
these considerations may explain why Aristotle regards rhetoric 
as an appendage of political science.” ([1996] 145-6)
We have already offered a rather different explanation of the way in 
which  Aristotle  thinks  rhetoric  and  political  science  are  related  (to 
which  should  be  added  the  concern  with  character,  which  adds 
another but very limited way in which rhetoric is related to political 
science, as a sort of offshoot. 1356a25-7119). We note in passing that, pace 
117This would yield a sense in which it makes sense to advise the orator on how 
fallacious techniques “should” be used (cf. 1401a27f.): i.e. if you were to undertake to 
use them, this is how you should do it.
118 cf. also Halliwell [1994] 216-9, 221, 228-30; Wörner [1990] 24; Grimaldi [1972] 19-21. 
The issue is discussed at length and a resolution different from mine offered in 
Engberg-Pedersen [1996].
119This is what I take to be the correct understanding of 1356a25-7, the passage to 
which Irwin appears to allude (cf. “appendage of political science”) in the passage 
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Irwin,  Aristotle  does  not  quite  say  that  the  orator  must  not  try  to 
persuade every audience – he says that with some listeners it wouldn’t 
be easy even with the most exact understanding of the subject matter, 
and indeed that deploying that  kind of ‘scientific’ knowledge in those 
circumstances  would  be  impossible  (1355a24-7).  Still,  Aristotle  does 
indeed  say  that  there  are  some kinds  of  persuasion  that  the  orator 
should  not  undertake.  The  orator  should  not  persuade  listeners  of 
“inferior things” (ta  phaula) (1355a31).  This,  I  think, is  a much more 
limited  restriction  than  that  implied  by  Irwin.  Most  significantly, 
Aristotle  does  not  either  say  or  imply  that  to  persuade  listeners  of 
inferior things would not count as an exercise of rhetorical expertise, or 
as a case of producing pisteis. So, the objection to the handbook writers 
at the start of the treatise and the objection to persuading people of 
inferior things here are of two very different kinds. Irrelevant speaking 
is  objectionable  in  a  way  which  disqualifies  it  from  counting  as 
producing  pisteis and hence from being an exercise of rhetoric at all. 
This kind of technique cannot promote good judgement in the citizens 
listening,  and  so  cannot  possibly  contribute  to  the  civic  aims  that 
rhetoric serves. In this sense, because rhetoric contributes, as we would 
say,  epistemically  to the success of the state,  there are some  epistemic  
requirements, failure to meet which disqualifies something from being 
an  exercise  of  rhetoric  at  all.  Persuading people  of  what  is  base, 
however,  is  objectionable  on  (as  we  might  say)  moral  rather  than 
epistemic  grounds.  It  is  of course true that Aristotle thinks that with 
oratory, as with all human activity, there are requirements, claims of 
virtue and considerations of what is “fine”, that mean that an orator 
should not exercise his expertise in certain ways.120 But failure to meet 
quoted.
120It is, in any case, not clear what these “inferior things” are of which an orator ought 
not to persuade people. Some take “phaulos” to mean – roughly – bad. The 
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these requirements entails only that the orator is acting badly, it does 
not disqualify his activity from being an exercise of rhetoric, a case of 
producing  pisteis.  Notice also that a mere handful of lines further on 
from the passage to which Irwin alludes, Aristotle explicitly allows that 
rhetorical expertise – like other good things – can be used wrongly and 
thereby cause great harm (1355b2-7).
This  approach  seems  also  to  provide  the  right  response  to  worries 
arising  from  Aristotle’s  apparent  recommendation  of  arousing  the 
passion of phthonos (envy) in the audience, as an exercise of rhetorical 
expertise.121 Such  a  practice  might  be  objectionable  on  ethical 
grounds.122 Nevertheless, even if so, the most this would show is that 
the speaker should not arouse phthonos in his listeners. But this is fully 
compatible,  on  our  proposed  view,  with  supposing  that  arousing 
phthonos can – even on those occasions – constitute a genuine case of 
providing  a  pistis,  and  hence  be  a  genuine  exercise  of  rhetorical 
expertise. As such, it should come as no surprise to find in a treatise on 
rhetoric  instruction on how to arouse  phthonos,  alongside some less-
predominant meaning in LSJ has to do with inferiority of status, which suggests an 
objection of more limited scope. Or Aristotle’s objection here might even be to 
arguing for the “weaker” side of a case: that a virtuous orator ought never be trying 
to make the weaker case appear the stronger.
121 Rhetoric II.10, 1388a27-30 is very naturally read as offering such a recommendation. 
The issue is ably discussed in Sanders [forthcoming], who argues that there is no such 
recommendation.
122The objection would run as follows. Phthonos is inferior (Gk. phaulon, 1388a35f. –  
plausibly ‘bad’, since it is here contrasted with epieikes) and belongs to inferior (or 
‘bad’) people – so to arouse it risks reinforcing an ethically bad attribute in the citizen 
audience.
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than-glowing remarks about the ethical credentials of the emotion and 
those who feel it.123
Applying the characterisation of rhetorical  pisteis   to each kind of pistis.  
Logos   proofs 
Successful  proofs  of  the  kind  Aristotle  describes  as  proceeding 
‘through the argument’ (1356a19) will have the following key features.
(1) The audience is disposed to regard pistis P as reputable, and the 
speaker presents P to them as such:
a. the audience EITHER taking P to be intrinsically plausible
b. OR coming to see that P is warranted by things that they find 
intrinsically plausible 
(2) The speaker presents P to the audience as proper grounds for 
judgement J – i.e. as so related to J that if the audience regard P 
as  reputable,  then  they  have  proper  grounds  for  making 
judgement J because of P. And the audience accept this.
(3) While  the  audience  may  or  may  not  be  correct  about  the 
reputability  of  P,  they  are  correct  to  recognise  the  relation 
between  P’s  being  reputable  and  the  probity  of  making 
judgement J.
(4) The  audience  recognises  P  as  proper  grounds  for  making 
judgement J.
The end result, of course, is not necessarily that the audience comes to 
make judgement J, but that they come to recognise what they take to be 
proper grounds for making it. Some more complex cases may involve 
123 1388a35-6.
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iterations of the above schema, such that where the audience comes to 
what they take to be a properly formed judgement as a result of this 
kind of proof, the orator may then use this judgement as the basis for a 
further argument. That is, J may be merely an interim conclusion, one 
step in a longer argument.124
How this works in the case of  ethos   proofs. 
Proofs of the kind Aristotle describes as being ‘in the character of the 
speaker’  (1356a2),  or  ‘through  his  character’  (a4f.),  will  have  the 
following key features.
1. The orator  presents  the  audience  with evidence  that  he  is  of 
good character.
2. The  audience  regard  it  as  reputable  on  this  basis  that  this 
particular speaker is of good character.
3. The  audience  infer  from  this  that  the  speaker  is  trustworthy 
(pistos)
4. The  audience  hears  this  particular  speaker  recommend 
judgement J.
5. So  the  audience  believe  the  following:  this  speaker  is 
trustworthy, and he recommends J, so probably it is correct to 
judge J.
6. The audience recognise this speaker’s trustworthiness as proper 
grounds for making judgement J.
124 Aristotle’s practical advice on keeping rhetorical arguments short, in the section 
1357a7-21, is just that: there is nothing in the formal structure of rhetorical arguments 
that prohibits multiple steps. It is the cognitive limitations of the audience that mean 
that an argument must not be too long to follow.
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In the terms of my earlier proposal, there is here a pistis of which the 
audience have a well-founded acceptance, and which provides proper 
grounds for making judgement J. The  pistis is the conjunction of ‘this 
speaker is  trustworthy’  and ‘this speaker recommends judgement  J’. 
The  second conjunct  is  obviously  something  that  it  is  easy  for  the 
audience to find reputable, simply by hearing the speaker recommend 
J in his speech. The first conjunct comes from taking the speaker to be 
of good character. At times, Aristotle presents this as though it were a 
very intellectual matter (II.1, 1378a6ff.), where the speaker’s character 
is  inferred  from  evidence  he  presents  in  his  speech  for  his  own 
wisdom, virtue and goodwill, and then the speaker’s trustworthiness 
(axiopistos  1356a5f.,  pistos 1378a6,  a15)  is  then  inferred  from  these 
elements of his good character. But I take it that we need not suppose 
this to be an explicit thought process in the listener’s mind. In fact it is 
better  thought  of  as  the  activation  of  a  disposition  –  evidence  of 
someone’s  wisdom,  virtue  or  goodwill  is  sufficient  to  activate  a 
(rational)  disposition  to  treat  that  person  as  trustworthy.  Aristotle 
more-or-less says this in his book I formulation concerning character 
proofs at 1356a6ff., “we believe / trust / treat-as-reliable good people 
more, and we do so more readily: this applies generally on all subjects, 
but  applies  absolutely  where  precision  is  impossible  and  there  are 
things to be said on either side.” Clearly Aristotle intends this both as a 
general statement about how humans are disposed to respond to what 
others say, and as an  explanation of how the character of the speaker 
can function as a pistis, as a basis for being justified in accepting some 
further conclusion. So, presenting evidence for the good character of 
the  speaker  functions  in  rhetoric  simply  to  activate  this  general 
disposition in these particular circumstances, in relation to this speaker, 
and what he is saying now. The listeners’ apprehension of the speaker’s 
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character need not be an explicit thought process to which they attend, 
merely  something they –  one way or  another  – take to  be  the case 
(phainesthai 1377b26, hypolambanein b27, dokounta 1378a14, phaneien a16). 
They believe the things Pericles has said, because they believe Pericles 
– he himself is what is pistos, and if his character is good it provides the 
strongest of proofs (1356a13). When asked to justify why he thought a 
particular  course  of  action  was  best,  an  assemblyman  could  reply, 
“because  Pericles  said  it  was,”  perhaps  supplemented  with  some 
comment on Pericles’ wisdom, virtue and patriotism.
(How enthymeme  might  turn  out  to  be  the  body  of  proof  on  this 
model)
Before we come to how this model works for pathos (emotion) proofs, 
we may make some observations about the role of enthymemes. This 
model  of  what  is  required  for  something  to  be  a  pistis fits  with  a 
plausible reading of Aristotle’s assertion at 1354a15 that enthymeme is 
the “body of  pistis”. Let us recall that, for Aristotle, enthymemes are 
pieces  of  inferential  reasoning  (1355a8)  that  constitute 
“considerations”125 in favour of the speaker’s  case.  On the proposed 
understanding  of  proof,  enthymemes  will  underlie  the  workings  of 
proofs of all three kinds, logos, ethos and (as we shall see) pathos proofs. 
The  expression  “the  body  of”  (we  might  compare  our  English 
expression  “the  guts  of”)  need  not  carry  the  implication  that  there 
could never be a case of pistis that did not involve an enthymeme. But 
the implication would be that,  in most cases,126 something’s  being a 
pistis would be as a result of its being substantially an enthymeme. This 
125The literal meaning of enthymema is a consideration. Cf. above n.18, and Burnyeat 
[1990] for more detail on the kinds of inferential reasoning involved in an 
enthymeme.
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is because even in the kinds of proof that use character and emotion, 
one can describe the way in which the proof works as an enthymeme. 
These proofs involve the listener moving from accepting one or more 
“premises” to accepting a “conclusion” in a way that can be accounted 
for precisely by the way in which those premises are related: they are 
related in such a way that the premises serve to make the conclusion 
reputable.  Thus,  if  one looks  at  the  contents of  the  listener’s  mental 
states, the things he accepts as he follows the proof, one has a set of 
premises and a conclusion, and an inference that has the structure of an 
enthymeme. We might allow that the standard case of an enthymeme 
involves the listener consciously  believing the premises, believing that 
the conclusion is made reputable by the premises, and then coming to 
believe  the  conclusion.  Character-proofs  and  Emotion-proofs  will 
simply be variants on this standard case since they will involve mental 
states  that  constitute  acceptance  of  one or more premises  of  such a 
piece of reasoning, but without those mental states necessarily being 
ones of consciously believing those premises.
On this understanding, we distinguish the relevant ways of describing 
how a proof works, seeking to highlight at each point the contents of 
the listener’s mental states.
Ethos-proofs:
1. I  hear  Callias  credibly  present  evidence  of  his  own  good 
character
2. I trust Callias (I treat Callias as being of good character)
3. I know that Callias asserts that J
126 The obvious exceptions are logos-proofs using examples (and perhaps some kinds 
of signs), and perhaps merely-apparent enthymemes, which Aristotle seems to allow 
to be cases of logos proof at 1356a35ff..
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4. I believe J
This can be redescribed in terms of the contents of my mental states.
1. Evidence for: Callias is of good character
a. This evidence is reputable
2. Callias is of good character
3. Callias recommends J
Therefore (or ‘this is good grounds for asserting’)
4. J
And what we have here in this latter sequence seems to be an example 
of an enthymeme, where the premises recommend the conclusion. We 
should note that step 2 above involves a mental state – trusting Callias 
– that we can treat as having the intentional contents ‘Callias is of good 
character’. It constitutes good judgement to trust someone on the basis 
of evidence for their good character, and it is similarly a matter of good 
judgement  to  make  judgements  because  they  are  recommended  by 
someone in whom you have a properly-formed trust. This is a case of 
good judgement precisely because of the underlying enthymeme, i.e. 
because trusting has a kind of intentional content which is about the 
trusted  person’s  character,  and  if  this  is  correct,  it  is  capable  of 
constituting proper grounds for precisely the further judgements that it 
disposes you to make when you trust somebody.
Pathos- (emotion-) proofs
Similarly,  the  suggestion is  that  the  emotions  involved  constitute 
affirmations of one or more premises that are part of an underlying 
enthymeme. So we get a sequence of mental states as follows.
1. I register evidence that Smith is a dangerous character
2. I  feel  afraid  of  Smith  (I  feel  that  Smith  is  a  dangerous 
character)
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3. I believe Smith is guilty of assault
This can be redescribed in terms of the contents of those mental states.
1. Evidence for: Smith is a dangerous character
a. This evidence is reputable
2. Smith is a dangerous character
3. Smith is guilty of assault
If  this  is  right,  then  here  too  we  see  the  key  characteristics  of 
enthymeme:  the  premises  confer  reputability  on the  conclusion.  We 
will  consider  below and in  subsequent  chapters  whether  the  above 
could indeed form the basis of Aristotle’s view of pathos-pisteis. For the 
moment,  this  sketch  of  a  view  shows  how  it  could  be  that 
enthymematic argument underlies all of the kinds of technical proofs 
within Aristotle’s theory of rhetorical pistis.
How this then sets a challenge for  pathos   proofs: an apparent problem  
solved but a deeper challenge generated.
We sketched above an outline of how in all kinds of  pisteis including 
pathos-proofs there is an enthymematic argument underlying the proof. 
But in that account, we did no more than set out how there could be a 
sequence of  mental  states  with contents  such that  certain  inferential 
relations held between those contents. Proof requires more than this. 
We said that  a  requirement  was that if  the listeners  were correct  to 
regard  the  premises  as  reputable,  it  would  be  an  exercise  of  good 
judgement for them to make the recommended judgement  because of  
the premises. That is, what is presented must be such that the listener 
could believe the conclusion for that reason. Indeed, it is precisely when 
the listener believes the conclusion on the basis of the proof that the proof 
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has been successful.127 It is a requirement of rhetorical proofs that, if 
they  are  successful  and  the  listeners  acquire  beliefs  on  the  basis  of 
accepting what is  presented,  their  acceptance of  the premises  of the 
proof  be  a  well-founded basis  for  believing  the  conclusion.  In  other 
words,  once  it  is  granted  that  the  listener  accepts  as  reputable  the 
premises  of  the  proof  they  should  not  be  liable  to  any  epistemic 
criticism for taking these as good grounds for believing the conclusion.
An initial puzzle is that this appears at first sight problematic in the 
case of emotions.
In general, we can see whether something is a good basis for believing 
a conclusion by reference to two tests.
1. Can this thing be cited by believers themselves as a justification 
for their believing the conclusion?
2. Can we cite this thing as a third-party explanation for how a 
believer was justified in believing the conclusion?
In the case of argument proofs, it is obvious that these tests are passed. 
We  justify  our  beliefs  by  citing  an  argument,  and  even  where  the 
argument  turns  out  to  be  flawed,  we  might  cite  the  fact  that  we 
believed it at the time to justify rationally our believing the conclusion. 
Similarly,  we explain  how someone’s  belief  in  a  conclusion is  well-
founded  by  adverting  to  a  good  argument  that  they  believe  that 
supports  it;  and  likewise  it  constitutes  some  level  of  defence  of  a 
person’s  good judgement  to advert  to an argument whose premises 
127 This is not to say that the proof is necessarily deficient if it is not accepted – 
unusually stupid people might fail to understand a perfectly good rhetorical proof, 
for example. But proofs aim at being the basis on which someone believes their 
conclusion.
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they believe, even when those premises are known in fact to be false (or 
when their believing them is known to lack proper grounds).
A similar story can be told for believing someone on the basis of their 
character. We support our beliefs by reference to the character of the 
person on whose authority we believed the conclusion. We explain the 
well-foundedness of the beliefs of others by reference to their having 
received them on trust from someone trustworthy, and we do so even 
when the beliefs have turned out false.
So,  I  might  believe  that  p  because  I  believe  an  argument  to  p,  or 
because I believe Callias (who says that p). These are familiar ways in 
which we justify our beliefs  to  ourselves  and others  – we relay the 
argument that persuaded us, or we advert to the reliable testimony of 
the person we believed, “Callias told me, and he is honest as the day is 
long.” 
Our claim is that there is a similar story to be told about the emotions 
and the justification of beliefs.
This might not seem immediately obvious for two reasons. Firstly, we 
do not cite our emotional states directly as justification for our beliefs 
in the way we do cite an argument or the character of an informant. In 
answer to the question, “Why did you think Smith guilty?” it seems a 
weak kind of justification to say, “Because I was in the emotional state 
of fearing him.” Secondly, we do not cite the emotional states of others 
directly as part of explanations of their epistemic success. Thus, “she 
judged that Smith was guilty because she was afraid of him,” would be 
more typically understood not as a justification of her judgement at all, 
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but as a way of saying that her judgement was impaired. There is thus 
some reason to doubt whether emotions can justify beliefs in the ways 
that facts and beliefs can. 
However, the resolution of this apparent problem should already be 
clear. If we simply use the form of expression “feel that ...” to describe 
emotional states, then they start to seem on a par with beliefs. Thus, we 
may offer justifications of our beliefs as follows. “I believe that Smith is 
guilty of assault  because I feel  he is  a dangerous character.”  This is 
simply a redescription of my feeling afraid of Smith making explicit the 
content of the emotion. This also suggests that if my fear of Smith had 
played an important part in my concluding that Smith was guilty of 
assault,  it  would not  be  misleading  to  say,  “I  believe  that  Smith is 
guilty of assault because he is a dangerous character.” That is, once we 
understand clearly the role played by the contents of emotional states, 
these  contents  can  be  cited  directly,  in  justification  of  conclusions 
inferred from them, in just the same way as we do with beliefs.
This, I propose, is exactly how Aristotle is able to see the arousal of the 
passions  as  the  provision  of  proof,  and  is  the  explanation  at  work 
behind  his  belief  that  passions  affect  our  judgements  (1356a15f.; 
1377b31-78a5)  –  a  belief  that  features  in  the  very  definition  of  the 
passions offered in the Rhetoric (II.1, 1378a19-22).
A deeper problem for the claim that arousing emotions is  a way of 
providing proof
However, substantiating this account presents a deeper challenges. The 
contents of emotions must be affirmed by the subject in something like 
the  way beliefs  are  –  they  cannot  merely  be  appearances.  In  short, 
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Aristotelian passions must be shown to have the right characteristics to 
occupy the role in pisteis  proposed here. Showing this will be the task 
of chapters 5 and 6.
Before this challenge is taken up, however, we should address directly 
a  long-standing  problem128 facing  any  interpretation  of  Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric in relation to  emotion-arousal.  The problem is  the apparent 
stark contradiction on whether emotion-arousal has any place at all in 
rhetorical expertise. The next chapter criticises previous approaches to 
this problem, and proposes a new solution.
128Stephanus seems to worry about it in his commentary on the Rhetoric (Stephanus 
287-8, CAG 21 pp. 297-8).
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Chapter  4  –  The  contradiction  problem  over  emotion-
arousal
The principal focus of this chapter will be to propose a solution to the 
contradiction  problem  of  Aristotle’s  Rhetoric,  the  difficulty  that 
Aristotle appears to hold contradictory views about the admissibility of 
emotion-arousal as a component of rhetorical persuasion.
We have seen that Aristotle objects to the techniques put forward by 
the writers of rhetorical handbooks on the grounds that these cannot 
contribute  to  the provision of  proofs  (e.g.  1354a11-16).  Since it  is  in 
proofs alone that rhetorical skill is exercised, their handbooks tell us 
nothing  much  about  the  expertise  of  rhetoric.  The  techniques  in 
question  are  clearly  connected  with  emotion-arousal  (“slander,  pity,  
anger and similar passions of the soul”  a16f., “anger, envy or pity” a24f.), 
and we shall see that it is the prominence in Aristotle’s critical remarks 
of this connection that has given rise to puzzles about whether these 
criticisms are compatible with the important place (as one of the three 
kinds of technical proof) given to emotion-arousal in his own position.
I shall be principally concerned with setting out and opposing what I 
shall  call  the “Contradiction View” (hereafter  ‘the  CV’).129 That  is,  I 
shall be opposing the interpretation of the relevant passages that gives 
rise to a contradiction within the  Rhetoric. Whilst this position offers 
quite  a  plausible  interpretation  of  some  key  passages,  it  generates 
129 Barnes [1995] 259-262; Wisse [1989] 17-20; Fortenbaugh [1992] section VII; Kennedy 
[1985];  perhaps  Cope  [1877]  6.  If  the  “Contradiction  View”  can  be  shown  to  be 
incorrect, then this further undermines the motivation for attributing to Aristotle two 
conceptions  of  rhetoric,  an “austere”   or  idealised  conception  and a  “normal”  or 
pragmatic conception. See above Ch. 1 n. 37.
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significant  difficulties  in  other  respects.  Quite  apart  from  the 
contradiction  itself  which  this  view  obviously  generates,  the  other 
difficulties with the CV are enough to make it deeply unattractive.  I 
thus offer an alternative interpretation that resolves the contradiction, 
ascribing  to  Aristotle  a  position  that  is  consistent  throughout  the 
treatise. Of course, I am not the first to attempt this task. Many have 
felt that somehow the interpretation of  Rhetoric I.1 offered in the CV 
cannot be correct,  and have sought to interpret this chapter in ways 
that avoid inconsistency with the rest of the treatise.130 Hence, I will 
also make clear how my resolution of the difficulties, though having 
much in common with some of these accounts, differs from them in 
important respects  and represents  a genuinely  new approach to the 
issue. The claim is that the new approach preserves what is attractive 
about  these  previous  solutions  whilst  avoiding  the  intractable 
difficulties  they have typically faced in finding the desired views in 
Aristotle’s text. It also, arguably, provides – and turns crucially on – a 
new  and  historically  highly  plausible  picture  of  the  targets  of 
Aristotle’s criticism in Rhetoric I.1.
I
The apparent Contradiction Problem and the “Contradiction View”
The CV is  an exegetical  conclusion based on the  following difficult 
passages in the Rhetoric, in which Aristotle criticises his predecessors.
These days, those who put together Arts of Speaking have provided us  
with scarcely a part of it.131 For it is only the proofs that belong to the  
art,  other  things  are  mere  accessories.  But they  say  nothing  about  
130 Cope  [1867]  4-6;  Cooper  [1999];  Wardy  [1996]  114-6;  Grimaldi  [1972]  44; 
Schuetrumpf [1994]; Burnyeat [1990] 10 n.26.
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enthymemes, which are the body of proof; whereas they devote most of  
their treatment to things that are outside the issue. For slander, and  
pity and anger and passions of the soul of this kind are not about the  
issue, but aimed at the juror. (1354a11-18)
One shouldn’t warp the juror by leading him on to anger, or envy or  
pity, for that would be like someone warping the ruler he is about to  
use. (1354a24-26)
If this is correct, then it is obvious that it is an expertise in irrelevance  
[lit. “things outside the issue”] that is the subject discussed by those  
who give definitions of other things, such as what the introduction or  
narrative should contain or each of the other parts of the speech – since  
in  them they  busy themselves  with nothing except  how to  put  the  
judge  into  a  certain  condition,  and they  set  out  nothing about  the  
proofs that belong to the expertise, that is to say the means of becoming  
good at enthymemes. (1354b16-22)
On the face of it, what is at issue is the arousal of emotions in general. 
The lists – anger, pity, envy, and the general phrases “passions of the 
soul such as these”, “put the judge into a particular condition”, etc., 
certainly suggest this. These other writers saw stirring the emotions as 
part  of  rhetoric,  and  Aristotle  criticises  them  not  merely  for  their 
exclusive focus on these things, but for including them within rhetoric 
at all.  He is absolutely crystal clear – the art of rhetoric is about the 
131 Or  “have produced only  a  small  part  of  it”  depending  on whether  one reads 
“οὐδὲν  ὡς  εἰπεῖν  πεπορίκασιν  αὐτῆς  μόριον”  or  “ὀλίγον πεποιήκασιν  αὐτῆς 
μόριον”  (or  indeed  “ὀλίγον πεπονήκασιν  αὐτῆς  μόριον”  as  Kassel  [1976] 
conjectures).  In  fact,  little  hangs  on  this  difference,  since  there  is  an  uncontested 
“οὐδὲν” at 1354b21 in a passage clearly aimed at making the same point.
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technical proofs, and centres around enthymemes; it does not include 
things  that  are  “outside  the  issue”  (or  “irrelevant”).  Emotions  are 
outside the issue, and so arousing them is no part of rhetoric.
The apparent contradiction is then striking, when Aristotle affirms at I.
2.1356a1-20 that arousal of listeners’ emotions is one of the three kinds 
of proof that belong to the art. Indeed, in this passage he appears to 
make the very link that is so problematic. He says the following about 
the kind of proofs that work through the emotions of the listeners.
[Proofs]  through  the  listeners,  whenever  they  are  brought  into  an  
emotional state by the speech: for we do not make judgements in the  
same way when upset as when we are glad; or when hostile as when  
friendly. And this is, as we said, the only thing the current handbook  
writers attempt to treat. These things will be made clear one by one  
when we speak about the emotions.(1356a14-19)
So, in this passage, Aristotle is talking about his own three technical 
proofs; he refers forward to his account of the emotions in II.1-11; and 
he says – referring back to his own remarks at I.1 – that it was this very 
subject  that  previous  writers  spent  their  labours  on:  their  fault 
mentioned here seems to be that they treated of nothing else. On the 
face of it, it seems that here Aristotle’s  pistis-by-emotion, one of three 
kinds of entechnoi pisteis (technical proofs) in his own theory of rhetoric, 
is the very same subject which, in I.1., he rejects as having no place in 
rhetoric.132 The above passages, on the natural reading just given, seem 
132 This is a difficult passage for anyone denying that Aristotle contradicts himself in 
the  Rhetoric in  relation  to  emotion-arousal.  An  alternative  understanding  of  this 
passage will be offered below. 
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to  provide  a  strong  basis  for  thinking  that  Aristotle’s  views  in  the 
Rhetoric on emotion-arousal are contradictory.
So,  what  I  am  calling  the  “Contradiction  View”  (CV)  is  firstly  the 
exegetical view that the key phrases,
“slander and pity and anger and passions of  the soul of  this  kind”  
(1354a16f.)
“leading him on to anger or envy or pity” (1354a24f.)
refer  to  the  passions  in  general,  and  that  the  handbook  writers’ 
techniques are criticised on the basis not that they involve emotion-
arousal  in  the  wrong  way,  but  that  they  involve  the  arousal  of 
emotions at all.
It is secondly, and consequently, the view that there is something of 
whose role in rhetoric  Aristotle approves in  Rhetoric II.1-11,  I.2,  etc., 
and  of  whose  role  in  rhetoric  he  disapproves  in  Rhetoric  I.1.  More 
strongly still, there is something of which Aristotle says in Rhet I.2, II.1, 
etc. that it has an important role in rhetoric as one of the three entechnoi  
pisteis, and of which he says in Rhet I.1 that it has no role in rhetoric. So, 
for example, Barnes and Wisse, whilst differing as to their diagnosis of 
how Aristotle’s text came to contain a contradiction, both clearly hold 
the view that there is indeed a stark contradiction here.
Barnes writes:
“[in  Rhetoric  I, Chapter 1] the art is austere: although arousing 
the emotions may well  be effective in getting an audience on 
your side,  the study of  the emotions is  no  part  of  Aristotle’s 
rhetoric – it is not, strictly speaking, a mode of persuasion. … 
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[but] the contention of Chapter 1 seems to be rejected in Chapter 
2.  Here  rhetoric  is  still  concerned  with  “the  modes  of 
persuasion”.  But  Aristotle  now  distinguishes  among  these 
modes. … As for the technical modes [at 1358a2-4] … the second 
item  looks  suspiciously  like  the  appeal  to  emotions  which 
Chapter 1 expressly banned, a suspicion which is confirmed a 
few lines later at 1358a13-14. … Something is awry. Perhaps a 
subtler scrutiny will show that the first two chapters of the work 
are  after  all  consistent  with  one another?  Perhaps  we should 
rather  suppose  that  the  two  chapters  are  “doublets,”  one  of 
them  originally  written  to  supplant  the  other,  which  were 
unconvincingly  published  together  by  Andronicus?  Perhaps 
Aristotle was in a muddle himself? Most scholars now prefer the 
first of these suggestions.133 Myself, I opt for the second. … In 
sum, Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 do not seem to cohere with one 
another.”   (Barnes [1995] 261-263)
Similarly, Wisse writes:
“The  contradiction  is  obvious:  the  ‘technical’  means  of 
persuasion  are  here  identified  with  the  enthymeme,  and 
everything else, especially pathos, is explicitly excluded from the 
‘art’ (technê). … It is inescapable, therefore, to accept that here 
[viz. in Rhetoric I.1] Aristotle does not regard pathos as part of the 
art of rhetoric, which is inconsistent with his concept of the three 
technical  pisteis put  forward  in  the  second  chapter  of  the 
Rhetoric. … Accordingly, attempts to interpret the first chapter 
differently  and  to  remove  the  inconsistency  are  all 
133 I  will  show  below  that  there  are  serious  problems  with  previous  attempts  to 
resolve the contradiction. The resolution proposed here proceeds on quite different 
grounds from the proposals found unconvincing by Barnes and Wisse.
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unconvincing.  Grimaldi’s  idea,  e.g.,  that  Aristotle  only  rejects 
‘emotional  appeals  which are  totally extraneous to  the issue’, 
and that he sanctions appeals which are not, has no support in 
the  text  of  the  first  chapter:  such  a  distinction  is  simply  not 
there.  Sprute’s  claim  that  Aristotle’s  statements  in  1,1  only 
concern an ideal art of rhetoric, corresponding to an ideal set of 
laws, will not do either. Aristotle’s opinion [in Rhetoric  I.1] that 
pathos is non-technical is an unqualified one …” (Wisse [1989] 
18-19)
The Contradiction View seems to have substantial textual support, and 
seems  based  on  common-sense  interpretations  of  some  important 
passages. On a number of these passages alternative readings will be 
offered below. But initially, and particularly because the reading of the 
text  involved in  the  CV is  so  entrenched,  it  will  help  to  show that 
despite  these  initial  attractions,  a  wider  look  at  the  views  the  CV 
attributes  to Aristotle shows it  to  be in fact  deeply implausible.  We 
shall see that as well as the major contradiction itself, this view creates 
further deep interpretative problems, mainly through its attributing to 
Aristotle some highly implausible views. So, I first hope to show that 
the CV cannot be correct as it stands. I  also want to show that there are 
good grounds for denying the principal contention of the CV, that it is 
emotion-arousal generally of which Aristotle both says in Rhet I.2, II.1, 
etc. that it has an important role in rhetoric as one of the three entechnoi  
pisteis, and of which he says in  Rhet I.1 that it has no role in rhetoric. 
There  is  a  strong  case  to  be  made  that  Aristotle  is  talking  about 
different things in these passages – what is criticised in I.1 is something 
quite  distinct  from what  is  advocated in  I.2  and II.1-11.  Thus,  even 
independently of the contradiction itself, I suggest that there are strong 
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grounds for rejecting the CV. Showing the CV to be less attractive than 
it  first  appears  will  help  to  establish  the  need  for  an  alternative 
proposal.  In the process,  we will  uncover a host of  desiderata for an 
interpretation of the  Rhetoric,  especially of the first chapter,  many of 
which are not met by the CV but are met by the proposed alternative.
II
The CV cannot stand as the correct  interpretation of  Rhetoric I.1  for 
several reasons. Our main concern in this section will be with reasons 
drawn  independently  of  the  contradiction  over  emotion-arousal. 
Nevertheless, this is itself a good reason against accepting the CV. The 
CV  involves  Aristotle  in  a  contradiction  within  one  and  the  same 
work.134 This  is  already  a  motivation  to  reinterpret  charitably,  if  a 
possible  interpretation  can  be  found.135 Furthermore,  it  is  a  very 
flagrant  contradiction  –  so  flagrant  that,  if  the  CV reading  of  I.1  is 
accepted, it is hard to see how Aristotle could have missed it. (Aristotle 
insists that current handbook writers have told us nothing about  the 
pisteis (1354a13),  nothing about  the entechnoi  pisteis (1354b21),  one of 
which is the pathê of the listeners.) Explanations in terms of redactors, 
or different periods of Aristotle’s own thought,136 should be a last resort 
if an interpretation cannot be found that makes sense of the treatise as 
134 Note that problems of inconsistency in the  Rhetoric have been a key part of the 
arguments put forward by those who argue against the unity of the treatise. Solmsen 
[1929]; Barnes [1995] 262-3. 
135The aim of avoiding attributing inconsistencies to the author is an interpretative 
principle that applies whether or not the work was published. And to acknowledge 
the need for caution about attributing inconsistencies need not spring from dogmatic 
insistence upon consistency for all authors in all cases (pace Wisse [1989] 11).
136 Solmsen [1929]; Fortenbaugh [1992]; Barnes [1995]
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it stands – after all, such hypotheses are urged principally on the basis 
that the text we have cannot otherwise be explained.137
However, quite apart from these considerations, the CV seems to raise 
as many difficulties as it solves. The reading of 1354a11-26 involved in 
the  CV  has  all  emotion-arousal  in  its  scope.  But  this  will  entail 
attributing to Aristotle the belief that all emotion-arousal would have 
been ruled out by Areopagus rules. Such a belief would be false, and 
Aristotle surely would have known it. That the CV commits Aristotle 
to  believing  that  the  Areopagus  rules  would  have  ruled  out  all 
emotion-arousal is clear. On this view, 1354a16-18 declare all emotion-
arousal to be “outside the issue” (1354a16-18). This is supposed to be 
grounds for thinking (“ὥστ'” a18) that any such technique would fall 
foul  of  the  Areopagus  rules  or  any  similar  laws  in  well-governed 
states,  thereby  leaving  the  handbook  writers  with  “nothing  to 
say” (a20-1). Thus, if emotion-arousal generally is “outside the issue”, 
any rhetorical  technique that  involves  it  thereby (a22-3)  violates  the 
Areopagus rules. That the Areopagus rules did not in fact prohibit all 
emotion-arousal  is  clear.138 Although  we  have  only  three  surviving 
examples of speeches before the Areopagus from the relevant period, 
all by Lysias,139 they do not seem to support the CV. All of these end 
with explicit  appeals  for  the judges’  pity,  and at  the very outset  of 
Lysias  7  the  trial  situation  is  summarised  in  a  way  that  is  clearly 
137 Views  of  this  redactional  or  developmental  kind are charted in  both Grimaldi 
[1972] 28-31, and Wisse [1989]
138Cf. Laani’s proposal ([2005] 125-6) that appeals to pity were not considered 
irrelevant to the charge.
139 Evidence surveyed in Ober [1989] 341-9. The three speeches are Lysias III (defence 
against Simon), IV (defence on a Wound by Premeditation) and VII (defence in the 
matter of the Olive Stump).
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designed to arouse fear. The most obvious way to account for this is to 
suppose that these appeals to emotion  were permitted by Areopagus 
rules because they were relevant.140 But the CV involves supposing that 
Aristotle  denied  this.  So,  the  CV  not  only  attributes  to  Aristotle  a 
contradiction, but a false and rather implausible view of what would 
have been permitted by the rules of the Areopagus.
The attempts to explain the contradiction (as hyperbole, the “rhetoric 
of the rhetoric”,141 the ‘ideal rhetoric’  view of I.1,  “polemic tend[ing] 
towards emphatic statement … a brief passage of arms”,142 etc.) in other 
ways are unconvincing. It is quite hard to get a clear view on what the 
‘rhetoric of the Rhetoric’  view amounts to, and indeed how it explains 
anything. The most charitable construal of it seems to be that Aristotle 
was  so  intent  upon  denigrating  competing  approaches  to  teaching 
rhetoric,  that  he  incautiously  advanced  against  his  opponents 
exaggerated arguments  that  count  against  significant  swathes  of  his 
own theory too. The sense of “rhetoric” at work here would be the use 
of arguments that are chosen more for their impact than because they 
140 It is of course not the only way to account for these features of the Lysias speeches. 
One might suppose that the form in which we have them is not the form in which 
they  were  delivered.  One  might  suppose  that  these  supposed  violations  of  the 
Areopagus rules (as the CV envisages them) somehow escaped censure. But these are 
surely less plausible than to suppose that prohibiting all irrelevant speaking did not 
rule out (and was not taken by Aristotle to rule out) all arousal of emotion.
141 Kennedy  [1985];  Wisse  ([1989]  19)  mentions  this  view  although  it  is  unclear 
whether he wholeheartedly subscribes to it.
142 Grimaldi [1972] 20f.. As is clear from the preceding chapters, in opposing these 
views,  I  am not  denying that  Aristotle  is  concerned with  criticising  the  views  of 
others. The issue under dispute is whether his arguments are properly interpreted as 
reflecting his considered views, and indeed whether they are properly described as 
“arguments” at all.
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state Aristotle’s  precise position. One can see the advantages of this 
view: Aristotle’s considered position on emotion-arousal is the one he 
develops in Rhetoric I.2 and II.1-11;143 we should not take seriously the 
precise views expressed in a brief “passage of arms” whose purpose is 
better understood as merely a forcible assertion of the superiority of his 
own  views  over  those  of  his  predecessors.  They  are  a  kind  of 
exaggerated overstatement of his real views.144 However, this will not 
do as a view of the opening chapter. Firstly, the “passage of arms” in 
question is far from brief. Aristotle’s rejection of the handbook writers’ 
methods  is,  as  we  have  seen,  woven  into  the  entire  argument  of 
1354a11-55a20.  A  central  contention  of  this  section,  a  conclusion 
repeated three times (1354a15ff; 1354b16ff; 1355a19f) is that the subject 
matter of these rhetorical handbooks is “outside the issue”, which is 
taken to be (at 1354a11-16 and 1354b16-22) a reason for thinking it no 
part of the art of rhetoric.  Citing the rules of the Areopagus against 
irrelevant speaking, and lengthy argument for their correctness are all 
supposed to support this point. The structured argument against the 
handbook  writers  extends  certainly  to  1355a3,  and  more  likely  to 
1355a20.  So  the  “rhetoric  of  the  Rhetoric”  view  is  committed  to  an 
extremely lengthy passage of invective (1354a11-55a20) that is not to be 
taken to represent Aristotle’s considered views. But a further problem 
143 Rather puzzlingly, Wisse ([1989] 20) suggests combining this view with the claim, 
“we may conjecture, Aristotle was in the end as much out of sympathy with pathos as 
he claims to be in the first chapter.” If, as this suggests, the first chapter does after all 
reflect Aristotle’s genuine views, then this “rhetoric of the  Rhetoric” theory simply 
fails to provide a “way out of the difficulty” at all. Wisse is correct to label this a 
“conjecture” on his part, for there is not a shred of evidence outside Rhetoric I.1. for 
this view. The “rhetoric of the Rhetoric” theory is much more plausibly thought of as 
a way of marginalising as polemical hyperbole the anti-emotion-arousal views of I.1. 
Cf Kennedy [1985].
144 “Deliberate exaggeration” Kennedy [1985] 132.
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is  that this view faces great  difficulty making plausible sense of the 
things Aristotle says. If what we have here is some kind of exaggerated 
overstatement of Aristotle’s position, what could be the more sensible 
set of arguments of which this is an exaggerated version? To put the 
point another way, this view faces a dilemma. If there is a kernel of 
good argument, sincerely advanced by Aristotle, in these sections, and 
this core of argument really does count against the arousal of emotion 
generally, then it counts against Aristotle’s own position later in the 
treatise  and the contradiction  is  as  stark  as  ever.  If  there  isn’t  or  it 
doesn’t, then it is hard to see what remains of any value in this long 
section of  Rhetoric  I.1,  on this  view,  once the alleged hyperbole  has 
been  stripped  away.  Aristotle’s  polemic  here  is  that  the  handbook 
writers’  techniques  were  for  irrelevant  speaking,  and  were  for  that 
reason  no  part  of  rhetoric:  it  is  very  hard  to  see  how  that  can  be 
separated out into sensible core argument and exaggerated hyperbole. 
Finally, in relation to this view, it seems to me not to take seriously the 
careful argument and serious tone of this first chapter. What we have 
in  Rhetoric  I.1  is  simply  not  a  torrent  of  invective,  it  is  a  series  of 
carefully  constructed  arguments.  The  section  1354a11-55a20  repays 
careful  study  of  its  arguments,  as  I  hope  has  been  evident  from 
previous  chapters,  and  even  linguistic  considerations  indicate  what 
kind of writing this is. The section is replete with logical connectives 
(for example, “γὰρ” occurs 12 times, “εἰ” 4 times, “ἄν” 6 times, “ὥστε” 
5 times, “ἢ” 19 times, “μὲν” 13 times, “οὖν” 4 times) and 1355a18-20 
certainly  purports  to  offer  a  summarised conclusion  of  a  section  of 
arguments. Of course this “rhetoric of the  Rhetoric” view is correct in 
claiming that Aristotle here is advancing a polemic, in the sense that he 
is arguing for his own view in preference to other views with which he 
signals his disagreement.  But this either does nothing to remove the 
Chapter 4 – The contradiction problem over emotion-arousal page 141 of 272
apparent contradiction with later parts of the  Rhetoric,145 or it does so 
by  an  objectionably  cavalier  approach  to  the  sincerity  and 
thoughtfulness of Aristotle’s arguments in the text of I.1. For sure, we 
are  dealing  here  with  polemic,  but  it  is  polemic  advanced  through 
careful philosophical argument.
One  way146 of  attempting  to  soften  the  contradiction  supposes  that 
Aristotle’s  criticism of the handbook writers  is  for the fact that they 
focus  on  the  arousal  of  emotion  to  the  exclusion  of  everything  else. 
Undoubtedly  this  is  an  aspect  of  their  failings  (“οὐδὲν  … ἄλλο … 
πλὴν” 1354b19f;  perhaps  “τὰ πλεῖστα” 1354a16,  “μόνον”  1356a16). 
But this simply does not constitute  the main or only thrust  of what 
Aristotle actually says against the handbook writers. It is not just the 
exclusion  of  other  things,  such  as  enthymemes,  that  Aristotle  finds 
objectionable;  it  is  also  their  emotion-arousal  techniques  themselves 
(1354a16-8, 24f., b16-20).
There are further difficulties for the CV. The CV involves supposing 
that the subject matter of Aristotle’s targets here is the pathê in general. 
However, this makes it mysterious why diabolê (‘slander’) is in the list, 
indeed at the very head of the list. It is not a pathos, nor, out of several 
extant lists of pathê147 from the period, is there any in which it appears. 
145 Kennedy ([1985]  132)  seems to  concede  this,  carefully  noting  that  this  view is 
compatible  with  continuing  to  make  recourse  to  developmental  hypotheses  to 
explain the apparent contradiction.
146Cf. Cooper [1994] 194-5, Cope [1867] 6  and Schütrumpf [1994] 101f., where this 
strategy is invoked alongside another way of addressing the apparent contradiction. 
147 Plato,  Philebus 47e1;  Aristotle,  DA  I.1.403a16-18;  EN  II.5.1105b21-3;  EE  II.
2.1220b12-5; MM I.7.1186a11-14; Ps-Aristotle, Rhet ad Alex 34.1440a38-b2; 
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The CV has to  reinterpret  diabolê148 as  a  substitute  for  the results  of 
diabolê, which are normally taken to be anger (a problem for this view, 
since it is already in the list), antagonism or hostility.149
A further problem relates to Aristotle’s views about the passions. If the 
aspect of the handbook writers’ methods that Aristotle has in mind is 
the  arousal  of  the  pathê generally,  then  this  commits  Aristotle  to  a 
hugely implausible generalisation about the passions. On this view, he 
is  saying  that  anger,  pity  and passions  in  general  are  not  “peri  tou  
pragmatos”, that is, they are not ‘concerned with the issue’. Prima facie, 
this generalisation is simply false – one can be angry at a murder, a 
fraud, a theft, a rape, and the same is true of pity, hostility, and the rest. 
Whether taken as a claim about the  pathê themselves,  or about their 
arousal, it just seems absurd to think that they cannot be about (say) 
the central issue of a trial. The claim would have been as implausible to 
148 e.g.  Barnes  [1995]  and Wisse  [1989] both translate διαβολὴ as ‘[the arousal  of] 
prejudice’.  LSJ  has both “slander” and “prejudice”  as  meanings of  διαβολὴ – the 
latter translation is perhaps possible, but none of the passages cited support a view of 
diabolê as an emotion. In support of our insistence that diabolê is not an emotion: Cope 
[1877] says “It denotes the exciting of suspicion and ill-will in the minds of the judges 
or audience, in order to prejudice them against the opponent with whom you are in 
controversy: and is therefore improperly classed with the πάθη or emotions such as 
ἔλεος and ὀργὴ. This has already been noticed by Victorius and Muretus: the latter 
says, ‘διαβολη non est παθος, sed pertinet ad iudicem ponendum ἐν παθει.’” p.7. Cf. 
also Rapp [2002] 44f.. Grimaldi [1980] 10f. notes “In itself διαβολη is not an emotion; 
it produces an emotion.” He also cites the long opening excursus of Demosthenes On 
the  Crown (1-9)  on  the  illicit  advantages  brought  by  accusation  and  slander,  and 
draws attention to phrase “τοῖς ἔξωθεν λόγοις” (18.9) as a reference to slander, a 
phrase that clearly refers to the activity of the speaker and not to the mental state of 
the listener.
149 cf. 1416a4f.; 1382a2f..
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Aristotle and his readers as to us.150 Moreover, it seems very difficult to 
reconcile  with the evidence  we  do have for Aristotle’s  views on the 
passions.151 
That his generalised claims about the irrelevance of the pathê are hard 
to make plausible on the CV is another reason for suspecting this view.
So,  there  are  not  inconsiderable  motivations  for  seeking  a  better 
alternative.
III
We saw above that,  at least  prima facie,  1356a14-19 shows that  what 
Aristotle objected to in the handbook writers is the very same thing as 
150 Plato (Phileb 50b-c) thought that emotions had truth-apt contents. Thus the issue in, 
for instance, a trial seems just the category of thing that might constitute a suitable 
object for the passions.
151 Aristotle clearly thinks that passions  can be “about” something, and there is no 
reason to suppose that this could not include the “issue” at stake in a trial. Although 
Aristotle nowhere in the Rhetoric uses peri plus genitive for what a passion is about, 
he frequently uses  peri plus accusative. For example, “φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων καὶ τὸ 
θαρρεῖν τί ἐστι,  καὶ περὶ ποῖα θαρραλέοι εἰσὶ καὶ πῶς διακείμενοι  θαρραλέοι 
εἰσίν·”  1383a14ff;  “ἔστω  δὴ  αἰσχύνη  λύπη  τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν 
φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν,”  1383b13ff;  “σχεδὸν  περὶ πάντα φθόνος ἔστι” 
1388a2f.. In fact, “ἐπι” plus dative is Aristotle’s favoured construction for specifying 
the contents of an emotional state, but it is clear from the variation in constructions in 
Rhetoric II.1-11 that he took “περι” plus accusative to be interchangeable with it. On 
the CV interpretation, Aristotle's generalisation in I.1 about the passions could only 
be  made  consistent  with  these  remarks  from  book  II  by  supposing  that  whilst 
passions may be peri the issue (accusative) they are not peri the issue (genitive).
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he includes in his own account as one of three kinds of technical proof. 
Nevertheless, we will be claiming that this is not in fact the case.
Let us initially note a number of indicators that suggest that the subject 
matter treated by the handbook writers criticised in I.1 is not the same 
as that which in Aristotle’s own scheme is one of the three  entechnoi  
pisteis.
The  item  at  the  head  of  the  list  of  things  Aristotle  criticises  in  the 
handbook writers has no place in Aristotle’s own account of the proofs. 
Diabolê is not a state of mind at all; in Aristotle’s terminology it is not a 
‘passion of the soul’,152 and it is not among the emotions whose arousal 
has a place in Aristotelian rhetoric. In fact, diabolê, so far from being an 
emotion, is an  activity – slandering or maliciously accusing someone; 
152 LSJ  has  “prejudice”  among  the  possible  meanings  of  διαβολη,  but  this  is 
misleading. In none of the passages cited does the word seem to refer to the mental 
state of the listener, nor to require any other meaning than slander. The occurrence of 
the word elsewhere that seems nearest to requiring the meaning “prejudice” is  in 
Antiphon  De Caede Herodis,  71,  where the jurors are urged to deliberate “μὴ μετ’ 
ὀργῆς  καὶ  διαβολῆς”.  Yet  even  here,  the  meaning  “slander”  is  quite  possible  – 
indeed sections 74ff. make it clear that it is precisely slander made by the opposing 
speaker that is being referred to. The word does not refer to the mental state of the 
listener.  The point  of mentioning anger and slander together is  that they are two 
corrupting influences on deliberation that the jurors are here instructed to avoid. But 
this does not mean that they exert their influence on deliberation in the same way – 
indeed at  section  91 of  the  same speech,  they are distinguished on precisely  this 
point.   Moreover,  both  elsewhere  in  the  same  speech  (86,  91),  and  elsewhere  in 
Antiphon (Tetr.I.4;  Choreut 7-9),  diabolê and  diaballô   always either permit or require 
being understood as referring to slander or false accusation made by an opponent, 
rather than to the mental state of the listener. The English word “prejudice” is only 
apt in connection with  diabolê,  if  treated as a verbal noun:  diaballein might thus be 
translated as ‘to (attempt to) prejudice’ someone against someone else.
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and there is an associated activity of countering such slander.  These 
activities  are  strongly  associated  with  the  proemium section  of  the 
speech – not just by Aristotle’s predecessors, but by Aristotle himself 
(III.14-15). It is an activity therefore that centres around the listeners’ 
states of mind prior to the narrative of events, or the argumentation for 
accepting  the  speaker’s  claims.  If  we take  seriously  Aristotle’s  own 
view of diabolê, from III.14-15, it is an activity which may occupy whole 
sections of the speech (this part of book III is arranged according to the 
sections of the speech:153 14 on  prooimion; 15 on  diabolê; 16 on  diêgêsis; 
etc.,  such that there is perhaps even a suggestion that diabolê may at 
times  itself  be  a  distinct  section  of  a  speech),  or  which  will  more 
usually belong in the conclusion or the proem.154 Crucially this puts it 
separate from any claims about the facts of the case, their narration in 
the diêgêsis, or arguing for them in the pisteis section. Indeed, it is clear 
that  for  Aristotle  in the  Rhetoric,  the activity of  diabolê is  something 
entirely distinct from any kind of argument for the orator’s conclusion, 
even an argument from character.  Arguments  and their  rebuttal  are 
discussed under ‘pisteis’, in III.17, entirely separately from diabolê and 
153 The numbering of sections is obviously not Aristotle’s own, but the division of this 
part of the treatise into sections dealing successively with each section of a speech is 
clearly signalled in the text itself. This is the fundamental arrangement of this part of 
the treatise (III.13-19) on taxis. Aristotle’s view is that certain activities are associated 
with each section, but that these activities may not be confined to that section alone. 
For instance (1415b9ff), gaining listeners’ attention is one of the central purposes of 
an introduction, but may be needed in other parts of the speech too. Likewise, diabolê 
and  countering  diabolê ‘belong’  with  ending  and  introduction  but  can  be  found 
elsewhere too.
154 For Aristotle, if you are prosecuting, your diabolê should be at the end to make it 
remain in the listeners’ minds, if you are defending, your countering of  diabolê will 
need to be at  the beginning,  to secure the listeners’  open-minded attention at  the 
outset. III.14.1415a29-34.
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its rebuttal. And whereas the defending orator is told that he will need 
to undermine diabolê right at the start of his speech, in order to gain the 
fair-minded attention of the listeners, there is no similar instruction to 
start one’s speech by countering the opponent’s arguments.155 These are 
dealt with as part of what is covered under pisteis, in III.17. The result 
of  diabolê is not a case that needs to be refuted, but the production of 
“κωλυοντα” (1415a32), hindrances or obstacles. Removing these is one 
of the “ἰατρευματα” – antidotes – that are needed before the orator’s 
case can get underway.  This should alert us to the possibility that in 
Aristotle’s complaint about diabolê in I.1, he is not criticising the arousal 
of some  diabolê-related emotion, but criticising the very use of  diabolê 
itself. Considering diabolê on its own for the moment, it is obvious how 
diabolê, ‘slander’,  can be plausibly charged with being ‘not about the 
issue’. Indeed it is notable that Aristotle himself makes this very point 
again, when he discusses diabolê in book III. When advising how diabolê 
can  be  undermined,  he  suggests  attacking  your  opponent’s  use  of 
diabolê on grounds that it shows a lack of faith in the pragma, the actual 
facts of the case at hand (ὅτι οὐ πιστεύει τῷ πράγματι. III.15.1416a37). 
Both in book III and in book I, he can take it as simply obvious that 
diabolê is not related to the facts of the case at hand.
A further signal that what Aristotle criticises in I.1 is distinct from the 
emotion-arousal  he  advocates  elsewhere  in  the  treatise  is  what  he 
seems to take as  obvious  in his critical arguments at I.1. In relation to 
slander and the other things criticised at 1354a16ff, Aristotle is able to 
take it as simply obvious to his readers that these things are “outside the 
155 A familiar example of this is Socrates’ in Plato’s  Apology, who right at the start 
tackles  diabolê and  spends  considerable  time  on  this  before  getting  to  the  actual 
indictment only at 24b.
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issue”. To the extent that Aristotle provides arguments to support this 
claim, these are found at 1354a31-b16. Yet these merely establish that 
the “issue” in question for the juryman is confined to establishing the 
facts of the case. Beyond this, Aristotle just takes it as  obvious that the 
kinds of thing that are the objects of his criticism are irrelevant to “the 
issue”  thus  specified.  Do  these  categories  include  Aristotle’s  own 
methods  of  emotion-arousal?  On  the  face  of  it,  they  do,  since  it  is 
natural to understand his words “pity, anger and similar passions of 
the soul” (1354a17) as referring to all arousal of these emotions. But it is 
hard to see how Aristotle could have held the view that all such things 
are “outside the issue”, let alone taken this to be so obvious as not to 
require  argument.  Consider  the  contrast  on  this  point  between 
emotion-arousal and slander.  It  is abundantly clear in both Aristotle 
and  elsewhere  (particularly  in  the  orators)  that  diabolê is  the 
presentation of irrelevancies – this is perhaps even part of what it is for 
something to be diabolê.156 On the other hand, it seems equally clear that 
when  Aristotle  suggests  that  (for  example)  referring  to  someone’s 
gratuitous  acts  of  hubris is  a  good means of  arousing anger against 
them (1378b25), he is not advocating speaking irrelevantly. What surely 
is obvious here is that it is just such matters as these that are highly 
likely  to  be  relevant  in  a  forensic  situation.  Thus  “obvious 
irrelevance” (in the eyes of Aristotle and the audience he envisages for 
the Rhetoric) seems to apply to the handbook writers’ methods but not 
to Aristotle’s proofs through emotion-arousal. Therefore when we are 
seeking  an  interpretation  of  1354a16f,  “pity  and  anger  and  similar 
passions”, we would ideally want this to refer to a category of things 
whose irrelevance was  as obvious as that of the first item in that list, 
diabolê,  and  to  a  category  that  did  not  include  such  things  as  the 
156cf. Demosthenes 57.33; Isaeus Fragmenta. 3, fr.1: 2.6; Lycurgus in Leocratem, 1,149; 
Lysias 3.46.
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reference to someone’s deliberate acts of hubris – whose irrelevance is 
certainly  far  from  obvious!  This  is  good  reason  to  seek  an 
interpretation  such  that  that  the  categories  of  activity  that  are  the 
objects of Aristotle’s criticisms at 1354a16ff. do not include the kind of 
emotion-arousal that he advocates as one of the three kinds of technical 
proofs.
We  have  touched  already  on  the  awkwardness  of  attributing  to 
Aristotle the view that the rules  against irrelevant speaking actually 
observed in the Areopagus prohibited all use of emotion-arousal. We 
may  now  go  further  and  say  that  this  reference  to  the  Areopagus 
suggests  that  what  Aristotle  criticises  in  1354a14-31  is  likely  to  be 
things  that  typically  were ruled  out  by  the  Areopagus  rules.  Since 
Aristotle’s  own  proposed  use  of  emotional  proofs  –  emotional 
arguments with emotional premises – are not of this kind (and since at 
least  diabolê at  a16  clearly  is),  this  should give  us  further  reason to 
suspect  that  the  use  of  emotion-arousal  that  he  recommends  is 
something distinct from the things he criticises in 1354a14-31.
Further evidence for this distinction is to be found in Rhetoric book III. 
The treatment of taxis (arrangement [of the speech]) occupies Aristotle 
from  III.13  to  III.19.  Within  this  section,  Aristotle  seems  to  echo 
material  both from  the  parts  of  I.1  containing  the  criticisms  of  the 
handbook writers and from the sections setting out his own view of the 
pisteis (in relation to emotions, particularly I.2 and II.1-11). But the way 
in which these echoes occur suggests that Aristotle thinks of these as 
quite distinct subjects. Rhetoric  III.14 (on  prooemia,  introductions) and 
III.15  (on  diabolê,  slander)  contain  several  echoes  of  Aristotle’s 
criticisms  of  the  handbook  writers  from I.1  –  principally  related  to 
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techniques that are “aimed at the listener”157 or irrelevant158 or distort 
the  listener’s  judgement.159 And  perhaps  most  significantly,  these 
criticisms  recur  once  again  in  a  context  in  which  they  are  closely 
connected with diabolê. Despite all this, Aristotle does not seem to see 
any connection here with the emotions. These sections contain no echo 
of or reference back to I.2 or II.1-11, even though, to the extent that they 
concentrate on  eunoia (goodwill) and  diabolê, we might be inclined to 
say that they have a good deal to do with emotion-arousal. They do not 
use  the  word  “πάθος”,  nor  Aristotle’s  standard  words  for  the 
individual emotions. This is surely rather surprising on the view that 
in I.1 the defects – centering on irrelevance and distortion – highlighted 
by Aristotle in the handbook writers’ techniques arose precisely from 
their use of audience emotions. Aristotle’s use of terms like “πάθος” 
returns with his treatment in III.16 and 17 of the sections of the speech 
designated  for  setting  out  the  speaker’s  case  and  proving  it.  These 
sections – i.e. the sections on the parts of the speech that Aristotle sees 
as central to proof and properly belonging to the technê of rhetoric (i.e. 
as ἔντεχνόν) – do include discussion of how to use  logos,  êthos and, 
crucially for our interests  here,  pathos.  So this section of book III  on 
taxis seems  to  show familiarity  with  both of  the  earlier  supposedly-
contradictory  passages,  but  treats  the  subject  matter  of  each  quite 
distinctly.160 We suggest that this is evidence that they were distinct.
157 1415a35 cf. 1354a18
158 1415b5, 6; 1416a37; cf. 1354a15f., 17f., b16f., 27; 1355a1-2, 19.
159  1416a36f. cf. 1354a24-26.
160 This presents a particular difficulty for attempts to explain the supposed 
incompatibility between earlier sections by assigning different sections to different 
times or different authors (e.g. Barnes [1995]).
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However, the central claim of this chapter will be that what Aristotle 
criticises in I.1 is much more specific than emotion-arousal in general: 
emotion-related activities closely associated with speech introductions 
and with important similarities to  diabolê.  What is wrong with these 
activities, as we shall see, is not their connection with the passions but 
their  lack  of  connection  with  the  issue  at  hand.  If  this  can  be 
established,  then  Aristotle’s  remarks  in  book  III  are  rather  less 
surprising. On this view it is just what we should expect that when 
Aristotle speaks of prooemia and diabolê (III.14-15), we get echoes of his 
criticisms at I.1, but no echoes of his account of the pathê at I.2 and II.
1-11. Whereas when Aristotle speaks of the core of the art – statement 
of  case,  and  proof  (III.16-17)  –  we  do  find  references  to  the  pathê, 
consistent with his own view of their role in providing proof and hence 
their status as genuine exercises of rhetorical expertise. Of course, this 
leaves  puzzling  why,  back  in Rhetoric  I.1,  Aristotle  uses  the  phrase 
“and pity and anger and similar passions of the soul” as part of his 
criticism of the handbook writers, and more must be said to explain 
this. Nevertheless, it seems that the cross-references, and the summary 
recapitulations  of  his  position  found  in  book  III  tell  in  favour  of 
associating his I.1 criticism with diabolê and speech introductions, and 
against interpreting it as a criticism of all arousal of the pathê.
If,  then,  despite  initial  appearances  and  the  apparent  evidence  of 
1356a14-19 we have good reason to think that what Aristotle criticises 
in this opening chapter of the treatise is  distinct from what he later 
recommends,  we  should  turn  our  attention  to  providing  a 
characterisation of what it is that Aristotle is so concerned to oppose in 
this  opening  passage.  We  are  rejecting  the  CV  claim  that  it  is  the 
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arousal of emotions as such that Aristotle has in mind here. In doing 
so, we need to propose a plausible alternative.
What Aristotle is really criticising at 1354a14-31.
The question of what and whom Aristotle is criticising can be helpfully 
approached by what will at first sight seem a perverse move, namely 
by ignoring for the moment most of the key phrase (i.e. “slander and 
pity and anger and passions of the soul like these” 1354a16-17) he uses 
to describe the targets of his criticism. This will be helpful in taking a 
view  of  the  other  considerations  bearing  on  the  question.  The 
considerations  adduced  so  far  show that  it  would make for  a  very 
attractive  interpretation  of  Rhetoric I.1  if  a  plausible  target  for 
Aristotle’s criticism could be produced that was obviously open to the 
charge of irrelevance, clearly likely to fall foul of the Areopagus rules 
on relevance, and could allow diabolê to fit naturally into the list, with 
its normal meaning of slander. Just such a target is found historically in 
the use of theatrical techniques for generating (especially) pity,161 in the 
use  of  set-piece  speech  sections  learned  from  a  collection,  in  long 
introductory sections, in the use of  diabolê – irrelevant and often false 
material whose only purpose is to show one’s opponent in a bad light. 
In  many  cases,  particularly  with  introductions  and  diabolê,  the 
irrelevance  would  be  clear  because  these  techniques  would  be 
deployed before  the speaker  had even  set  out  his  case in  a  diêgêsis 
(‘narrative’  or  ‘statement  of  case’)  section,  let  alone  proved  it  with 
pisteis. Of these techniques,  some are very likely to have found their 
way into rhetorical handbooks by the time Aristotle is writing. Thus, 
we have relevant  ancient  evidence  that  the  way in  which  emotion-
arousal in rhetoric was taught involved using standard topoi, that could 
161 cf. Plato Apology 34b-35b.
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be learned up and deployed more-or-less irrespective of the particular 
people  or  particular  facts  of  the  case.  Aristotle’s  objections  would 
surely be well targeted here, since the deployment of such formulaic 
topoi is  unlikely  to  relate  in  any  important  way to  the  truth  of  the 
matters under consideration. Examples of this use of formulaic topoi for 
emotional effect would be Thrasymachus’ Eleoi (‘Pities’),  and exercises 
such as Pseudo-Demosthenes’ Exordia (Introductions).162 If there were a 
plausible way in which what Aristotle says about the methods and the 
authors he is criticising at 1354a14ff. could refer to techniques such as 
these, this would represent an attractive interpretation of this passage, 
and one that would not generate a contradiction with Aristotle’s own 
position.
In  support  of  this,  1354b16ff.  sheds  light  on  the  grounds on  which 
Aristotle makes his criticism of the handbook writers.  Aristotle here 
seems to be repeating his criticisms from 1354a13ff, the crucial lines, 
but  here  his  description  of  his  targets  is  illuminating.  He says  that 
those accused of giving instructions in irrelevant speaking are “those 
who define other163 things, like what the introduction or the narrative 
should contain, as well as each of the other sections of the speech. For 
in  them,  they  treat  of  nothing  except  how to  put  the  judge  into  a 
particular frame of mind.” (1354b17-20) What is interesting about this 
description of those Aristotle is opposing is that it seems his own work 
fits the description. At Rhetoric III.13-19, he spends time defining what 
the different sections of the speech should contain. Moreover, in doing 
so,  he is  attentive to  how each part  of  the speech should affect  the 
162 Gorgias’  question  and  answer  method  of  teaching  rhetoric  may  be  a  further 
example. Sophistici Elenchi 34.184b35-185a8.
163 Other, that is, than those related to “what happened or didn’t happen, what will 
happen or won’t, what is the case or isn’t.” 1354b13-14.
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listener’s state of mind. While this might seem to involve Aristotle in 
still greater internal contradiction within the Rhetoric, in fact it points to 
how  the  apparent  inconsistency  can  be  resolved.  Aristotle  would 
readily admit that what he has to say about taxis in book III is “outside 
the issue”. His consistent view about rhetoric, throughout the Rhetoric 
is that since it is about providing proofs, some things are essential to 
the art, and other things are merely accessory. Indeed, the proofs, the 
pisteis, are essential, and everything else is accessory. This distinction 
should  be  understood  as  follows.  Any  non-accidental  instance  of 
rhetorical success can be fully explained by reference to things that are 
essential components of the art itself.164 Nevertheless, the instance will 
have lots of other features which do not play a role in explaining why 
this  person  was  persuaded  of  that  conclusion.  The  latter  are  the 
‘accessories’. This then forms the principle on which the treatise itself is 
organised – the first two books set out the materials for proofs, and 
once  that  is  done,  space  is  given  in  book  III  to  accessory  matters. 
Accessory  matters  are,  by  definition,  those  which  do  not  count 
evidentially in favour of any particular view of the issue at hand (if 
they  did,  they  would  be  part  of  the  proofs).  So,  the  suggestion  at 
1354b16ff. is that the handbook writers have spent their whole energy 
on topics Aristotle relegates to book III.  Those topics quite naturally 
include how to counter  diabolê as well as other methods of ensuring 
that the audience pay appropriate attention to your case in the various 
sections of the speech. But these topics are quite distinct from the use 
of  emotion  in  addressing  the  facts  of  the  case  as  part  of  offering 
listeners proofs in favour of the orator’s conclusion. 1354b16ff. is best 
understood as a recapitulation of the point made at 1354a10ff:  “Only 
the proofs belong to the art, everything else is accessory … they mainly 
164 1354a7-11.
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treat  of  what  is  irrelevant  to  the  subject  at  hand!”165 And if  that  is 
correct,  it  is  not  their  use  of  emotion-arousal  per  se  that  constitutes 
Aristotle’s grounds for criticism. Rather it is that their techniques are 
bound to consist in irrelevant speaking, and thus – at best – they will 
be  techniques  for  what  is  accessory  to  rhetoric,  not  for  things  that 
themselves amount to exercises of the technê.
IV
The Solution to the Contradiction Problem
So, our proposal is that in I.1, it is not the use of emotion generally that 
Aristotle criticises in the work of his predecessors, but something much 
more specific. My contention here is that when he says “slander and 
pity,  anger  and  similar  passions  of  the  soul,”  this  is  not  a  list  of 
passions but a list of activities. He is referring to the activity of diabolê, 
and  the  activities  advocated  by  handbook-writers  in  their  set-piece 
‘recipes’ for emotion-arousal – recipes used to generate sections in a 
speech (often in the introduction) included to affect the state of mind of 
the listener, unconnected with the specific subject matter at issue. Such 
techniques  are  designed  to  prejudice  the  listeners  in  favour  of  the 
speaker, and against his opponent, irrespective of the strength of each 
side’s case. The kind of thing, I suggest, that Aristotle had in mind was 
the stirring up of hostility because of how someone dressed, because of 
his  parentage  or  racial  origins,  or  the  arousal  of  pity  by  bringing 
friends, wife or children weeping onto the bêma.166
165 1354a13-16.
166 Techniques  well-attested in  Athens:  Plato  Apology  34c;  Aristotle  Rhetoric  III.15, 
1416a21-4, b1-3.
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So, the list  is  a list  of activities advocated by the handbook writers. 
What these activities have in common is that adapting them to make 
them work on any particular occasion does not depend on the presence 
of features that have any bearing whatsoever on the truth or falsehood 
of the orator’s claims about “the issue”.
Aristotle  says  that  these  activities  are  irrelevant  (1354a17f.).  They 
therefore  contribute  nothing  to  proofs,  and  so  techniques  for  such 
activities contribute nothing to the art of rhetoric. Crucially this does 
nothing to rule out from the art of rhetoric such things as emotional 
proofs,  or  emotionally  apprehended  premises in  proofs,  where  those 
proofs  do bear on “the issue” – but these are entirely different from 
what  the  handbook  writers  had  offered  (i.e.  from  what  Aristotle 
criticises here).
The key part of this proposed solution that is new, and that requires 
careful justification is the way in which the phrase “slander and pity 
and anger and similar passions of the soul” (a16f.) is being understood. 
The case in favour of the proposed new understanding of this phrase is 
built up from a number of considerations. Firstly, careful attention is 
paid  to  the  nature  of  diabolê,  and  how  Aristotle  thinks  of  slander 
throughout  the Rhetoric.  Support  is  secondly  derived  from  the 
production of historically plausible targets for Aristotle’s criticism. This 
is partly a matter of surveying the ancient evidence for how set-piece 
‘recipes’ for the arousal of emotions formed an important part of how 
Aristotle’s contemporaries attempted to teach the art of rhetoric. It will 
be particularly striking how apt a target Thrasymachus is, given both 
the general nature of Aristotle’s criticisms and their specific wording. 
Nevertheless,  whether  or  not  I.1  is  so  specifically  targeted, 
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Thrasymachus is vital to our case because he provides an example of 
the use of emotion words to refer not to emotions themselves, but to 
rhetorical set-pieces designed for the arousal of emotion, provided by a 
teacher of rhetoric for inclusion in speeches – a use of these words that 
is pivotal to the proposed new reading of 1354a16f.. A final part of the 
case  involves  offering  an  alternative  understanding  of  a  passage 
(1356a16ff.) that seems problematic for our proposal here. We will need 
to show that it is not decisive in favour of the CV.
Diabolê
The  passages  dealing  with  diabolê have  been  referred  to  above. 
Commentators have typically looked at the phrase “slander and pity and  
anger and similar passions of the soul” (1354a16ff.) and worked from the 
end of the phrase backwards. Here, it is suggested, is a list of pathê, a 
generalisation involving ‘the passions of the soul’, and that even though 
slander does not properly fit this category, its effects do, so this must 
be what is in view; thus the phrase is a way of picking out the general 
category of ‘passions of the soul’ – with three examples at the head. On 
the reading I am suggesting here,  diabolê  is to be taken at face value, 
and understood entirely  consistently  with what Aristotle  has  to  say 
about it in book III: it is a an activity, slander, strongly associated with 
the opening and ending of a speech. I have argued for this above, and 
reemphasise that this interpretation finds significant support in the fact 
that the criticism Aristotle makes in I.1 is a criticism repeated in book 
III in connection with prooemia and diabolê.
There are then two possible ways of reading the rest of this key phrase.
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One is to see the rest of the phrase as an explication of diabolê and how 
such use of diabolê is envisaged as working.167 On this first view, then, 
the phrase could be paraphrased roughly as  “slander,  and the pity, 
anger and similar passions of the soul associated with it”. The whole 
phrase is, on this view, about diabolê.
A second view is that this is a list of coordinate items, but all of the 
items in the list refer to set-pieces that could be composed or selected 
for use from a collection, along the lines recommended by a ‘master 
rhetorician’ like Thrasymachus. On this view, rather than massaging 
the meaning of “slander” to make it more like pity, anger and passions 
of  the  soul,  one  instead  interprets  references  to  “pity,  anger  and 
suchlike passions of  the soul” to  make them more like slander.  We 
know  from  the  work  of  Thrasymachus,  of  which  Aristotle  was 
specifically aware,168 that these words could be used in this way. So, the 
phrase could, on this second view, be paraphrased roughly as “slander, 
‘doing pity’, ‘doing anger’, and ‘doing other similar passions’”. This is 
offered more as a paraphrase than a translation, in order to make clear 
how I think this phrase can be understood. It is possible even that this 
list of terms – slander, pity, anger – would have been recognisable to 
Aristotle’s readers as a list of chapter headings from such a rhetorical 
handbook.169
 Thus these words at 1354a16-17 are, in effect, in inverted commas.
167 This  view  was  suggested  by  a  remark  of  Stephen  Halliwell’s  that  the  list  is 
‘coloured’ by having diabolê at the head. The view considered here is not simply that 
the pejorative  tone is inherited by the rest of the list,  but that what they  refer to is 
made specific to their connection with diabolê. Something like this seems to have been 
the view of Ludwig Radermacher, as appears from a passage quoted by Grimaldi 
(Radermacher [1951] 216; Grimaldi [1972] 44), although it is unclear both precisely 
how Radermacher’s view worked, and how Grimaldi understood it. 
168 Rhetoric III.1.1404a14-15, also more generally 1409a2, 1413a8.
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I prefer this second reading. It fits well with the ancient evidence, as 
we shall see, and avoids a problem with the first reading, which is that 
pity is not obviously an emotion stirred up by slander. Whereas it is an 
emotion strongly associated with set-piece appeals unconnected with 
the central facts of the case.
Ancient Rhetorical Set-Pieces in General
One advantage of the reading proposed is that it gives a realistic and 
plausible target for Aristotle’s criticism. It does not involve him in any 
wild generalisations about emotions. But it does involve him engaging 
with a recognised feature of how rhetoric was taught in the fifth and 
fourth centuries BC. From this period we have a collection of set-piece 
speech openings (the Exordia) attributed to Demosthenes, and DK 85B4 
attests a published collection of Thrasymachus’  Prooimia. Socrates,  in 
the  Apology,170 says that he is not going to use the familiar tactics for 
appealing to pity – tears, weeping friends and young family, and the 
like  –  and  it  seems  pretty  clear  that  these  are  well-worn  set-piece 
methods that stand apart from the actual argument of the case. Indeed, 
Socrates makes that  very contrast  at  35c.  Thrasymachus produced a 
work called “Eleoi”171 – literally “Pities”, normally rendered “Appeals 
to Pity” – which Aristotle highlights for the fact that it touched in part 
on delivery, but which is most plausibly thought of as having been a 
collection of ‘recipes’ or techniques (obviously including such things as 
169 In  case  this  seems  over-speculative,  we  might  note  that  the  section  of  Plato’s 
Phaedrus  (267c-d),  quoted below, in which almost exactly these terms can be found 
associated with Thrasymachus belongs in a section of that dialogue where Plato is 
making extensive (and perhaps mocking) use of the ‘technical’ rhetorical terminology 
of each of the rhetorical theorists mentioned.
170 34b-35b
171 Attested in the Rhetoric III.1.1404a14f.
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a sobbing and trembling manner of  delivery)  for arousing pity in a 
rhetorical  audience.  Indeed,  as  we  shall  see,  this  was  far  from 
Thrasymachus’ only work of this nature.
Thrasymachus
The figure  of  Thrasymachus is  particularly  interesting in relation to 
Aristotle’s  criticism  in  I.1  –  he  seems  to  be  so  apt  a  target  for  this 
criticism that it is tempting to think that Aristotle has him specifically 
in mind. The case for this can get no better than a conjecture – but I 
shall argue that it is a highly plausible one. If one is not convinced that 
Aristotle was here specifically targeting Thrasymachus, this evidence 
ought to convince us that here is at least one apt target for the criticism 
construed in the way suggested above.
An important reason for suggesting that 1354a16ff. refers specifically to 
Thrasymachus comes from Plato’s Phaedrus.
As  to  the  art  of  making  speeches  bewailing  (οἰκτρογόων  –  Lit. 
‘piteous-wailing’) the evils of poverty and old age, the prize, in my  
judgement, goes to the mighty Chalcedonian [i.e. Thrasymachus]. He 
it is also who knows best how to inflame [Gk. ὀργίσαι, lit. enrage / 
anger] a crowd and, once they are inflamed, how to hush them again  
with his words’ magic spell, as he says himself. And let’s not forget  
that  he  is  as  good  at  producing  slander  (διαβάλλειν)  as  he  is  at  
refuting it, whatever its source may be. (267c7-d2)172
Note  initially  that  here  in  one  passage,  we  have  Thrasymachus 
connected with pity, anger and diabolê, the very items Aristotle lists in 
172 Translation is Nehamas & Woodruff [1995], with comments in parentheses mine.
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Rhetoric I.1. We should note that where Nehamas and Woodruff refer 
to the ‘art of making speeches …’, the text has only ‘τῶν … οἰκτρογόων 
(etc.)  … λόγων … τέχνῃ’  which  could  refer  as  much to  the  art  as 
Thrasymachus taught it and wrote about it, as to the art as he practised 
it.  So,  when  Plato  comes  to  summarising  in  this  short  statement 
Thrasymachus’ views on the art of rhetoric, what he mentions is the 
command of the trio of pity, anger and slander. If it was in relation to 
this trio that Thrasymachus was well-known, then when Aristotle says 
“slander, pity, anger …”, there is at least the possibility that he is using 
this as a way of signalling that Thrasymachus is among his targets.
We have seen already that in relation to pity specifically, Aristotle is 
aware  of  this  connection  with  Thrasymachus.  He  refers  to 
Thrasymachus’ work “Pities” (Eleoi) at III.1.1404a14f..
Still  from  Plato,  we  should  also  note  that  in  the  Phaedrus, 
Thrasymachus  is  the  principal  name  associated  with  teaching  the 
technê of  rhetoric.  At  261c  he  is  named  alongside  Gorgias  and 
Theodorus, as authors of technai peri logôn (Arts of Speaking). At 266c, 
it is “Thrasymachus and the others” who claim expertise in the technê  
logôn.  266-267  contains  something  of  a  survey  of  those,  including 
Thrasymachus, who have contributed to the art of speaking. At 269d, 
as Socrates signals his disagreement with this tradition about what the 
art of rhetoric consists in, he names Lysias and Thrasymachus as its 
representatives – we should note that Lysias is a practitioner of rhetoric, 
rather than a writer of an ‘Art of Rhetoric’, which leaves Thrasymachus 
as  the  figure  representative  of  those  who  wrote  and  taught  more 
theoretically about the art.173 Hence, when Socrates comes to stipulate 
173 It is perhaps indicative of his greater influence by the time of the Phaedrus that it is 
Thrasymachus not Gorgias who plays this role.
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what, on his own view, should be taught by someone trying to educate 
others in the art of rhetoric, he says the following.
It’s clear then that for Thrasymachus and whoever else teaches the art  
of  rhetoric  seriously  their  first  task  will  be  to  write  with  utmost  
precision to enable us to understand the soul …(271a4-6)
So,  Thrasymachus  stands  in  the  Phaedrus as  a  prominent 
representative, if not the prominent representative, of those who write 
and teach the art of rhetoric.
Further, out of those listed by Plato in the Phaedrus, as associated with 
the art of rhetoric,174 there is only a small subset likely to be apt targets 
of  Aristotle’s  criticisms  at  the  start  of  the  Rhetoric.  These  are 
Thrasymachus, Gorgias, Theodorus and Licymnius. These are the ones 
mentioned in the  Rhetoric, and we might note that in both Plato and 
Aristotle, Theodorus and Licymnius are mentioned solely in relation to 
the  taxis (arrangement)  and  lexis (style)  aspects  of rhetoric.  Of these 
four names, the ones more closely connected with issues of emotion-
arousal  are  Thrasymachus  and  Gorgias.  This  further  reinforces 
Thrasymachus’ prominence in connection with emotion-arousal in the 
technographic tradition as seen through the eyes of Plato’s academy – 
very likely the eyes with which Aristotle would have seen it.
We see this picture further reinforced from Aristotle’s own writings. In 
De Sophisticis Elenchis 34.184b, he names three predecessors in relation 
to the art of rhetoric, Tisias, Thrasymachus and Theodorus. Again, we 
174 Thrasymachus,  Tisias,  Gorgias  of  Leontini,  perhaps  Prodicus,  Theodorus  of 
Byzantium, Polus,  Hippias of Elis,  Licymnius of Chios,  Protagoras of Abdera and 
Zeno of Elea.
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note that of these, it is Thrasymachus who is the best candidate to be 
the target of Aristotle’s critique in relation to slander, pity, anger and 
the like in Rhetoric I.1.
The only other figure mentioned in Aristotle as having written an ‘Art 
of Rhetoric’ is Licymnius of Chios, at  Rhetoric III.13.1414b17. He will 
perhaps fall within the scope of Aristotle’s criticism for preoccupation 
with different sections of a speech, and such ‘accessory’ matters. But 
there is nothing in Aristotle or other ancient evidence available to us 
that  might  link  him specifically  to  the  criticism related  to  emotion-
arousal, in the way that is so clearly present with Thrasymachus.
We can see, then, even independently of our interpretation of Rhetoric I.
1 that Thrasymachus is an apt target for Aristotle’s criticism. He is not 
only prominently connected with teaching and writing about rhetoric 
as an art. He is also specifically connected with slander, pity and anger. 
However, there is a further strand to Aristotle’s criticism, on the view I 
am recommending. That is that the use of slander and the arousal of 
emotion was taught as a matter of using set-piece sections which could 
be learned and used quite in isolation from consideration of the facts of 
the case at hand. In Thrasymachus’ case, there is good evidence that 
this was precisely how he taught. We have evidence of various works 
of his. DK 85A1 lists among his works, “Playthings” (Παιγνια175) and 
“Rhetorical Resources” (Αφορμαι Ρητορικαι), DK 85B4 has a collection 
of  “Introductions” (Προοιμια),  DK 85B5 (=1404a14)  has “Appeals  to 
Pity”  (Ελεοι),  DK85B7  “Knockdown  Arguments”  (Υπερβαλλοντες 
Λογοι).  Even  the  most  substantial  fragment  of  his,  DK  85B1,  can 
175 The word is the same as that used by Gorgias as a way of describing his Encomium 
of Helen.
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plausibly be thought to be a rhetorical set-piece.176 It is tempting to use 
what we know of the content of Thrasymachus’ oeuvre to fill out what 
we do not know – the nature of the contents of his supposed  Megalê  
Technê. If  Thrasymachus  did  write  such  a  work  as  his  definitive 
handbook on rhetoric, it may not be unreasonable to suppose that a 
significant part of its contents was such set-pieces, perhaps organised 
by where they would come in the speech. This might be one way in 
which a work likely dominated by model speech-sections might define 
what each section should contain, and show how to affect the listener 
in particular  ways.177 The evidence we have is  for  a  “(Great)  Art  of 
Rhetoric” by Thrasymachus, and that the provision of set-pieces was a 
very  large  part  of  the  way  in  which  he  sought  to  teach  the  art  of 
rhetoric.
If  the view urged above is correct  in its  interpretation of  Aristotle’s 
criticism  of  previous  writers  of  Arts  of  Rhetoric  for  their  views  on 
slander  and  emotion-arousal,  then  we  find  that  all  of  the  features 
criticised come together in Thrasymachus.
Gorgias
The case should not be overstated. Thrasymachus is not necessarily the 
only  person  in  view.  It  is  simply  that  he is  very  striking for  being 
strongly  associated  point  by  point  with  every  aspect  criticised  by 
Aristotle,  as  his  criticism  has  been  reconstructed  here.  If  he  is  the 
principal target, he is still probably not the only target.
176 Yunis  [1997].  The  suggestion,  made  by  White  [1995],   that  B1  was  actually 
delivered, and originally belonged to a full speech, and that we may reconstruct a 
specific diplomatic context for B1, is not convincing.
177 Cf. Rhet I.1.1354b17-20.
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Another figure who would surely be an object of Aristotle’s criticism is 
Gorgias. As we saw in chapter 1, his Encomium of Helen reveals a view 
of the power of speech to persuade that is strongly associated with the 
power of speech to excite the emotions. Fear, upset, joy, pity, yearning 
are all mentioned as associated with the power of speech. There is thus 
a plausible line connecting Gorgias with emotion-arousal.
In  the  passage at  the  end of  the  De Sophisticis  Elenchis cited  above, 
Aristotle  goes  on to  comment  on  the  way in  which  Gorgias  taught 
rhetoric. He handed out speeches in the form of question and answer. 
Aristotle’s  criticism is  that  this  is  not actually  to  teach a  technê,  but 
merely to make available the products of a  technê. It seems natural to 
suppose  two  things  from  this  criticism.  First,  Gorgias  did  not 
supplement  the  set-piece  examples  mentioned  with  a  systematic 
account – if he had, Aristotle’s criticism would have been unfounded. 
Secondly,  it  is  natural  to  suppose  that  the  force  of  Aristotle’s  point 
comes from the fact  that  Gorgias was  purporting to  teach the art  of 
rhetoric,  as  an art,  a  technê.178 If  this  is  right,  then it  is  a  reason for 
thinking that Gorgias as well as Thrasymachus, is within the scope of 
Aristotle’s  criticism  at  I.1.  He  purported,  by  his  writings,  to  be 
conveying the art of rhetoric. He saw a key part of this as involving the 
arousal of emotions. Likewise, he appears to have been someone for 
whom rhetorical  set-pieces were a significant part of his  oeuvre,  and 
someone who saw the learning of these set pieces as a key component 
of learning the art of rhetoric.
Finally,  on  Gorgias,  we should  note  what  is  put  into  his  mouth in 
Plato’s Gorgias in the speech 455d-457c. He there claims that the ability 
178 This point seems historically very likely, since Plato makes this Gorgias’ central 
claim at the start of the Gorgias, 449a-b.
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his rhetoric gives is a power to influence people on matters such as 
medicine, or indeed any other craft, regardless of how well or badly 
qualified the speaker is to know what he is talking about. The claim 
seems to be that the power of the speech is derived independently of 
the strength of the case. Gorgias could deploy his power to get patients 
to take poison or medicine, or to get the citizens to appoint him as their 
general, chief architect, envoy, or whatever he chose.179 Rhetoric is like 
skill in boxing, he says (456d) – it’s an ability to punch both bad guys 
and good guys. Aristotle seems to have reflected on this claim180 and 
yet insisted, against Gorgias (or certainly Plato’s Gorgias) and probably 
against  many  others  too,  that  rhetoric’s  persuasive  power  is  not 
independent of the appropriateness of its deployment.181 For Gorgias 
and others, rhetoric is a matter of learning and deploying techniques. 
Skilfully  deployed,  they  will  always  enable  you  to  win:  learn  the 
speeches, read the handbooks, use their recipes, and you will win. For 
Aristotle,  the  skill  of  rhetoric  will  enable  you  to  see  in  any  case  
whatsoever what the available persuasive features are that tell in favour 
of your side of the case, and to make the best of those features. But still 
the  eventual  strength of  your  case will  depend on what  facts  there 
actually are to appeal to! Someone arguing for the truth will generally 
have  a  stronger  case  (1355a36-8).  The  key  difference  is  that  for 
Aristotle, rhetoric is always about looking at the facts of the issue at 
hand and seeing how they tell for and against each side of the case. 
Whereas  the  rhetorical  techniques  of  Gorgias  have  a  power  that  is 
independent  of  the particular  situation of  deployment.  If  something 
like Gorgias’ view was shared by Thrasymachus and whoever else may 
be in view in Aristotle’s criticism at the start of the Rhetoric, and their 
179See also ch. 1 above on Gorgias Helen.
180 Rhetoric I.1.1355a35-b7, including the boxing / wrestling comparison.
181 A similar point is made at Phaedrus 268a8-269c5.
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techniques  were  designed  accordingly  so  as  not  to  depend  on  the 
strength of your case,  they would be just the kind of technique that 
Aristotle could dismiss as not even being “about the issue”.
My  claim  is  that  the  most  plausible  targets  of  Aristotle’s  criticism, 
Gorgias and – more especially – Thrasymachus, give support to my 
key contention about the nature of that criticism.  Diabolê need not be 
reinterpreted as an oblique way of referring to some emotion – it is 
criticised in its  own right.  And it  is  not emotion-arousal  per  se that 
Aristotle  criticises,  but  the  inclusion  of  sections  of  emotion-arousal 
deployable independently of the orator’s argument – the very kind of 
emotion-arousal  that  was  so  characteristic  of  Thrasymachus  and 
Gorgias, emotion-arousal using set-pieces that could simply be lifted 
from a collection and used without reference to the facts of the case, 
and whose rhetorical power would be independent of the underlying 
strength of the speaker’s position.
V
I  wish  now  to  deal  with  some  difficulties  for  the  position  I  am 
recommending.  The  answers  to  some  of  these  will  already  have 
become evident.
Firstly,  one  difficulty  is  that  it  is  not  the  most  natural  way  to 
understand 1354a16f. “slander, pity, anger and similar passions of the 
soul”. The most natural reading (if there is such a thing) of this is as a 
list of ‘passions of the soul’. If it were a list of types of rhetorical set-
pieces, then the summarising phrase “and similar passions of the soul” 
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perhaps seems out of place. Likewise, it is easier to see 1354a24f. as a 
repetition of the same point if the earlier list was a list of passions.
One possible explanation is that the phrase ‘passions of the soul’ does 
not properly belong in the text at all. This was Kassel’s view in 1971 
when he wrote his introduction to the text of the Rhetoric.182 It seems his 
main reason was that it is not a good end to a list headed by  diabolê. 
Thus amended, the sentence reads, “For slander and pity and anger 
and the like are not concerned with the issue but directed at the judge.” 
Nevertheless, the phrase is attested in most of the main manuscripts 
and in  the Arabic  translation (although significantly  the Arabic  text 
does not have slander but fear (khawf) at the head of the list). Kassel 
himself does not seem wholly convinced of his excision and gingerly 
(“dubitanter”) reinstates the phrase in his 1976 text.183 
Assuming that the text is correct as it stands, there is no knockdown 
argument against this difficulty, as far as I can see. We should note that 
of the two interpretations of the list  at 1354a16ff.  offered above,  the 
“diabolê and  its  associated  emotions”  interpretation  is  already 
consistent with the most natural or obvious reading of the list. So, the 
difficulty  arises  only  for  the  interpretation  where  ‘eleos’  is  taken  to 
mean an appeal to pity of the kind recommended in Thrasymachus’ 
Eleoi, and ‘orgê kai ta toiauta pathê tês psuchês’ is taken to refer to ploys of 
a similar kind. But this is my preferred interpretation, and it seems to 
require  understanding  “καὶ  τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς” to  mean 
“and similar set-piece emotion plays” or more vaguely  to  mean “et  
cetera”. The objection is that there is perhaps something more natural 
182 “πάθη  τῆς  ψυχῆς  mit  διαβολὴ  sich  trotz  aller  versuchten 
Interpretationskunststücke schlect genug verträgt” Kassel [1971] 118.
183 Citing 1419b25-27, presumably for the inclusion of δεινωσις in a list of παθη..
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about  interpreting  this  phrase  as  the  end  of  a  list  of  passions. 
Nevertheless, I have contended that this traditional interpretation as a 
whole faces some serious problems, which make it worth considering 
alternatives, even if they are not quite so natural as a reading of these 
lists. Moreover, in the light of the use of these terms by Thrasymachus, 
it may have been a perfectly familiar usage to employ emotion terms 
like  “ἔλεος”  to  mean  a  set-piece  designed  to  evoke  that  particular 
emotion.184 If  the  combination  of  slander,  pity  and  anger  was  a 
sufficiently clear signal to readers that Thrasymachus was the target, 
then it might be perfectly natural to use emotion terms in the way he  
used them. We speculated above that “slander”,  “pity” and “anger” 
might be something like chapter titles in Thrasymachus’s work. If some 
such thing were correct, then “similar passions of the soul” could just 
be variables for similar chapter titles. Thus, Aristotle would be saying, 
‘“slander”,  “pity”,  “anger”  and  any  other  “passion”  in  a 
Thrasymachean handbook’. At the very least, there are some possible 
alternatives to the traditional interpretation of this phrase that would 
be  consistent  with  the  view  I  am  proposing.  In  the  end,  it  is  still 
perhaps  right  to  concede  that  the  traditional  interpretation  is  more 
natural, and to weigh this against the wider merits of the view urged 
here.
Next, one of the passages cited at the outset of the chapter,  Rhetoric  I.
2.1356a14-19,  appears  precisely  to  identify  the  passions  for  which 
Aristotle has a central role in his own theory, and the passions treated 
so  obsessively  by  his  predecessors.  For  convenience,  I  repeat  the 
passage here.
184 On the other hand,  the title of Thrasymachus’  work uses ‘ἐλεος’ in the plural, 
which signals a meaning for the word distinct  from the main meaning of ‘ἐλεος’, 
namely ‘pity’, in a way that is not so obvious for the singular at 1354a17.
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[Proof]  through  the  listeners,  whenever  they  are  brought  into  an  
emotional state by the speech: for we do not make judgements in the  
same way when upset as when we are glad; or when hostile as when  
friendly. And this is, as we said, the only thing the recent handbook  
writers  attempt  to  treat  systematically  (Gk.  πρὸς  ὃ  καὶ  μόνον 
πειρᾶσθαί φαμεν πραγματεύεσθαι).  These things will be made  
clear one by one when we speak about the emotions.(1356a14-19)
On the face of it, this makes it very hard to resist the CV. After all, it 
seems  to  refer  back  to  the  handbook  writers’  treatment  of  emotion 
arousal, i.e. the target of criticism at I.1. And in the same breath, it is a 
reference to the passions as one of the three kinds of technical proof in 
Aristotle’s own theory. The two here are seemingly identified: there is 
something that Aristotle criticised in the handbook writers to which he 
now gives a key role in his own theory. The result is that Aristotle’s 
argument in I.1, ruling out such passions from having a role in proof 
and hence in rhetoric,  stands in flat  contradiction to  the view he is 
starting to develop in this passage, the view that forms the basis for his 
treatment of the passions in book II.
Nevertheless, I do not think that we are forced in this direction by this 
passage. There are two possible and related strategies, both of which 
seem plausible to me, for understanding it in a way that is consistent 
with the position developed here.
The  first  strategy  involves  no  retranslation.  It  focuses  on  the  word 
“attempt”  (Gk.  πειρᾶσθαί)  at  a17:  Aristotle  is  saying  that  the 
handbook writers were well aware of the significance of emotions in 
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persuasion,  and  how  powerfully  they  worked.  Nevertheless,  they 
failed  in  their  attempt  to  give  the  right  kind  of  explanation  of  the 
persuasive  power  of  emotion  that  is  required  for  a  technê.  His 
contention here,  therefore,  is that what he  successfully explains in I.2 
and II.1-11, they were attempting to treat. Since they did not succeed in 
connecting their techniques for arousing the passions with the subject 
matter of the case at hand, they fell foul of the relevance requirements 
that are at the heart of the criticisms of I.1. At best, their techniques 
contribute  to  the  shady  business  of  diabolê,  or  to  gaining  the 
unprejudiced attention of the listener, mere ‘accessories’ of the art of 
rhetoric. At worst, what they have written about is no part of rhetoric 
at  all.  This  is  consistent  with  what  Aristotle  says  here  –  they  were 
trying to  treat  systematically  the  contribution  of  the  passions  to  the 
successful  use  of  rhetoric,  but  ended  up  treating  something  quite 
different:  slander and manipulative set-piece emotion plays.  On this 
reading, Aristotle is claiming to have succeeded where they had failed.
A second strategy in dealing with this passage is to retranslate in a way 
which  makes  it  a  much  stronger  assertion  of  the  kind  of  position 
attributed to Aristotle in the first strategy. In the standard translation, 
“πρὸς ὃ καὶ μόνον” is all taken together to mean that it was ‘to this 
feature  alone’  that  previous  writers  directed  their  efforts.  However, 
“καὶ  μόνον”  may be  taken  with  what  follows  (i.e.  with  peirasthai - 
“attempting”)  as  an  emphatic  connective:185 it  was  this  feature  of 
persuasion  that  the  contemporary  writers  ‘were  merely striving 
towards’.
185 Denniston [1950] 316-8.
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I think that these are the two most pressing difficulties for the view I 
am urging.
VI
It is important to make clear how this differs from the views of others 
who have found in Aristotle’s Rhetoric a consistent position on the role 
of  emotion.  Prominent  among  these  are  Edward  Cope,  William 
Grimaldi, John Cooper and Robert Wardy.186 After all, several of these 
writers  have  seen  relevance  to  the  subject  of  the  case  at  hand,  or 
relevance  to  the  orator’s  argument,  as  being  central  to  Aristotle’s 
criticism at I.1. There is indeed some important shared ground between 
these interpretations and mine, particularly in relation to the  general  
position attributed  to  Aristotle.  Nevertheless,  there  are  significant 
exegetical  differences  between  the  position  offered  here,  and  other 
proposals of a harmonised position for Aristotle in the Rhetoric. I hope 
to show now how my position is different, and how it is not vulnerable 
to  some  criticisms  that  have  rendered  implausible  these  previous 
attempts at seeking a consistent position for Aristotle.
Previous Harmonising Views of Aristotle’s  Rhetoric  
Both Cooper and Wardy argue that the criticism of I.1, whilst having 
all  emotion-arousal  in  its  scope,  does  not  reject  it  wholesale  from 
having  a  place  within  rhetoric.  Some  key  arguments  support  this 
position.
Cooper cites 1354a11-13 in this way. “Now the framers of the current 
treatises on rhetoric have constructed but a small portion of that art.” 
186 Cope [1867]; Grimaldi [1972]; Cooper [1999]; Wardy [1996].
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This sentence, it is argued, presupposes that they have supplied part, 
albeit a small part, of the art of rhetoric. What is criticised by Aristotle, 
on this interpretation, is their exclusive focus on emotion-arousal: they 
have focussed on one of the technical proofs to the exclusion of the 
other two. 187
This position also appeals to a phrase which is pivotal to Aristotle’s 
criticism in I.1, namely “ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος” (outside the issue). The 
claim is that his criticism is correctly understood not as a rejection of all 
emotion-arousal,  but  as  a  rejection  of  emotion-arousal  if it  is 
unconnected with the issue at hand.
Wardy  argues  that  the  criticism  “might  be  restricted  to  emotional 
manipulation; after all, Aristotle insists a little later that ‘one must not 
warp the juryman by leading him into anger or envy or pity;”188 He 
finds in “διαστρέφειν” (warp) a restrictive connotation. The proposal 
seems to be that Aristotle is here expressing no general objection to 
leading  jurymen  on  to  anger,  envy  or  pity,  his  censure  is  rather 
restricted to cases where arousing these emotions amounts to warping the 
juryman.
So, we read the following.
“… he does not imply that a good system of laws would forbid 
appeals to the judges’ emotions. He means only that good laws 
would forbid appeals to emotion that detracted from and were 
no  part  of  the  orderly  presentation  of  the  case  itself  being 
argued. So it is irrelevant appeals to emotion made by the orator 
in  and  through  his  speech  (e.g.  by  describing  shocking  or 
187 Cooper [1999] 391-3. A similar point is made by Cope [1867] 4-5.
188 Wardy [1996] 115, emphasis his.
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uplifting  events  and circumstances  having  no  bearing  on  the 
matters in dispute or on the questions of right and wrong before 
the court), not appeals to emotion altogether, that Aristotle here 
objects to.”189
“I conclude that what Aristotle rejects is not emotional appeal 
per se, but emotion appeals which have no ‘bearing on the issue’, 
in that the pathê they stimulate lack, or at any rate are not shown 
to possess, any intrinsic connection with the point at issue – as if 
an advocate were to try to whip an anti-Semitic audience into 
fury because the accused is Jewish …”190
The position eventually ascribed to Aristotle here is, I think, right. But 
the exegesis is wrong, and has been rightly rejected.191
First, I do not think, as Cooper maintains,  that “Aristotle immediately 
grants that this [viz. emotion-arousal]  is  a part,  though only a small 
part, oligon morion (1.1, 1354a12-14) of the art”.192 This crucial assertion 
depends  on  a  disputed  textual  variant193 and  is  impossible  if  the 
alternative text is correct. But even if one grants the text that this view 
requires, the point still does not go through for two reasons. First, on 
Aristotle’s view, emotion-arousal is not a ‘small part’ of rhetoric, it is a 
very significant part of rhetoric, one of three kinds of technical proofs, 
and worthy of a full eleven chapters of book II. As he says, it makes a 
great  deal  of  difference  in  relation  to  persuading  people  (II.
189 Cooper [1999] 392.
190 Wardy [1996] 116.
191 E.g. by Barnes [1995] 262; Wisse [1989] 19.
192 Cooper [1999] 391; similarly Grimaldi [1972] 44.
193 See above n. 117.
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1.1377b24f.). So even if these writers were guilty, as this view suggests, 
of treating virtually nothing except emotion-arousal, there would still 
be a problem with suggesting that they had only treated a small part of 
the art of rhetoric. By Aristotle’s own lights, they would have treated a 
substantial and very significant part.
Another reason to reject this suggestion is that it makes no sense of the 
structure of the argument of I.1. The argument turns on the fact that if 
something is “outside the issue”, then it is not part of providing proofs, 
hence  not  part  of  rhetoric.194 Since  “slander,  pity,  anger,  etc.”  are 
outside the issue (“διαβολὴ γὰρ …” 1354a16), discussion of them fails 
to  be  discussion  of  the  proofs,  and  hence  of  rhetoric  (“αἱ  γὰρ 
πίστεις ...” a13). Since this is what the handbook writers spent most of 
their effort on (a16), it follows that they spent most of their effort on 
something  other  than  rhetoric.  If  arousing  the  pathê mentioned  at 
1354a16f. is  itself  one of the technical kinds of proof, then the whole 
argument of this section is undermined. The premise about the  pathê 
provides  no  support  for  the  conclusion  about  how  little  Aristotle’s 
predecessors have contributed to the art of rhetoric.
A final  reason to  reject  this  first  argument  for  the Cooper  /  Wardy 
harmonisation is that it creates a contradiction with what Aristotle says 
barely one Bekker page later.
For  in  discussing  these  [viz.  divisions  of  a  speech] they  busy  
themselves with nothing except how to put the judge into a certain  
condition,  and  they  set  out  nothing  (οὐδὲν)  about  the  proofs  that  
belong to the expertise. (1354b19-21)
194See above ch. 1.
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Here there is no variant textual reading. Moreover the structure of the 
argument  makes  it  abundantly  clear  that  this  is  supposed  to  be  a 
restatement of just the same point as was made at 1354a11-13. It could 
not be clearer. The handbook writers have said lots about emotion, but 
nothing about the proper constituents of the art of rhetoric, namely the 
technical proofs. It is not that they have said a little about these kinds of 
proof, they have said nothing about them. Hence, even if (allowing the 
textual  variant  at  1354a12f.)  it  is  to  be  conceded  that  they  have 
contributed “a small  part” of the art  of  rhetoric,  it  would not be in 
virtue of the emotion-arousal under discussion in I.1 that they have 
done so.
The remaining reasons offered for the Wardy /  Cooper view can be 
dealt  with  more  quickly.  They  imply  that  Aristotle’s  criticisms  are 
directed at “slander, pity, anger and similar passions”  if  they are off-
subject:  that is, they are directed at a subset of appeals to emotion – 
namely, the ones that are off-subject.
“So it is irrelevant appeals to emotion … not appeals to emotion 
altogether, that Aristotle here objects to.”195
“what  Aristotle  rejects  is  not  emotional  appeal  per  se,  but 
emotion appeals which have no ‘bearing on the issue’”196
The text simply does not say that “slander, pity, fear, etc.” are not part 
of  rhetoric  if  they  are  off-subject,  nor  does  it  give  any  grounds  for 
supposing it is merely a subset of what these terms are referring to that 
195 Cooper [1999] 392.
196 Wardy [1996] 116.
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is  being  criticised.  It  asserts  categorically  that  these  things  are off-
subject, and hence cites a preoccupation with these things as a reason 
to  suppose  that  previous  writers  have  failed  to  contribute  anything 
(much) to the art of rhetoric. There just isn’t any “if” in the text, nor 
any hint at discriminating between different  slanders,  pities,  angers, 
etc.. The sentence involving diabolê and the pathê at 1354a16-18 offers an 
unqualified generalisation, and is the basis for Aristotle’s concluding 
that these things are no part of the art of rhetoric.
How  sympathetic  one  is  to  the  restrictive  reading  of 
“warp” (διαστρέφειν) at a24 seems to me to depend on one’s view of 
the strength of the case built  up elsewhere for a similarly restrictive 
view of the criticisms of I.1 generally.197 It is not an impossible reading, 
but it is not plausible in isolation from the Cooper / Wardy reading of 
the preceding passages of I.1 – a reading which I have argued is far 
from  compelling  exegetically,  as  a  solution  to  the  contradiction 
problem,  even  if  it  finally  attributes  the  right  general  position  to 
Aristotle. 
There are others who have argued on grounds different from these for 
a harmonised position for  Aristotle.  Edward Cope,  whilst  sharing a 
number of the arguments just discussed, offers an explanation based 
on a distinction between rhetoric as it ideally should be, and rhetoric as 
197Thus,  this  reading  of  1354a24f.  –  leaning  heavily  on  the  connotations  of 
διαστρεφειν – is compatible with the view I propose here, although it is not the only 
way to restrict the scope of these lines. A more natural reading, given my view of 
1354a16ff., is that the phrase “leading the juryman to anger, envy or pity” is simply a 
further  reference  to  the  same  practices  Aristotle  was  discussing  immediately 
beforehand – the practices recommended by the handbook writers.
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it must be practised in the real world.198 On this view, some aspects of 
rhetoric are part of the art, but only as a concession necessitated by the 
failings  of  listeners  (“διὰ  τὴν  τοῦ  ἀκροατοῦ  μοχθηρίαν,”  III.1, 
1404a7f.). Emotion-arousal is one such aspect. Ideally it would not be 
part of rhetoric, but in fact it is, as a concession to the real world. “The 
depraved judgement  and taste  of  an ordinary audience  requires this 
kind of ‘flattery,’ as Plato calls it, and the speaker is therefore obliged to 
give way; to relax the rigorous observance of the rules of his art, and to 
humour their perverted inclinations.”199
This  explanation  is  surely  far  from  compelling,  as  an  attempt  to 
elucidate the relationship between Aristotle’s criticisms in I.1 and what 
he  says  in  I.2,  and  book  II.200 This  “concessive”  view  is  typically 
supported from passages in book III. But there is nowhere so much as a 
hint of such a view in the material that deals with the pisteis. He makes 
concessions to the failings of the audience twice (to my knowledge) in 
the Rhetoric: in relation to hypokrisis (‘acting’) at III.1.1403b34-5, and in 
relation to gaining or distracting the attention of jurors in the prooimion 
at III.14.1415b4-6.  None of  this does anything to recommend such a 
view of the technical kinds of proof in books I and II. We may put the 
point more strongly. There is  good reason why the concessive view 
only surfaces in book III. Books I and II have been dealing with what is 
entechnon, that is, what belongs essentially to the art of rhetoric – i.e. 
198This view has much in common with the views of Sprute [1994] and Schütrumpf 
[1994], including their weaknesses, cf. above n. 37.
199 Cope [1867] 5-6; Sprute [1994] 118-122; Engberg-Pedersen [1996] 131-135; Halliwell 
[1994] 212f.. Additionally, Grimaldi ([1972] 19 n.3) lists Vater, Spengel and Russo as 
advocating this view.
200 We argued above (chapter 2) that this view is not required to explain Aristotle’s 
concern in I.1 with how the laws should stand.
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the pisteis. When he gets to book III, he announces that he has finished 
dealing with the pisteis, he is now dealing with other matters, what he 
called ‘accessories’  in book I. It is easy to see why excellent delivery 
and  gaining  the  audience’s  attention  are  accessories.  Successful 
persuasion  can  take  place  without  them  –  audiences  often  pay 
attention of their own accord, and follow a speaker’s argument even if 
delivered  unimpressively.  Conversely,  without  the  essential 
components of rhetoric, i.e. proofs, you may have all the attentiveness 
and excellent delivery you like, but no persuasion will take place. If all 
you have are ‘accessories’, the best you can do is create conditions in 
which persuasion could easily take place successfully. On this view, it is 
clear why concessive arguments would apply to things like  hypokrisis 
and attention-gaining, but not to the technical kinds of proof. Still, my 
exegetical argument does not depend on this precise explanation of the 
structure  of  Aristotle’s  wider  rhetorical  theory.  There  simply  is  no 
suggestion in the text of books I and II that Aristotle’s theory of the 
technical proofs is in any way concessive,  and any attempt to argue 
this from passages in book III back into the earlier books would require 
some justification. The explanation above suggests that it is no accident 
that  such  concessive  passages  are  to  be  found  only  in  book  III.  If 
correct, it tells strongly against attempts to apply concessive principles 
from book III back into the earlier passages about the pisteis. 
Finally,  among the harmonisers,  is  William Grimaldi.  His case for a 
consistent position for Aristotle is argued partly on grounds that have 
already been covered.201 But most of his attention in addressing this 
201 He shares  Cooper’s  view that  Aristotle  concedes  that  the  technographers  have 
constructed a “small part” of the art. He also seems to share the view that emotion-
arousal is criticised to the extent that it is irrelevant, but his exact views here are hard 
to make out. Grimaldi [1972] 44.
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contradiction  problem  is  directed  towards  establishing  that  “one 
cannot  claim  that  Aristotle  is  arguing  simply  for  the  logical  and 
rational proof of the case.”202 Now, even if he is right about this, it does 
not solve the contradiction problem. Indeed, it scarcely touches it. For 
even if, as Grimaldi urges, Aristotle allows a role within rhetoric for 
some things other than the “logical and rational proof of the case”, it 
does not follow that one of those things is emotion-arousal. The issue 
in the contradiction problem is whether Aristotle rules out all emotion-
arousal  from amounting  to  an exercise  of   rhetorical  expertise.  The 
contradiction problem arises because Aristotle appears to do just that 
at 1354a11-18. Grimaldi is no doubt correct to observe that these lines 
do  not  contain  an  Aristotelian  insistence  on  logos-proof  alone  (or 
pragma,  to  use  Grimaldi’s  preferred  term  for  this  technical  kind  of 
proof).  He  has  no  doubt  served  the  cause  of  scholarship  by 
undermining  such  a  claim.  Moreover,  had those  lines  contained  an 
insistence on logos-proof alone, they would certainly have generated a 
contradiction problem (in relation to I.2 and II.1) deeper still than the 
one considered here.  Nevertheless,  the fact  remains  that  for  all  that 
Grimaldi  has  said,  1354a11-18  may  rule  out  any  role  in  the  art  of 
rhetoric for arousing the ‘passions of the soul’.
I  conclude  that  in  relation to  previous  attempted  resolutions  of  the 
contradiction problem, there are insuperable difficulties.  No solution 
has  been  found  persuasive,  and  many  have  thought  the  problem 
insoluble.203
However, careful attention to the meaning of diabolê, and to the use of 
emotions  and  emotion-terminology  by  Thrasymachus  and  other 
202 Grimaldi [1972] 44, a position which he describes at pp.18-20.
203 Barnes [1995] 262; Wisse [1989] 19-20.
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technical writers  of the period,  suggests a resolution of the problem 
that  makes  exegetical  sense  of  the  prominent  passages,  and  gives 
Aristotle a consistent view of  pistis,  diabolê, and the parts of a speech, 
through the whole of the Rhetoric.
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Chapter  5  –  Aristotle’s  Rhetoric on  what  the 
emotions are.
In earlier chapters, we sought to make clear how, in Aristotle’s view, 
the arousal  of  the passions can be a way in which a speaker  offers 
listeners a proof (pistis). From some key arguments at the start of the 
Rhetoric,  we  set  out  Aristotle’s  view on  the  nature  and  purpose  of 
rhetoric. The expertise, in his view, is exercised in the production of 
proofs (pisteis), and we have laid out a set of conditions that something 
must have if it is to count as a proof. Chapter 3 concluded with a sketch 
of how emotion-arousal might accordingly be a way in which an orator 
could  offer  listeners  proof.  The  last  chapter  dealt  with  a  possible 
difficulty facing the picture thus emerging, in the apparent denial in I.1 
that any kind of emotion-arousal could count as giving a proof.
With  that  difficulty  removed,  there  are  still  a  number  of  important 
challenges  remaining.  The  account  offered  above  of  how  arousing 
emotions can be a way of providing proof is not compatible with every 
way of  understanding emotions.  The chief  aim of  this  and the next 
chapter is to show that Aristotle’s view of the emotions in the Rhetoric, 
particularly  in  book  II,  is  compatible  with  the  role  which  we  have 
claimed he sees emotion-arousal playing in the exercise of rhetorical 
expertise. So, in the Rhetoric, are emotions the right “shape” for the role 
they play in rhetorical proofs?
One  particular  issue  is  pressing.  Our  account  of  pistis presented  in 
chapter  3 requires  that  the speaker  invite  the listener  to  believe  the 
conclusion because of what has been presented as a proof. The definition of 
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pistis204 contained the following requirement for what is presented to a 
listener (B) as proof (P) for some judgement (J).
P  is  so  related  to  J  that,  if  B  regards  the  elements  of  P  as 
reputable and is correct to do so, then it would be an exercise of 
good  judgement  on  B’s  part  if  B  were  inclined  to  make 
judgement J because of P.
The claim then about how proof could involve emotion-arousal was 
this.  One  way  in  which  the  listener  might  regard  something  as 
reputable, in such a way as to make it a matter of good judgement to 
draw the conclusion because of it, would be for the listener to feel that 
things are as the speaker (in offering the proof) represents them to be. 
That is, the listener’s emotion would itself constitute his acceptance (as 
true  or  at  least  plausible)  of  the  premises  presented  to  him by  the 
speaker in the proof. In the case where those premises are (if true) a 
good  basis  for  accepting  the  conclusion,  and  where  the  listener  is 
correct  to feel  as he does,  it  is  an exercise of good judgement to be 
inclined  to  accept  the  conclusion  because  of  feeling  that  way.  Thus 
emotions  take  the  role  in  apprehending  parts  of  an  argument  that 
might otherwise be taken by beliefs. If the following inelegance may be 
excused,  cases  of  correctly  ‘feeling the  premises’,  just  like  correctly 
believing the argument’s premises, rightly incline a listener to accept the 
argument’s conclusion (to which, we are supposing, they are related in 
the required way).205
Whether emotions are capable of taking this role depends crucially on 
what kind of thing the emotions are. Clearly, if emotions involve (or 
204Above p. 99.
205 See Burnyeat [1990] for a discussion of what kind of connection between premises 
and conclusion is admissible in rhetorical arguments. cf. also EN I.3, 1094b23-27.
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simply are) judgements or beliefs, then getting listeners to feel a certain 
way can be just a particular way of getting them to accept a premise in 
an argument.206 Such a view nicely  fits  the account of  proof we are 
putting forward. It is not part of the current project to defend views of 
this  particular  kind.  They  are  mentioned here  simply  as  one  broad 
category  of  views  that  will  be  fully  compatible  with  our  proposals 
about  proofs  and  the  place  of  emotion-arousal  in  the  provision  of 
proofs.
However, we will be concerned here with a view proposed in recent 
years  that  emotions  involve merely  the  appearance of  things  being a 
particular  way.  This  kind  of  view  has  been  proposed  both  within 
theories of the emotions themselves, and as an account of Aristotle’s 
view of the emotions.207 In the latter regard, it is usually Rhetoric II that 
is cited in support of the proposal. It  is important to see that if this 
proposal correctly represented Aristotle’s view, then his view of the 
emotions would not be compatible with what we have suggested is his 
view of the rhetorical proofs that work by emotion-arousal. Much of 
the next chapter will be taken up with showing that this “appearance” 
view  of  Aristotelian  emotions  does  not  in  fact  accurately  represent 
Aristotle’s position in the Rhetoric. But here, we should briefly see how 
this  view,  if  correct,  would  pose  serious  problems  for  Aristotelian 
proofs by emotion-arousal (at least on the view set out here that locates 
them within a more general view of rhetorical pistis).
The “appearance view” (as we shall call it) – in common with many 
other views of the nature of emotions – accepts that experiencing an 
emotion involves a distinctive outlook on the object(s) of that emotion. 
206 cf. e.g. Nussbaum [1994] ch. 3, [1996], [1999].
207 cf. Cooper [1996], [1999]; Striker [1996]; Sihvola [1996]; Prinz [2003].
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So, in the outlook of the person that feels pity, whatever it is that they 
pity is suffering undeservedly. The appearance view is a claim about 
the  relation  between  the  subject  of  the  emotion  and  the  outlook 
distinctive of that emotion. On the appearance view, the relation is one 
of appearances: the distinctive outlook is ‘how appearances stand’, i.e. 
how things look, from the perspective of (e.g.) the pitying person.
For our purposes, it will not matter whether how things look is  ipso  
facto some good reason in favour of believing that things are that way. 
The essential feature of appearances with which we are concerned here 
is that they do not involve the subject in taking the way things appear 
to be the way things are. Things may look a particular way to me, but 
(even if I recognise that how things look is some good reason to believe 
this is how they are) I need not take it that they are that way. Indeed, I 
may  perhaps  know  that  in  this  particular  case  appearances  are 
misleading. In such a case, that things are a certain way may be exactly 
the way they correctly should look to me, but that things are that way 
is not something I ought to believe.208
It  is  obvious  why  arousing  this  kind  of  state  will  not  count  as 
providing  proof.  The  key  condition  for  proof  set  out  above  simply 
required the premises of the proof to be appropriately related to the 
conclusion  they  recommend.  The  thought  was  that  on  Aristotle’s 
account  of  rhetorical  proof,  once this  condition is  fulfilled,  correctly 
accepting the premises as reputable is sufficient to make it the case that it 
would  be  an  exercise  of  good  judgement  to  accept  the  conclusion 
because of them. Proofs using emotion-arousal count as proofs because 
of the possibility that emotions are ways of accepting certain things as 
208“Ought” here is to be understood as related solely to considerations bearing on the 
truth of what is believed.
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(at  least)  reputable.  But  this  requirement  is  not  met  if  the  stance 
towards a premise that emotions would involve is merely that this is 
‘how things look’. For, even if things look exactly as they should look, 
its  being  the  case  that  appearances  to  me  are  such-and-such  a  way,  is 
compatible with my taking it to be the case that ‘that things are that 
way’ is not something I ought to believe. It is obvious that in such a 
case,  it  would  not  be  an  exercise  of  proper  judgement  for  me  to 
proceed to some further judgement on the basis of an inference from 
how  things  looked.  Appearances  do  not  suffice  for  regarding  the 
content of those appearances as reputable. They are not sufficient (even 
when  impeccable  as  appearances)  to  make  it  an  exercise  of  good 
judgement to proceed inferentially from them to further judgements. 
But  it  is  the  latter  that  would  be  required  for  arousing  emotions  – 
conceived of in accordance with the “appearance view” – to count as 
providing proof.
The same point is underscored by the way in which appearances can 
quite  properly  coexist  with  knowledge  that  things  are  not  as  they 
appear.  There is  no failure  of  perceptual  systems when the stick in 
water still looks bent to me even if I know it is straight. This is often 
claimed as an advantage of an “appearances view” of emotions, since 
we can fear spiders that we know are not dangerous (or fearsome). On 
the appearances view, fearing the spider involves it merely  appearing 
dangerous, and this is obviously compatible with  knowing that this is 
not so. Aristotle’s exact views of “appearances” will be the principal 
focus of the next chapter. For the present, we note that (whatever its 
merits  elsewhere)  this  possibility  of  conflicting  appearance  and 
knowledge creates a serious problem for how emotion-arousal could 
provide proper grounds for conviction, i.e. rhetorical proof. Since even 
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properly-formed appearances can persist even when they are known to 
be  misleading,  they  cannot  alone  constitute  proper  grounds  for 
conviction of  something else.  Indeed,  it  would constitute  very poor 
judgement  to  draw any conclusion on the basis  of  appearances  one 
knew to be mistaken.
The problem is that appearances are sometimes evidentially valuable, 
rightly  inclining  us  to  suppose  that  things  are  as  they  appear,  and 
providing  also  a  good  basis  for  drawing  further  conclusions.  But 
sometimes they are of no evidential worth.209 If the appearance view of 
emotions were to be correct, then the account of proofs using emotion-
arousal would need to be supplemented in order to exclude the arousal 
of emotions where the appearances involved did not provide any basis 
on which the subject should properly be inclined to accept the proof’s 
conclusion.210 The  beauty  of  Aristotle’s  view  of  proof,  as  we  have 
presented it, is that it is built around a very simple notion – inferential 
relations.  Rhetorical  proofs  are  pieces  of  reasoning,  and  they  are 
worthy of being called proofs just if the premises stand in the right 
relations to the conclusion. This is why concepts such as  sullogismos  
and apodeixis are so important, why enthymeme is the body of proof, 
and why the similarities with dialectic are so strong. Premises may not 
209 The stick would look bent in water whether it was bent or straight: hence its 
appearing bent when in water is no evidence one way or another as to whether it is 
bent.
210We might note further that the most plausible way in which the account might be 
supplemented would be to require that the subject be justified in taking appearances 
to be trustworthy. But this is itself revealing, because thus supplemented it seems as 
though now it is not only the case that things look thus-and-so to the subject, but that 
the subject takes it to be the case  that plausibly things are thus-and-so. And it is clear 
that what legitimates any further inferences from this is not how things look, but how 
things are taken to be.
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necessitate  conclusions,  nor  may  premises  turn  out  to  be  true,  but 
where they are appropriately related to the conclusion, if the listener is 
correct  to  accept the premises,  he ought to  be inclined to accept  the 
conclusion.  This  applies  whether  the  listener’s  apprehension  of  the 
proof proceeds through simple belief or through trusting the speaker 
or through feelings. Since appearance is not itself a kind of acceptance, 
it does not fit this model. Advocates of the appearance view of the kind 
of distinctive outlook involved in emotions take it to be an advantage 
of their view that my feeling that things are a certain way does not 
entail that I take it (or accept) that they are that way.211 It is precisely 
this feature that makes it hard for emotions, thus understood, to take 
the kind of role in rhetorical proof that we suggest Aristotle envisages.
The appearances view of emotions thus would not be compatible with 
the account defended above of proofs through the listeners’ emotions, 
and how these fit into Aristotle’s overall account of technical proofs in 
rhetoric.
With  this  consideration  in  mind,  and  with  the  general  purpose  of 
getting clear Aristotle’s  understanding of what the passions are,  the 
next  chapter  is  devoted  to  scrutinising  the  exegetical  claim  that 
Aristotle’s presentation of the passions in the Rhetoric is in accordance 
with the ‘appearance view’.  Clearly if  this claim could be upheld it 
would be highly problematic for the account of rhetorical proofs here 
ascribed to Aristotle. I will argue for the rejection of this claim.
For  the  remainder  of  this  chapter,  we  will  attend  to  Aristotle’s 
generalised  remarks  about  the  passions  in  Rhetoric  II.1,  particularly 
211Such a theory clearly has no difficulty allowing that it is possible for someone to 
fear as dangerous a spider they know to be harmless.
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1378a19-22. This is an obvious starting point for a careful examination 
of  Aristotle’s  understanding  of  the  nature  of  the  passions.  Thus, 
although  our  overall  argument  about  emotion-arousal  in  rhetorical 
proof  does  not  depend  on  a  particular  interpretation  here,  it  may 
nevertheless be helpful to indicate in outline how this passage is being 
understood.
The passions are those [things] on account of which we change and  
differ in relation to our judgements [Gk. pros tas kriseis],212 and that  
are accompanied by pain and pleasure, for example, anger, pity, fear  
and any other similar passions and their opposites. (II.1.1378a19-22)
With this sentence, Aristotle introduces an extended section (running 
through to Rhetoric II.11) dealing with the passions. I take it that what 
Aristotle  is  offering  here  is  a  definition:  that  is,  he  is  not  simply 
characterising the passions so that his audience can identify what he is 
talking about,213 he is  identifying the essential  features  of  a passion. 
More significantly, perhaps, I take it that what is defined here is  the  
passions. That is, Aristotle here sets out what it is to be a passion. In 
doing  so,  I  take  it  that  he  defines  not  those  passions  only  that  are 
212“Judgements” here means instances of judging, not faculties of judgement.
213 I am inclined to think that the language here is rather more precise and technical in 
character than one would expect if Aristotle were simply highlighting some 
characteristic features of passions in order to indicate his subject matter.
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relevant  to  rhetorical  purposes,214 but  the passions or emotions as  a 
category.
As far as the text is concerned, the claim is as follows. What is defined 
here  is  identified  in  the  text  as  “ta  pathê”  (a19):  this  seems  best 
understood  as  meaning the  passions.  This  meaning for  “pathê”  is  a 
regular non-technical meaning of the word, and is a short version of an 
implied longer phrase “ta pathê tês psuchês” - the passions or affections 
of the soul.215 Against this background, it is clear that it has been this 
meaning  that  has  been  intended  in  the  references  forward  to  this 
section from earlier in the treatise, and it is equally clear from the way 
in which the section is announced in its immediate context.216
It  will  become  clear  as  we  look  at  the  definition  in  detail  that  the 
various elements of the definition serve to differentiate emotions from 
other states of the soul. In this regard one might puzzle over why the 
construction Aristotle uses is apparently strangely general, “emotions 
214 If Aristotle were here identifying a subset of the passions, it makes it the more 
surprising that he includes a condition (accompaniment by pain and pleasure) that 
not all of the types of state he discusses will meet. That said, there are puzzles here on 
any understanding of 1378a19ff.. More significantly, it seems unlikely that Aristotle is 
identifying a subset of passions relevant to rhetoric, because his discussion of the 
passions throughout II.1-11 suggests a more systematic interest in the passions 
extending much wider than their rhetorical usefulness, cf. Leighton [1996], Cooper 
[1999]. For this reason, some writers have seen this section as originally developed 
independently of concerns with rhetoric. cf. Kennedy [1991], Fortenbaugh [2002] 106.
215 cf. Leighton [1996] 220-31; LSJ v.sub. pathos, II; Gill [1984]. Note also several 
examples of this non-technical meaning in earlier uses of “pathos” phrases in the 
Rhetoric itself, e.g. 1354a16 (the longer phrase), 1356a14, 19, 1369b15.
216Forward references: 1356a14, 19, 1369b15; immediate context: 1377b30-78a5, 
1378a18f..
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are those things on account of which ...” (Gk. di’ hosa, a19).217 There are 
two ways in which we might respond to this observation. One is to 
dismiss  the  worry  as  an  inappropriate  demand  for  precision  from 
Aristotle here. On this option, one might observe that there is perhaps 
enough in the context (perhaps 1377b30-78a5) to suggest that what is in 
view here is conditions of the soul, and hence that the scope of “hosa” is 
implicitly  restricted  to  conditions  of  the  soul.  Perhaps  something 
similar is implied by the fact that this is a definition of the  pathê, and 
that  this  term  suggests  its  longer  equivalent,  “pathê  tês  psuchês”  - 
passions of the soul.
My  preferred  response  to  this  worry  is  more  complex,  but  more 
satisfying.  On  this  option,  the  definition  serves  to  differentiate  the 
“pathê”  (and its  implied  equivalent  “pathê  tês  psuchês”)  that  are  the 
subject of this definition, i.e. the emotions, from a wider meaning that 
“pathê tês  psuchês” can have.  We can get a sense of how this would 
work from the ambiguity of two slightly archaic senses of the English 
word,  “affection” -  that is,  as meaning an attribute or characteristic, 
and meaning (roughly) an emotion. The definition here,  then would 
begin as follows.
The affections are those on account of which ...
This  seems  a  not  unnatural  reading,  and  implies  a  repetition  of 
“affections”, and that the first (explicit) use of the term has a narrower 
meaning  than  the  second  (implied)  use.  The  sentence  thus 
differentiates  those  affections  (of  the  soul)  we  are  interested  in 
defining,  i.e.  the  emotions,  from  other  affections  (of  the  soul).  In 
support of this reading, we note that there is a  technical  use of terms 
like  “pathê”,  with  a  wider  reference  than  emotions.  An  obvious 
217A very similar construction is used at 1390b14f. where Aristotle seems much more 
careful to make clear the scope of “hosa”.
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example of this use is  DA I.1,  403a3-8, where the list of such  pathê  
includes  perception and thinking.  This  technical  use seems to mean 
something  like  “condition  of  the  soul”  –  Aristotle  is  certainly  not 
supposing in this passage from the De Anima that (as we would put it) 
perceiving and thinking are emotions. He is using pathê in its recognised 
technical sense of ‘condition’ or ‘attribute’.218 Thus, here in our passage 
from  Rhetoric II,  what  I  think  is  happening  is  that  Aristotle  is 
distinguishing  the  emotions,  the   pathê  tês  psuchês,  in  that  familiar 
sense,  from  the   pathê  tês  psuchês in  the  technical  sense,  i.e.  from 
conditions  of  the  soul  generally.  Emotions  are,  in  fact,  a  sub-set  of 
conditions of the soul.219 A reading of this kind fits  with the careful 
analytical  tone that  is  most clearly  evident  in the lines immediately 
following  (a22-29),  in  the  careful  distinguishing  of  three  questions 
applying to each type of passion. That we have the marking out of a 
subset  (the  passions  (i.e.  emotions))  within  a  larger  category  (the 
“passions”  (i.e.  conditions  of  the  soul))  is  signalled  by  the  parallel 
between the use of “di’hosa” here and at 1390b14, where it is clearly 
used for a classification of just this kind.
Some such strategy  is  helpful  to  see  off  a  worry that  Aristotle  had 
omitted  here  to  include  in  his  definition  anything  approaching  the 
obvious  requirement  that  a  pathos be  a  mental  state  –  something 
affecting the soul!  Without  this,  such material  things as  pleasurable 
218 Rorty [1984] and LSJ v.s. III.
219 Leighton [1996] is exercised additionally on how to relate these remarks on the 
emotions in Rhetoric II to the account of different types of motivation in I.10, and in 
particular why epithumia does not appear in the list at 1378a21-2, nor among the 
emotions described in II.2-11. Cf. also Cooper [1999]. The puzzle about epithumia 
seems to me to be softened by 1378a3 and especially 1388b32, which make it hard to 
deny that at least some kinds of epithumia count as emotions for Aristotle.
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mind-altering drugs might pose a threat to the definition’s sufficiency 
for  emotion.  One  might  also  consider  bodily  conditions  like  being 
drunk or sleepy: these can both affect judgements and be accompanied 
by  pleasure  or  pain,  and yet  neither  being  drunk  nor  being  sleepy 
amounts to a passion. We have suggested two strategies for how such 
a worry might be allayed.
On  either  strategy,  it  seems  to  me  that  this  definition  marks  out  a 
coherent category of conditions of the soul, not dissimilar to our own 
category  of  passion  or  emotion.  Indeed,  arguably  we  have  here  an 
adequate definition of emotion. To see this, let us consider the various 
elements of the definition.
The requirement that emotions be accompanied by pain and pleasure 
requires  some clarification.  A  full  treatment  of  the  emotions  in  the 
Rhetoric  would require us to look at this in more detail  exegetically, 
and to bring the evidence of II.2-11 to bear on this question. Space does 
not permit this here. Our views are summarised in an appendix below. 
For  present  purposes,  we  will  merely  venture  some  simple 
observations  from 1378a19-21 itself.  We will  also  consider  how this 
part of the definition will need to be understood if the definition of the 
passions  is  to  be  successful.  Firstly,  although Dorothea  Frede  is  no 
doubt  correct  to  see  Aristotle  here  as  engaging  with  the  Platonic 
position  expressed  at  Philebus 46b-c  and  47d-50c,  namely  that  the 
passions are mixtures of pleasure and pain,220 it does not follow that he 
is straightforwardly endorsing the Platonic position. Certainly a20-21 
alone cannot be taken as confirming such a view. In fact (and especially 
in the light of the accounts of individual emotion-types that follow), it 
220Frede [1996] 258-60.
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is better to read Aristotle’s requirement here as that each passion be 
accompanied by pleasure  or pain (or both). Secondly, we should note 
that within the definition, the specification of passions as states that are 
accompanied by pleasure and pain serves to distinguish passions from 
other conditions of the soul that explain a difference in judgements. 
Obvious examples would be thoughts, sensations, opinions and beliefs, 
perhaps also some or all desires. If this is correct about the function of 
this part of the definition, it is very illuminating about how it should be 
interpreted. The kinds of state just mentioned are all clearly distinct 
from  passions,  and  yet  it  is  possible  for  any  of  these  to  occur 
concurrently  with  pleasure  or  pain,  without  this  combination 
amounting to an emotion. It  must be more than simple concurrence 
that is meant by a20-21. Indeed, it will not even be adequate to insist 
that the connection be necessary rather than contingent. Perhaps there 
are some thoughts that  are so long and complicated and require so 
much concentration that for humans thinking them necessarily results 
in headaches. This would not make thinking those thoughts amount to 
an emotion.221 In fact what seems to be needed is for Aristotle to be 
insisting that emotions have as an essential feature pain and pleasure 
that is connected in the right kind of way to the rest of the emotion.222 In 
fear,  it  is  not  merely  any  pain  that  is  involved,  but  pain  that  is 
connected  to  the  apparent  advent  of  something  bad.  The  sense  in 
which the pain or pleasure follows the emotion’s other features involves 
a  very  close  connection.  We  have  suggested  already  that  emotions 
involve a distinctive outlook: feeling that things are a certain way. It is 
221Nor even is it simply a matter of emotions having the presence of pain or pleasure 
as an essential characteristic. For this could just be a conceptual matter – and a 
concept whose essential features included the conjunction of thoughts about Plato 
and pain in the lower abdomen would not thereby be the concept of an emotion. 
222 cf. Leighton [1996] 217-220.
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tempting to think that what Aristotle has in mind here is that the kind 
of  pain  and  pleasure  that  will  distinguish  emotions  from  other 
judgement-affecting mental states is pain or pleasure  at those things’ 
being that particular way.223 This of course goes beyond the text we are 
considering here. For now, we note that if the definition of emotion is 
to  be  adequate,  it  requires  the  strong  reading  of  “hois  hepetai”  (are 
accompanied by) just described.
Aristotle’s  other  condition is  that  emotions  be  states  of  the  soul  on 
account  of  which  we  change  and  differ  in  judgements.  So,  if  the 
definition is to be adequate, we would expect this condition to combine 
with  the  pleasure/pain  condition  in  such  a  way  as  to  distinguish 
emotions from other states of the soul connected in the relevant way 
with pleasure or pain. Such states might be things like hunger or thirst, 
perhaps in general certain sorts of desire. Again, it seems clear that in 
order  to  distinguish  emotions  from  these  states,  this  part  of  the 
definition requires careful interpretation. After all, there will be cases 
of  hunger  that  account  for  a  change in  judgements.  While  strolling 
around Paris mid-morning, I judge that it is vital to find for lunch a 
restaurant with the perfect balance of ambience, value, good food and 
attractive locality, but then I start to feel hungry and come to judge that 
all that is needed is to find the nearest restaurant with a table for two! 
Or this process might be more subtle: I retain all my previous criteria 
but under the influence of hunger, I come to judge that a restaurant 
previously rejected for poor ambience is after all more attractive than I 
had previously thought. My hunger causes my judgements to be more 
sympathetic,  in  ways  that  conduce  to  eating  sooner!224 It  is  a 
223See further the appendix below.
224 I see no reason to deny, with Leighton [1996] 225, that the desire alters judgement. 
Even on his account, supposing the desire to give rise to anger, irritation, despair or 
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commonplace  in  the  philosophy  of  emotions  that  emotions  are 
distinguished  from  bodily  desires  like  hunger  by  features  such  as 
standing in inferential  relationships with other mental states such as 
beliefs,  and  being  assessable  for  rationality.  Aristotle’s  requirement 
merely  that  emotions  account  for  changes  in  judgement  seems  too 
weak by comparison. The most obvious way of strengthening this in 
the  required  way  is  to  suppose  that  what  Aristotle  means  here  by 
saying that it is on account of emotions that people “differ in relation to 
judgements”  is  that  emotions  themselves  involve  distinctive 
judgements.225 Thus, coming to feel an emotion is a matter of coming to 
make the relevant judgements (or at least to make them in the way 
required  for  emotion).  On this  interpretation,  one might  worry that 
there is a problem with how emotions can explain or account for (“di’  
reflection on these, and that it is these that are the immediate cause of an alteration in 
judgement, it remains the case that the desire has accounted for a difference in 
judgements.
225If this is correct, Aristotle’s choice of vocabulary here seems to make his definition 
over-restrictive. “Krisis” generally means a verdict or decision reached after 
considering both sides of an issue. This is too narrow: clearly not all emotions involve 
a difference in ‘verdicts’ in this sense. Perhaps instead Aristotle is using “krisis” to 
mean ‘discriminations’ or ‘how someone discerns things to be’ (though if so it is not, I 
think, out of a concern here for including non-human animals’ emotions (on which, 
see below)). This might add a connotation that these kriseis have a quasi-perceptual 
salience to the subject. Or perhaps Aristotle’s point is after all just that emotions 
involve a distinctive outlook (“judgements” in the sense of ‘what one takes to be the 
case’), and he was tempted to use the over-restrictive word “verdicts” because of its 
political and legal connotations, which emphasise the relevance of emotions to the 
orator’s practical concerns. See further below. Cf. also LSJ s.v. krisis A.I.1, 2; II.1. 
Interestingly, Aristotle does not repeat his use of ‘krisis’ in his detailed treatment of 
the emotions (Rhetoric II.2-11). Arguably our understanding of this term here, in a 
definition of the emotions generally,  should be informed by a wider consideration of 
how Aristotle characterises in detail the cognitions involved in different types of 
emotions. On this, see below, chapter 6.
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hosa” a19)  a  change in  judgements  if  they themselves  are  that  very 
change in judgements:  the  explanans and the  explanandum need to be 
distinct if explanation is to occur. There are two possible responses to 
this – one is to reject the requirement for explanans and explanandum to 
be distinct. (In answer to, “Why is Sue so intent on hurting Bob?” we 
might say, “Because she is angry with him.” This can be an intelligible 
explanation even where Sue’s desire to hurt Bob is not distinct from 
her anger.) Another response is to insist that Aristotle’s point here is 
that emotions, by themselves involving distinctive judgements, change 
their subject’s total set of judgements. So, just as adopting a new belief 
explains  a  change  and  difference  in  one’s  (set  of)  beliefs,  likewise 
emotions explain a change and difference in one’s (set of) judgements. I 
think that this latter response is the more important, and is plausible as 
a reading of a19-20. It thus seems that if these lines are an adequate 
definition  of  emotion,  this  suggests  that  Aristotle’s  view  is  that 
emotions  involve  distinctive  judgements.  This  view  is  put  forward 
tentatively at this stage and will be explored more in the next chapter.
Before moving on from these lines,  there are a couple of significant 
words to comment on.
Firstly,  it  is  worth  noting  that  Aristotle  refers  here  to  a  change 
(metaballontes  a20)  as  well  as  a  difference  in  judgements  among the 
things accounted for by emotions. What kind of change is he referring 
to? In fact, it is hard to tell what Aristotle has in mind here. He may be 
referring to the bodily changes that he regards as part of having an 
emotion (cf.  DA I.1,  403a16-18).  The phrase may refer  to changes in 
judgements.  It  might  conceivably  be  read  with  “diapherousi” as 
hendiadys, meaning ‘change so as to be different’, i.e. just a stylistic way 
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of talking about change, and on this view too it would refer to changes 
in judgements.226 Or Aristotle may simply be leaving this open – it is 
clear simply that in emotion, people change in one way or another. My 
speculation is that  Aristotle is  hinting towards his awareness  of  the 
importance of bodily changes in emotion, but because this is largely 
irrelevant in the context of rhetoric, we get no more than this unspecific 
hint.
The second philological point relates to the word we have translated 
“judgements”,  in Greek  kriseis. Sihvola has suggested that Aristotle’s 
choice of this word is motivated in part by a desire to keep open the 
nature of the cognitions involved in emotions. As he explains,
“In Aristotle, κρισις is a very general cognitive term covering [a] 
wide  range  [of]  selective  and  discriminating  activities.  It  can 
refer  to  any case where  something like assent  to  something’s 
being the case is involved. It apparently covers both perception 
and belief  and is  applicable  to  both human beings  and other 
animals.  The  use  of  this  term  hints  that  when  defining  at  a 
general level the παθη which we would call emotions Aristotle 
did not want to commit himself to either belief-or appearance-
based interpretation.” 227
I suggested above that if Aristotle is aiming for an adequate definition 
of  emotions,  he  has  in  mind here  the  kinds  of  judgement  that  will 
distinguish emotions from (e.g.) bodily desires or sensations. This view 
does  not  leave  room  for  emotions  to  involve  mere  perceptual 
226That said, this seems a surprising stylistic device to find in the context of a 
definition.
227 Sihvola [1996] 74. The phrase amended above is actually printed “… covering wide 
range or selective …”, which doesn’t make sense. Accordingly, we assume this is a 
printing error, with the version above restoring the intended sense.
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appearances. The issues here will be explored more fully in the next 
chapter. But the key point here is that the choice of the word krisis here 
has  nothing  to  do  with  a  cautious  openness  to  various  kinds  of 
discriminating activities that might be involved in emotion, still less to 
leave open the possibility of animals having emotions. Such concerns 
are not in view here. In fact, the choice of this word surely has to do 
with  the  contexts  in  which  rhetoric  is  exercised,  lawcourts  and 
assemblies. In the very introduction to Rhetoric II.1, as part of stressing 
how important a role  pathos will  play,  krisis,  krites and  krinesthai are 
used several times (1377b21, b22 twice, b24)  in reference to the verdict 
or  the  judgement  involved  particularly  in  both  deliberative  and 
forensic rhetoric.228 This is all no more than one Bekker page before the 
passage we have been examining (and indeed the intervening page is 
mostly taken up with a brief treatment of the role of ethos as a means of 
persuasion)  –  so  it  is  very  much  in  the  immediate  context.  In 
assemblies and courts, listeners form verdicts (kriseis). Aristotle here is 
highlighting the rhetorical usefulness of emotion-arousal. It is not that 
here ‘krisis’ needs to mean the dropping of a voting pebble into an urn. 
Rather, Aristotle is, by the use of this word, drawing attention here to 
the relevance of the emotions to the judgements, the mental ‘verdicts’, 
about the issue at hand that dicasts and ecclesiasts express when they 
cast their votes.
We  have  considered  Aristotle’s  opening  remarks  and  his  general 
characterisation of the passions as he introduces the large portion of 
Rhetoric  II  devoted to them. If  these lines are to  be interpreted as a 
definition of the emotions (or even as a definition of Aristotle’s subject 
matter,  supposing this  not  to  include things  like  hunger,  thirst  and 
228 At 1377b21-2 it is explicitly stated that both deliberative and forensic situations are 
focused on a κρισις, a judgement or verdict. 
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sensations, or thoughts and opinions), then it seems that finding here 
an adequate definition requires firstly that pleasure and pain be closely 
connected with the other  features  of  an emotion,  and secondly that 
emotions somehow involve “judgements”.229
It is the second of these tasks that is most crucial to our overall project 
of  showing how for  Aristotle  arousing emotions  could be a way of 
providing  proper  grounds  for  conviction.  Accordingly,  the  next 
chapter is concerned with how to characterise the cognitions involved 
in Aristotelian emotions.
229If this proves unpalatable, one might fall back on a looser interpretation of these 
lines as offering a general characterisation of his subject matter, not an attempt at an 
adequate definition.
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Chapter  6  –  “Appearances”  and  “beliefs”  in 
Aristotelian emotions.
Do Aristotelian Passions require Belief or mere Appearances?
In considering Aristotle’s definition of the emotions at 1378a19f.,  we 
found indications that when Aristotle says that emotions make people 
“differ in relation to their ‘judgements’ (or ‘verdicts’)”, he is referring 
to the distinctive outlook involved in emotional experience itself. It is 
natural  to  take the reference  to  ‘judgements’  to  mean that  a  person 
takes  things  to  be  the  way  they  are  represented  as  being  in  that 
distinctive outlook. We have argued that this is important if emotion-
arousal is to count as providing proof in the sense set out in the earlier 
chapters – that is providing proper grounds for conviction.
In  this  chapter,  we  shall  take  up  the  claim  of  some  recent 
commentators that Aristotle, in the  Rhetoric,  supposed that emotional 
experience involved things merely  appearing  to  the subject  to be the 
way  they  are  represented,  rather  than  the  subject’s  actually  taking 
them to be so. This proposal is offered as an explanation of Aristotle’s 
frequent use in Rhetoric II.1-11 of phantasia and phainesthai and cognates 
in connection with the emotional person’s distinctive outlook.
Proposals emphasising the use of “  phantasia  ”  
The view that Aristotelian emotions involve mere appearances is one – 
the most credible, and the most important for our purposes here – of a 
number of views prompted by the observation that Aristotle,  in the 
Rhetoric,  frequently  (1378a31-2;  1378b9;  1382a21;  1382a25;  etc.)  uses 
phantasia and  phainesthai and  cognates  to  describe  the  distinctive 
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outlook of the passionate person.230 It has seemed natural to take this as 
a  deliberate  and careful  use  of  terminology.  In  all  of  the  following 
views, this terminology is read in the light of passages elsewhere in 
Aristotle,  principally  De Anima  III.3,  in which a technical account of 
phantasia231 is given. To see this, let us in section I of this chapter look 
carefully at the claims made by those who cite this terminology as a 
basis for denying that for Aristotle an emotion’s having its distinctive 
outlook is a matter of taking things to be the way they are represented 
as being in that outlook. In section II, we shall look critically at why 
they propose understanding this terminology in the way they do, and 
argue  for  an  alternative  understanding.  Sections  III  and  IV  centre 
around  the  use  of  De  Anima  III.3,  its  treatment  of  cases  where 
appearances and belief conflict, and its general picture of phantasia. In 
section V we highlight a number of important conclusions. 
I
Gisela Striker  232  
A key passage for Striker’s view is the following.
“It  is  evident  that  Aristotle  is  deliberately  using  the  term 
“impression”  [her  translation  of  phantasia]  rather  than,  say, 
“belief” (doxa) in his definitions in order to make the point that 
these  impressions  are  not  to  be  confused  with  rational 
judgements. Emotions are caused by the way things appear to 
230 Sihvola [1996] 56-7 sets out the evidence in full, calling it “a pattern which requires 
explanation”. I agree but prefer an explanation very different from Sihvola’s.
231Hereafter, mention of phantasia should be taken to include cognates of both it and 
phainesthai.
232Striker [1996] esp. 291f..
Chapter 6 – “Appearances” and “beliefs” in Aristotelian emotions. page 202 of 272
one unreflectively, and one may experience an emotion  even if  
one realizes that the impression that triggered it is in fact mistaken.”233
There are several contrasts implied by Striker here. We might highlight 
the following claims. The outlook involved in an emotion is arrived at 
“unreflectively”  rather  than  (presumably)  through  reflection  and 
deliberation.  And  the  use  of  the  term  phantasia (“impression”),  as 
contrasted  with  doxa  (“belief”),  signals  also  that  Aristotle  thinks  of 
emotions as involving a kind of stance that will explain why they can 
persist even when one realises that the stance is mistaken.
Her view appears to be implicitly informed by the kind of account of 
phantasia offered in  De Anima  III.3.  This is suggested by the contrast 
between phantasia  and doxa, the identification of the latter as involving 
a  kind  of  reflection  that  the  former  lacks  (cf.  428a22-4),  and  the 
persistence of phantasia in the face of conflicting beliefs (cf. 428b2-4).
She offers this account as an explanation of why Aristotle is,  in the 
accounts  of  the  emotions  in  Rhetoric  II,  making  regular  use  of 
“phantasia” and cognates.
John Cooper  234  
Cooper  likewise  attributes  an  appearance  view  to  Aristotle  as  an 
explanation of his use of terms like “phantasia” in Rhetoric II.
“It seems likely that Aristotle is using phantasia (and phainesthai) 
here to indicate the sort of non-epistemic appearance to which 
he draws attention in De Anima 3.3, 428b2-4, according to which 
something may appear to, or strike one, in some way (say, as 
233 Striker [1996] 291, emphasis and comments in square brackets mine.
234Cooper [1993], [1996], [1999].
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being an insult or belittlement)  even if one knows there is no 
good reason to take it  so. If  so,  he is  alive to  the crucial  fact 
about the emotions, that one can experience them simply on the 
basis of how, despite what one knows or believes to be the case, 
things  strike one – how, as it were, they look to one when, for 
one reason or another, one is disposed to feel them.”235
Cooper also attributes to Aristotle the view that the emotions involve a 
kind of stance, contrasted with belief and knowledge, that will explain 
why  they  can  persist  even  when  one  realises  that  the  stance  is 
mistaken.  This  stance  is  characterised  as  “non-epistemic”,  and  as 
simply a matter of how things “strike one”.  The  De Anima  reference 
confirms that Cooper has in mind simply things looking a certain way, 
appearances standing a particular way to the subject experiencing an 
emotion.  The  characterisation  “non  epistemic”  suggests  that  such 
appearances may not constitute any good reason whatever to believe 
that things are as they appear.
Cooper seems to suggest that characterising this aspect of emotions in 
terms of phantasia was motivated in part by an alertness to the need to 
explain “the crucial fact about the emotions” that they can conflict with 
the subject’s beliefs or knowledge.
Cooper  too,  explicitly,  claims  that  Aristotle  uses  “phantasia”  and 
cognates in Rhetoric II with a similar sense to how they are used in De 
Anima III.3.
Juha Sihvola  236  
235 Cooper [1993] 191-2, underlining mine.
236Sihvola [1996].
Chapter 6 – “Appearances” and “beliefs” in Aristotelian emotions. page 204 of 272
Sihvola’s  case is  more complex.  He considers  a number of  different 
ways  in  which  Aristotle’s  use  of  phantasia  terminology  might  be 
understood here. He is also very careful about attributing to Aristotle 
reasons for adopting the view (whatever its exact contours) that “the 
cognitive content of the emotions” is “perceptual appearance instead of 
belief”. He puts the point in terms of the advantages to the interpreter 
of ascribing such a view to Aristotle.237 But the advantages he sets out 
are advantages of having such a view, and it is hard not to suppose that 
Sihvola thinks of these as reasons Aristotle himself might have had for 
developing and adopting the view that he did. The advantages are as 
follows.  Firstly,  as  with  Striker  and  Cooper,  the  appearances  view 
helps  explain  how  emotions  can  have  an  independence  from  the 
subject’s  beliefs.  Secondly,  the  appearances  view  easily  allows  for 
emotions to be experienced by non-human animals who (by Aristotle’s 
lights) lack beliefs – a view that is obviously problematic on a view of 
all emotions as requiring the kind of beliefs that only humans can have.
“If  emotion  could  be  based  on  perceptual  appearance  rather 
than belief we could perhaps explain how Aristotle is  able to 
ascribe  emotions  to  animals  without  granting  them 
belief.” (Sihvola [1996] 60)
The options Sihvola sets out for what Aristotle’s view might be of the 
emotional person’s distinctive outlook seem to be the following. First, 
it  may  be  that  Aristotle’s  view  is  that  emotions  involve  mere 
appearances (how things look), where it is not part of the emotion that 
assent  is  given  to  these  appearances.  The  emotion  itself  does  not 
involve taking things to be a certain way, it involves their looking a 
certain way. A second option is that emotions do involve taking things 
237Sihvola [1996] 59-60.
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to be a certain way, but the use of phantasia signals that this consists in 
(or results from) an unreflective assent rather than the kind of reflective 
assent that only humans can undertake. A third kind of position that 
Sihvola  considers  is  that  Aristotle’s  phantasia language  sets  out  the 
minimum conditions for having an emotion: thus emotions need only 
involve appearances (however these are understood) rather than belief 
in things being a certain way, but they might equally  involve more 
complex, more reflective or more committed states like belief. Sihvola 
sets out these options, and speculates that different accounts might be 
required for different emotions.238 
Sihvola, however, clearly supposes that Aristotle is deploying the same 
kind  of  understanding  of  phantasia in  Rhetoric  II.2-11,  in  implied 
contrast with  doxa, as that which we find in  De Anima  III.3.239 Thus, 
interpretative options for understanding phantasia in DA III.3 are used 
to supply interpretative options for the same terms in Rhetoric II.
Striker, Cooper, Sihvola and “Appearance Views”
Although they differ  in  a  number  of  areas,   these interpreters  have 
some important things in common.
The Motivation for Attributing an Appearance View to Aristotle:
All three find Aristotle’s use of “phantasia” and cognates striking and in 
need  of  explanation.  They  offer  between  them  three  kinds  of 
explanation of why Aristotle in the Rhetoric might have held a view of 
emotions  whose  proper  description  would  require  terms  like 
“phantasia”.  One  is  that  understanding  emotions  as  involving 
appearances rather than beliefs enabled him to explain how emotions 
238Sihvola [1996] 73f..
239Sihvola [1996] 57-8.
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can conflict  with the subject’s  beliefs.  Another is that understanding 
emotions  in this  way enabled him to explain  why emotions  do not 
require reflection and deliberation. Another is that this view enabled 
Aristotle to attribute emotions to non-human animals who lacked doxa.
The appeal to De Anima III.3:
All these scholars see the use of terms like “phantasia” in Rhetoric II as 
similar to their use in De Anima III.3.240 And Cooper and Sihvola refer 
specifically in this connection to the discussion there of how the sun 
can appear small when it is believed to be huge.
Versions  of  the  “Appearances  View”  of  Emotions  attributed  to 
Aristotle:
On that basis, some or all of the following are attributed to Aristotle.
 Emotions  do  not  involve  the  subject’s  taking  things  to  be  a 
certain way.
 Emotions  do  involve  things  appearing  (or  looking)  a  certain 
way.
 Emotions  involve  taking  things  to  be  a  certain  way,  but 
unreflectively.
We will focus below on the first two of these views because they seem 
most central to what motivates the adoption of this kind of view and to 
what  motivates  ascribing it  to  Aristotle.  Although we shall  hope to 
show  that  the  third  claim  is  as  unmotivated  exegetically  as  an 
understanding of “phantasia” terms in Rhetoric II as the first two claims, 
we  see  no  reason  to  suppose  that  Aristotle  would  deny  that  the 
distinctive  outlook  involved  in  emotions  could  be  adopted 
unreflectively.
240This view is also shared by Victor Caston ([1996] 41, n46.).
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Rejecting the “Minimum Condition” view
Let  us  also  at  this  point  deal  with  the  suggestion  that  phantasia 
represents a “minimum condition” for the kind of outlook involved in 
emotion.241 Such a suggestion might amount to one of two things. The 
first is that even though emotions themselves only involve appearances 
as of things being a certain way, it is possible that (independently of his 
emotional state) the subject additionally believes or takes it to be the 
case  that  things  are  that  way.  Allowing  this  latter  possibility  adds 
nothing to a view of the nature of the emotions themselves, which is 
what  is  at  issue  here.  This  is  not  a  genuinely  different  kind  of 
“appearances view”. However, the second version of this “minimum 
condition” view suggested by Sihvola is that Aristotle in Rhetoric II.2-11 
states  or  implies  that  experiencing  emotions  need only  involve  the 
appearance that things are a certain way but  might involve the belief 
that they are that way.  Phantasia is  the “minimum condition for the 
cognitive content of emotion”,242 but emotions might involve any stance 
that  is  in the relevant  way ‘superior’  to  phantasia.  Nevertheless,  this 
cannot be Aristotle’s view as we have it in the text of the Rhetoric. On 
this last proposal, terms like “phantasia” must still  be taken to mean 
appearance as distinct from belief or from taking something to be the 
case.  But then it  seems simply impossible to find this view in what 
Aristotle  actually says about the emotions. Consider pity. “Let pity be 
some kind of  pain at apparent (phainomenôi) destructive or grievous 
harm to one who does not deserve to encounter it.” (1385b13f.). How 
could the relevant part of this sentence possibly mean “destructive or 
grievous harm that is  either how things appear to the subject  or is the 
object of some superior cognitive state of theirs”? There is no basis for 
241Sihvola [1996] 71.
242Sihvola [1996] 71.
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such a view in the text. The same applies to the other parts of the text 
in  which  we  find  similar  terminology.  At  best,  this  could  be  what 
Aristotle  “might  ...  have”  said  “if  pressed”,243 (i.e.  Aristotle’s  more 
sophisticated  underlying  view,  which  he  should perhaps  have 
expressed to secure his view against certain criticisms); at worst, it is 
not Aristotle’s view at all.
Evaluating the Appearances View
So,  having  dealt  with  some  less  plausible  ways  of  attributing  an 
appearances  view to  Aristotle,  we turn  to  the  task  of  assessing the 
more plausible claims. We will first consider and reject the apparent 
motivations for attributing views of this kind to Aristotle. Instead, we 
propose  a  simpler  alternative  explanation  of  Aristotle’s  use  of 
“phantasia” and cognates in Rhetoric II. We will then look in detail at the 
account  of  phantasia in  De Anima  III.3  and in  particular  the  way in 
which  it  accommodates  the  possibility  of  conflict  between  phantasia 
and beliefs in the same person. On this basis, we will be able to assess 
whether this is how Aristotle understands the nature of the emotional 
person’s distinctive outlook in Rhetoric II.
II
Why, then, does Aristotle in  Rhetoric  II  use terms like “phantasia” to 
describe the distinctive outlook of the emotional person? According to 
Cooper and Striker, these terms express a view Aristotle has adopted 
in  order  to  accommodate  an  otherwise  problematic  fact  about 
emotions. Aristotle, on this view, is aware of the occurrence of cases 
where emotions are in conflict with what one knows or believes to be 
243Sihvola’s formulation seems to reflect these difficulties ([1996] 71).
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the case, and he has crafted his account of the emotions to allow for 
such cases.
The thought is that if Aristotle held that emotions involve beliefs, he 
would  face  a  problem.  The  problem  is  as  follows.  In  ordinary 
circumstances, when humans become aware that they hold beliefs they 
recognise to be conflicting, they abandon one or both beliefs (perhaps 
ending in a state of aporia about them,244 or perhaps going from side to 
side  between them,  but  certainly  not  with  undimmed simultaneous 
commitment to both of a pair of contradictory beliefs). However, this 
does  not  seem  to  be  the  case  with  emotions.  In  this  respect  the 
emotions are like perceptions. Just as in the Müller-Lyer illusion one 
line still looks longer than the other even after one has measured them 
both and verified that they are the same length,245 in the same way I 
may know that the spider in the bath threatens me no harm, but still 
feel as though it is terribly dangerous! If emotions involve beliefs (i.e. if 
the distinctive emotional outlook is taken to be of the way things are), 
it is puzzling why they do not behave like other beliefs. That is, it is 
puzzling why they do not get dispelled by better-grounded beliefs that 
are seen to contradict them.246 If Aristotle thinks that emotions involve 
244 To clarify: to have moved from believing p and believing q (which the subject is 
aware entails not-p), to believing that there is strong evidence in favour of p and 
strong evidence in favour of q, would, in the terms I am setting out here, count as 
being in a kind of state of aporia in relation to p and q. Regarding a proposition as 
being in good epistemic standing is not the same as believing it, so one can abandon 
belief in a proposition whilst still thinking that it has strong epistemic support.
245 Aristotle was clearly aware of this phenomenon in relation to perception cf. De 
Anima III.3, 428b3-4.
246 Nussbaum’s ([2001] 35-36) judgement theory certainly faces this issue. Nussbaum’s 
response is to question whether it is really true of beliefs in general that they get 
extinguished by other better-grounded beliefs that contradict them. Her contention is 
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doxai,  which at the very least involve taking something to be so, these 
puzzles will arise on his view. By contrast,  supposing that emotions 
involve  mere  appearances  explains  this  phenomenon.  Emotional 
appearances  are  on  this  view just  like  any  other  appearances  –  the 
spider  continues  to  (emotionally)  appear  dangerous  even  when  we 
know it  is not, in just the same way as the sun continues to appear 
about a cubit across even when we know it is huge.247
Attributing the appearances view to Aristotle is thus typically a matter 
of  taking  his  use  of  words  like  phantasia in  Rhetoric II  as  a  careful 
strategy in which he makes the same kind of use of this terminology as 
he does in De Anima III.3. The suggestion is that he thereby hints at his 
awareness  that  the  arguments  used  against  views  of  phantasia  as 
involving doxa in DA III.3, will also count against views of emotions as 
involving doxa. He supposedly hints too at a view in which the kind of 
careful  understanding  of  phantasia that  enables  him  in  DA  III.3  to 
explain how the sun can appear a foot across when we know it is huge, 
may  also  be  deployed  to  explain  how  the  spider  can  emotionally-
appear to be harmful when we know it is harmless.
So, what evidence is there that Aristotle had thought about such cases? 
In fact the only textual evidence cited by Cooper or Striker (or Sihvola) 
is his use of words like “phantasia” in these passages in Rhetoric II, i.e. 
the very usage that his supposed awareness of such cases is supposed 
to  explain.  In  fact,  there  is  nowhere  in  Rhetoric or  elsewhere  in 
Aristotle’s work a single reference to a case of the relevant kind.248 Of 
course, whether his account has the resources to explain such cases is 
that some beliefs – particularly (though not exclusively) value-laden beliefs like those 
involved in emotions – are stubborn and hard to get rid of.
247cf. De Anima III.3, 428b3f..
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important in considering whether Aristotle’s account of the passions is 
correct – it is perhaps a constraint on a theory of the passions that it 
explain such cases. But there is not a hint in the text of Aristotle that 
this played any part in the formulation of his views on the passions. 
That is, there is not a trace of the motivation ascribed to him by Cooper 
and Striker.249
The case is similar in relation to the suggestion by Striker and Sihvola 
that Aristotle’s use of terms like “phantasia” in Rhetoric II is intended to 
emphasise that the distinctive outlook involved in emotions need not 
be arrived at reflectively. Perhaps such a view of the emotions is correct, 
and perhaps Aristotle would have agreed. But the only  evidence that 
this is what he intends in the Rhetoric, in using terms like “phantasia” is 
the terms themselves, coupled with an appeal to  De Anima  III.3.  We 
shall  suggest  below  that  there  is  both  a  better  explanation  for 
Aristotle’s use of this terminology in the Rhetoric, and good reason to 
suppose that he is not using it here in the same kind of way as in the 
De Anima.
Sihvola claims that Aristotle’s use of “phantasia” in Rhetoric II expresses 
an understanding of the nature of emotions compatible with his view 
expressed  elsewhere  that  non-human  animals  may  experience 
emotions.250 It seems to me true that nothing in the account of human 
248 Unless such a case is in view at DA I.1, 403a23-24, but this certainly outruns what 
Aristotle actually says there. EN VII.6, 1149a24-b3 likewise is not such a case. I am 
grateful to Giles Pearson for helpful discussion of this passage. Similarly with the 
pathological pleasures and fears at EN VII.5, 1148b15-49a20, but these merit further 
consideration than can be given here.
249 Cooper [1999] 416-7; Striker [1996] 291.
250Cf. Sihvola [1996] 60-68, and evidence cited there.
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emotions in Rhetoric II rules out the possibility that non-human animals 
also experience emotions.251 But it  seems to me incorrect  to suppose 
that  it  was  any  part  of  Aristotle’s  reason for  using  “phantasia” and 
cognates  that  he was concerned to  ensure  his  view was compatible 
with the possibility of non-human animal emotions. There is not a trace 
of such concerns in the  Rhetoric. Sihvola may be right in the general 
view of emotions he ascribes to Aristotle; but he is wrong to suggest 
that this is what explains Aristotle’s use of terms like “phantasia” in the 
Rhetoric. This usage can be explained much more satisfactorily in other 
ways.
I have suggested that there are not substantial exegetical grounds for 
supposing that in formulating his account of the emotions the Rhetoric, 
Aristotle was trying to emphasise that emotions do not require prior 
reflection, or to allow either for the possibility of emotions in conflict 
with what one knows or believes, or for the possibility that emotions 
might be experienced by non-human animals. These proposals will be 
further  undermined  if  without  them  we  can  provide  a  satisfying 
account of why Aristotle did so frequently use words like “phantasia” 
in his accounts of the emotions.
“Phantasia” and  cognates  are  important  words  in  the  Rhetoric as  a 
whole, and are used to indicate how the listener takes things to be. The 
words are used to make clear that this is not necessarily how things 
251If, for example, all emotions require taking it that things are thus and so, then 
phantasia could be sufficient to meet this requirement in (non-human) animals but 
insufficient in humans (supposing humans can dissent from appearances and 
animals cannot). It would not compromise the possibility of animal emotions for 
there to be requirements on human emotions that non-human animals could not 
fulfil.
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actually  are.252 So,  someone can be  persuaded by something that  he 
thinks is a piece of good rhetorical reasoning, even if it is not – this 
would be a case of persuasion by “apparent enthymeme”, phainomenon  
enthymema (1356b2-3)253 – just as in dialectic, someone can be brought to 
draw a conclusion based on what they take to be a reasonable inference, 
even if the inference in question is not in fact reasonable. In cases like 
these, there is no question that somehow the apparent enthymeme is 
something  that  has  the  visual  or  auditory  appearance  of  an 
enthymeme. This has nothing to do with sensory appearances at all. It 
simply marks how the listener takes the matters under discussion (not 
just  signs  or  sounds)  to  stand.  The  word  “apparent”  (phainomenon) 
emphasises that how the person takes things may not be correct – they 
take this to be an enthymeme but it may not actually be one. This is 
how “phantasia” and cognates are used throughout the Rhetoric (noting 
one exception254), and this powerfully suggests that this is the correct 
way to understand them in the sections on the passions. So, we should 
understand these sections in the following kind of way: “fear may be 
defined as a distress or disturbance as a result of  taking it that some 
destructive or grievous harm looms.” (1382a21-2). If this is correct, we 
would  expect  in  the  sections  on  the  passions  that  Aristotle  might 
sometimes  happily  use  oiesthai and  dokein  to  refer  to  aspects  of 
252 Thus, Nussbaum [1994] 83-6, emphasises that phainesthai may be contrasted not 
only with dokein but also with einai. The latter is the more plausible in Rhetoric II.
253On apparent enthymemes, see above Chapter 3.
254 It seems reasonable to bracket I.11, 1370a28-30 as an exception. Here phantasia is 
closely connected with aisthêsis, and is discussed because it is taken to be involved in 
remembrance and anticipation (en tôi memnêmenôi kai tôi elpizonti, a29). This nest of 
technical psychological concepts signals that phantasia here is closely connected with 
perception, as it is in DA III.3. Elsewhere in the Rhetoric, there is nothing to signal this 
more technical usage of the word. And, we note, even here, phantasia is not 
specifically contrasted with how the agent takes things to be.
Chapter 6 – “Appearances” and “beliefs” in Aristotelian emotions. page 214 of 272
emotional  experience  that  he  elsewhere  describes  using  cognates  of 
phantasia.
In fact, this is precisely what we find. Aristotle, in a number of places 
in Rhetoric II.2-11, seems to use phantasia and phainesthai and words that 
are clearly marking how someone takes things to be – dokei and oiesthai 
– as ways of referring to the same cognitive features of emotions (cf. 
1380b37 and 1381a18, 1382b29-34, 1383a26, etc.255).  This suggests that 
Aristotle  is  not using the appearance  words in their  technical  sense 
explored in De Anima III.3. He is using these words to indicate that, for 
example, what is involved in fear is not that harm actually threatens, 
but that the fearful person takes it that harm threatens.256 That is, he is 
alive to what really is a crucial and central fact about emotions, namely 
that they are related to the subject’s perspective.257
I  have  argued  briefly  that  there  is  insufficient  exegetical  reason for 
linking the use in Rhetoric II of words like “phantasia” to the technical 
way in which they are used in  De Anima III.3,  with a view to solving 
some  supposed  problem  faced  by  Aristotle  over  animal  emotions, 
conflict  between  beliefs  and emotion,  or  the  unreflectiveness  of  the 
outlook involved in emotions. The text can be understood as well if not 
better, certainly more simply, without this approach.
III
255 Other examples are documented in Nussbaum [1994] 83-6.
256This view need not exclude the possibility that Aristotle’s frequent preference for 
phantasia in Rhetoric II.2-11 is influenced also by its possible connotations of the 
liveliness, vividness or salience to the subject of an emotion’s distinctive outlook.
257cf. from the recent emotions literature De Sousa [1987] 156-158; Solomon [1993] 
16-20, 196-206; Goldie [2000] esp.12-18 and ch. 7. 
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I  now wish to  argue that  taking  phantasia and cognates  in  their  De 
Anima  III.3 sense raises far more problems than it solves. So, even if 
there were a case for supposing that when Aristotle uses terms like 
“phantasia”, he is hinting at the kind of use that we find in De Anima III.
3, this will not yield the advantages envisaged by Sihvola, Cooper and 
Striker.  Indeed,  his  remarks  there  raise  serious  difficulties  for 
appearances views of emotions.
The “Appearances View” of Emotion
It will be helpful in the discussion below to have a clear formulation of 
what we are calling the “appearances view”.
De Anima III.3 is taken by the interpreters mentioned above to support 
a  view of  emotions  in  which the distinctive  outlook involved in  an 
emotion is  how things appear to the subject. We will refer to this view 
simply as the “appearances  view” of emotion. It  is  to be contrasted 
with the view, which we will refer to as the “beliefs view”, in which 
the distinctive outlook involved in an emotion is  how the subject takes  
things to be.258 Accordingly, the appearances view and the beliefs view 
are competing views of what kind of stance is involved towards how 
things are represented as being, in the distinctive outlook involved in 
emotions.  Let  us  suppose  that,  for  instance,  pitying the  victim of  a 
land-mine involves an outlook according to which they are suffering 
undeservedly.  The  appearances  view  would  be  that  to  the  person 
feeling  pity  appearances  are that  the  land-mine  victim  is  suffering 
258Let “belief” here mean simply taking something to be the case.
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undeservedly. By contrast, the beliefs view is that the person feeling 
pity takes it to be the case that they are suffering undeservedly.259
We will consider whether Aristotle’s arguments about phantasia in DA 
III.3  would count against a “beliefs view” of emotions, and whether 
they suggest  that  understanding  emotions  using a similar  notion of 
phantasia  would help Aristotle towards a solution to the problem of 
emotions persisting in the face of better beliefs. A careful examination 
of Aristotle’s arguments in DA III.3 will show not only that they would 
do neither of these things, but also that appearances views of emotion 
in  general  will  not  be  able  satisfactorily  to  solve  this  problem  of 
emotions  conflicting with better  beliefs.  It  will  further  become clear 
that an understanding of phantasia along the lines set out using this and 
similar words in  DA  III.3 cannot possibly be what stands behind the 
use of these words in relation to emotions in Rhetoric II.
De Anima  III.3:  Phantasia, Doxa and the Size of the Sun  
Let us see in detail how Aristotle’s account of phantasia is supposed to 
work in dealing with the case (428b2ff.) of the sun “appearing” to be a 
259We see a potential difficulty for the “beliefs view” - the view recommended here – 
related to feeling emotions in response to fiction. In what sense can we take it to be 
the case that Cassandra is suffering undeservedly whilst knowing that she doesn’t 
really exist? There will be a problem, on this view, in relation to tragic emotions in 
the Poetics, or possibly a problem over consistency between the Poetics and the 
Rhetoric in relation to emotions. Either way, it seems beyond our scope here. Pitying 
Cassandra is not like fearing the spider in the bath I know to be harmless. Emotions 
apart, there is no sense in which I take it to be the case that the spider is fearsome, 
whereas there is an important sense in which I take it to be the case (it is the case in  
the tragedy, perhaps) that Cassandra is suffering undeservedly. This suggests that the 
issue here may be a more general one related to our beliefs about fiction, rather than 
some special difficulty for a “beliefs view” of emotions.
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foot across when we know it to be larger than the inhabited part of the 
earth.  Aristotle presents  this example as problematic for accounts of 
appearances (phantasia) that involve belief. These problems he takes to 
be among a whole raft of reasons260 why such views should be rejected. 
Obviously,  his  own view must  offer  a  coherent  explanation of  such 
cases, so it makes sense to ask precisely how this will work.261
In  doing  so,  we  will  have  two  questions  in  mind.  The  first  is  the 
following.  Let  us  suppose  (as  Cooper  implies)  that  Aristotle  has 
noticed  that  emotions  can  sometimes  conflict  with  better-grounded 
beliefs. Might he have realised that his negative arguments in DA III.3 
against a view of phantasia involving belief, based on occasions where 
phantasia and belief can be in conflict, would also carry weight against 
a  view of  emotions  as  involving beliefs?  The second question  is  as 
follows.  Aristotle  considered  that  his  positive  account  of  phantasia 
offered  a  successful  explanation  of  why  phantasia  and  belief  could 
conflict. Might he have thought that an understanding of emotions as 
involving phantasia would likewise successfully explain why emotions 
and belief can conflict?
The Sun Example and the problem of belief
λείπεται ἄρα ἰδεῖν εἰ δόξα ...[argument against supposing that 
phantasia is doxa] ...
φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα μετ’ αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ δι’ 
αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, φαντασία 
ἂν εἴη, διά τε ταῦτα καὶ διότι οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἔσται ἡ δόξα, 
ἀλλ’ ἐκείνου, εἴπερ ἔστιν, οὗ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις· λέγω δ’, ἐκ τῆς 
260 As is clear from 428a24-28.
261 Indeed, the need to explain perceptual error generally (whether or not recognised 
as such) is prominent throughout DA III.3, 428a12, a18, b2-9, b17-30.
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τοῦ  λευκοῦ  δόξης  καὶ  αἰσθήσεως  ἡ  συμπλοκὴ  φαντασία 
ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῆς δόξης μὲν τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, αἰσθήσεως 
δὲ τῆς τοῦ λευκοῦ. τὸ οὖν φαίνεσθαι ἔσται τὸ δοξάζειν ὅπερ 
αἰσθάνεται,
μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. φαίνεται δέ γε καὶ ψευδῆ, περὶ ὧν ἅμα 
ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῆ ἔχει,  οἷον  φαίνεται  μὲν ὁ  ἥλιος  ποδιαῖος, 
πιστεύεται  δ’  εἶναι  μείζων  τῆς  οἰκουμένης· συμβαίνει  οὖν 
ἤτοι  ἀποβεβληκέναι  τὴν  ἑαυτοῦ  ἀληθῆ  δόξαν,  ἣν  εἶχε, 
σωζομένου  τοῦ  πράγματος,  μὴ  ἐπιλαθόμενον  μηδὲ 
μεταπεισθέντα, ἢ εἰ ἔτι ἔχει, ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ εἶναι 
καὶ  ψευδῆ.  ἀλλὰ  ψευδὴς  ἐγένετο  ὅτε  λάθοι  μεταπεσὸν  τὸ 
πρᾶγμα.  οὔτ’  ἄρα  ἕν  τι  τούτων  ἐστὶν  οὔτ’  ἐκ  τούτων  ἡ 
φαντασία. 262
So it remains to see if it [appearance] is belief ...
It is clear then that appearance could not be either belief with  
sensation  or  by  means  of  sensation,  nor  a  mixture  of  belief  and  
sensation, both for these reasons and because the object of the belief  
will be the very same thing that is (if it exists) the object also of the  
sensation. What I mean is that appearance will be the mixture formed  
from the belief that it is white and the sensation of white, certainly not  
from the belief that it is good and the sensation of white. Therefore  
things appearing is a matter of believing the thing that one senses,  
non-accidentally. And yet there can be also false appearances, about  
which the subject simultaneously has a true judgement. For example,  
the sun appears to someone to be a foot across, and yet he is convinced  
it is larger than the inhabited part of the earth. Thus what happens is  
either that he has lost his previously-held true belief, with no change in  
262Ross [1956]
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the facts, and though he has not forgotten it nor been persuaded to  
change his  mind;  or else,  if  he still  retains it,  necessarily  the  same  
[belief] is true and false. But [a belief] becomes false when the facts  
change without one’s noticing. So, appearance is neither any one of  
these [viz. sensation, belief, knowledge, etc.] nor formed out of them.  
(DA 428a18-19, a24-b9)
The  discussion  of  the  case  of  the  sun  features  as  part  of  a  section 
(428a18-b9)  where  Aristotle,  having argued  that  phantasia cannot  be 
aisthêsis,  epistêmê or  nous,  argues  that  it  cannot  be  either  belief  or  a 
combination of belief (doxa) and sensation (aisthêsis). Aristotle reserves 
most space for the latter, where his target appears to be what we shall 
call the “mixture view” of appearances advanced in Plato’s Sophist.263 
This  view  is  that  appearances  are  a  combination  of  belief  and 
sensation, and it is the involvement specifically of belief that plays the 
key  role  in  explaining  how  appearances  can  sometimes  be  false. 
Aristotle’s  use of  the sun example here as an objection to this  view 
centres around the role of belief in the Platonic view. I propose to look 
in detail at Aristotle’s arguments in this section. Understanding these 
arguments  will  show whether  they  would  count  against  a  view  of 
emotions as involving beliefs.
By 428b2, Aristotle has already clarified that this mixture theory would 
need  phantasia to be a combination of a sensation and a belief (doxa) 
with the same object (428a27-b2).264 His argument is that this will give the 
Platonic  mixture  theorist  insuperable  difficulties  over  a  particular 
263 Sophist 263d-264b.
264The exact nature of this constraint is tricky: “with the same object” may mean 
‘about the same thing’, e.g. something  white (or ‘the white’), or ‘about the same 
proposition’, e.g. that it is white.
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range of cases. There are cases where what ‘appears’ to us is false (e.g. 
the sun appears about a foot across) and at the same time we appear to 
have only correct beliefs about the very same matter. That is, we have 
the correct belief that the sun is larger than the inhabited part of the 
earth.  In  such cases,  the mixture  theorist  about  appearances  faces  a 
dilemma.  The  first  option  is  that  the  belief  that  the  sun  is  huge  is 
“lost” (428b5). It is lost presumably because, in having the  phantasia, 
the person has (on the proposal under consideration) a sensation and a 
belief that the sun is quite small. The belief that the sun is small causes 
the belief that the sun is huge to be lost (“ἀποβεβληκέναι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ 
ἀληθῆ δόξαν”, b5). Aristotle draws attention to how problematic this 
option would be.  The loss  of  the correct  belief  that the sun is huge 
would  have  happened  without  the  occurrence  of  any  of  the  usual 
processes by which our beliefs are changed: there is no change of the 
facts, no forgetting and he has not been persuaded to change his mind.
So, Aristotle seems to view this first option as unattractive. The second 
option  is  that  the  person  retains  their  belief  that  the  sun  is  huge. 
Aristotle’s argument is quite difficult to make out. He says, “if he still 
retains it, necessarily the same [belief] is true and false. But [a belief] 
becomes  false  when  the  facts  change  without  one 
noticing.” (428b7-9).265 
265Ross ([1961] ad loc.) is puzzled by the aorist (ἐγένετο) and the optative (λάθοι) – 
but there is no obvious puzzle here – Aristotle is recording the process by which 
generally a state of belief becomes false. The aorist is gnomic (and we note that a 
couple of manuscript traditions have the imperfect, “egineto”) , and the optative 
yields the sense “whenever” (though there is perhaps some awkwardness from the 
absence of “an”). 
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On Ross’s interpretation, the feminine noun to be understood at b7 (tên  
autên,  “the  same”) is  not  doxan but  phantasian.  The  objection  to  the 
belief-plus-sensation account of  phantasia is  then that  on this  second 
option, where the true belief (that the sun is huge) is retained, it makes 
the state of phantasia both true and false, which is absurd. On this view, 
it would be true in virtue of the true belief, and false because of the 
false sensation. While this view is a possible266 construal of the Greek, it 
seems  highly  unlikely  that  this  is  Aristotle’s  objection.  Firstly,  it 
violates the constraint on the view under criticism that the sensation 
and the opinion have the same object – a constraint that Aristotle has 
immediately  before  this  spent  some  5  lines  setting  out  (a27-b2).267 
Secondly, the view does not accurately represent Plato’s view in the 
Sophist, where false appearances are false because the belief part of the 
mixture is  false.  Thirdly,  and relatedly,  Aristotle  would – on Ross’s 
interpretation  –  be  objecting  to  a  rather  incoherent  version  of  the 
mixture  view,  lacking the very feature  (a  false  belief)  that  for  Plato 
explained  how  appearances  could  be  false  in  the  first  place.268 Of 
course,  these  latter  objections  do  not  rule  out  this  interpretation: 
Aristotle  is  not  engaged  in  exegesis  of  Plato’s  views,  he  may  be 
criticising  merely  what  Plato  literally  says.269 Still,  this  way  of 
266 Though in truth it is unlikely. There has been no use of the feminine noun 
φαντασια since 428a29, since when appearances have been referred to using τὸ 
φαίνεσθαι and φαίνεται (twice). It is difficult, in fact, to find any plausible 
alternative to thinking that τὴν αὐτὴν (b7) refers back to τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀληθῆ δόξαν 
(b5).
267Ross’s construal seems to require that the sensation part of phantasia be able to be 
false, and hence that the object of the sensation be a proposition. Cf. n.278 above. But 
then the mixture account of the content of appearances would already have been 
abandoned.
268 Plato Sophist 264a-b.
269 cf. Annas [1982] 323-6.
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(mis)interpreting  the  position  of  his  Platonic  opponent  is  highly 
unlikely in this particular case given the fact that at a47-b2, Aristotle 
seems to cast this whole discussion of the sun example as a problem 
arising from the fact that on this view what is perceived and what is 
believed must be non-accidentally the same. A final objection to Ross’s 
interpretation is that, on this reading, the problem for the Platonist that 
he  highlights  in  Aristotle’s  text  is  trivial  compared  to  the  other 
weaknesses of the Platonic view thus interpreted. If Aristotle is really 
suggesting that the belief involved in the state of  phantasia here (the 
state in which it  appears to the subject  that the sun is  about a foot 
across), is the belief  that the sun is larger than the inhabited part of  the  
earth, then – granted – the same overall state of  phantasia will be in a 
way true and in a way false. But this would be a trivial problem for this 
view (thus interpreted) compared to the difficulty it would then face of 
explaining how this appearance could be of the sun’s being about a foot  
across in the first place.
In  contrast,  both  Hamlyn270 and  Lycos271 take  it  that  Aristotle’s 
objection is that the same belief cannot be both true and false. This gives 
a more natural reading of the Greek text, and yet it is hard to see any 
sense in which the belief that the sun is larger than the inhabited part of the  
earth is false. Hamlyn suggests that it is false ex hypothesi as the belief 
involved in the appearance. That is to say that since it must (somehow) 
be the belief involved in the appearance that the sun is about a foot 
across, it must be false, since that appearance is false. Of course, this 
would be  a  paradoxical  result,272 that  a  true  belief  could  –  without 
270 Hamlyn [1993] ad loc.
271 Lycos [1964] 501-2.
272And apparently at odds with what Aristotle says at 428b8-9, “[a belief] becomes false  
when the facts change without one’s noticing.”
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changing its content – become false through being incorporated into a 
mental state which was false. And, quite apart from the puzzle about 
how the belief that the sun is huge could turn out false, there would be 
a further puzzle faced by the mixture theorist (thus interpreted) – the 
same worry faced on Ross’s interpretation above – about how the belief 
that  the  sun  is  huge could  possibly  be  part  of  what  constitutes  the 
appearance that the sun is a foot across. Aristotle is presenting a problem 
faced by the mixture theorist in finding a response to the second horn 
of his dilemma (i.e. the supposition that the subject  retains their belief 
that the sun is huge). On this interpretation, Aristotle imagines that the 
mixture theorist’s  response would be as  described above – with the 
highly paradoxical (if not absurd) features we have highlighted. But 
then he presents the difficulty of this horn of the dilemma simply by 
saying  “the  same [belief]  would be  bound to  be  true  and false.”  It 
stretches credibility to suppose that if this is how Aristotle understood 
the mixture theorist’s position, he would present, as his objection to it, 
not its most obvious absurdities, but the fact that it would make the 
same  belief  true  and  false.  We  may  note  again  that  on  this 
interpretation too, the mixture account would have given up all  the 
resources  which  it  needed  to  explain  false  appearances  in  the  first 
place.
Lycos273 has  a  variant  of  this  interpretation  in  which  the  belief  in 
question is still the belief that the sun is huge, and this belief is true 
because it has the sun’s size correct, but false “as the belief element in the  
appearing”. It is difficult to make out what Lycos is suggesting here, but 
the thought seems to be either identical to Hamlyn’s view, or it is that 
the belief is not the correct belief to be part of the appearance that the 
273 Lycos [1964] 502f..
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sun is a foot across. An appearance that the sun is about a foot across, if 
it is to have a belief among its composite parts, requires such a belief to 
be a belief that the sun is about a foot across. Thus the belief that the sun is  
huge has the wrong content for comprising part of an appearance that 
the  sun  is  a  foot  across.  The  suggestion  seems  to  be  that  at  b7-8, 
Aristotle is saying, “this same belief [that the sun is huge] must be both 
true and wrong [i.e. the wrong belief to be part of an appearance that 
the  sun  is  about  a  foot  across].”  If  this  is  the  suggestion,  it  is 
implausible as an elucidation of Aristotle’s Greek. Aristotle’s “alêthê kai  
pseudê”  simply  means  “true  and false”,  and is  best  translated  thus, 
although it  might at a stretch be rendered “right and wrong”, since 
these  English  words  can  mean  true  and  false.  But  this  feature  of 
English should not mask the meaning of Aristotle’s Greek. The English 
words “wrong” and “incorrect” can be used to express unfitness for a 
particular  purpose  –  on  this  suggestion  Lycos  has  Aristotle 
highlighting  the  fact  that  the  belief  is  unfit  for  the  purpose  of 
constituting the belief component of an appearance that the sun is a 
foot across. However, the Greek word “pseudê  ” simply means false, 
and,  as  with  “false”  in  English,  this  cannot  mean  unfit  for  some 
purpose. Since this is what b7f. says, the puzzle remains. How can a 
belief that the sun is larger than the inhabited part of the world be in  
any plausible sense at all false?
Two  further  options  seem  to  offer  a  more  fruitful  approach  to  the 
passage.
One possibility not considered by interpreters is that “the same [belief] 
must be true and false” at 428b7f.  records  a verdict  that the subject 
himself is committed to. The idea is that firstly the belief that the sun is 
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huge is retained (b7). But this is now alongside the  phantasia,  which 
includes the belief that the sun is quite small (b3f.). Each of these beliefs 
entails both its own truth and the falsity of the other. Thus these two 
beliefs commit the subject to – what is an absurd inconsistency – two 
different  verdicts  on the same belief.274 He must (“anankê” b7)  think 
that  the  “same  belief”275 is  at  once  true  and  false.  Now  this 
interpretation requires supposing that there is an unstated “in his (the 
subject’s) view” to be understood in lines b7-8. Textually, this is rather 
speculative.  Still,  if  it  is  possible,  this  interpretation  has  Aristotle 
drawing out the conclusion for the mixture view of appearances that it 
casts the “sun example” as an example of someone having inconsistent 
beliefs. How, though, would this constitute an objection to the mixture 
view – which is what b7-8 clearly is?  After all,  the mixture view is 
Plato’s,  and he would have been happy to grant that human beings 
often hold inconsistent beliefs.276 It is the business of philosophy, and 
was  supremely  the  business  of  Socrates,  to  face  people  with  this 
uncomfortable  fact.  There  is  a  challenge  for  this  interpretation  to 
identify Aristotle’s objection.277
274The unstated noun at b7 is indeed surely doxan rather than phantasian.
275“The same belief” may refer specifically to the belief under discussion throughout 
the dilemma (b4ff.), namely ‘that the sun is larger than the inhabited part of the 
earth’, or may refer in a general way to whichever of the two beliefs one is 
considering.
276This is distinct from allowing that people might consciously hold beliefs that they 
recognise to be inconsistent.
277A related possibility is to suppose from the context that the believing subject is 
presumed correct with regard both to his retained belief (that the sun is huge) and to 
how things appear (which ex hypethesi includes a belief that the sun is quite small). 
Their being correct about both of these, however, entails on the mixture view that 
“the same belief” (on which cf. n. 276. above) actually is both true and false.
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A final interpretative option is that suggested by Hicks.278 One might 
take tên autên (the same) as referring to the same type of attitude – i.e. 
doxa, that the subject adopts in relation to the size of the sun. So, it is 
not a token instance of believing that is both true and false, but rather 
‘what the subject believes’. What is “necessary” therefore here is that 
the answer to the question, “What does the subject believe about the 
size of the sun?” be both, “that it is a foot across,” and, “that it is huge.” 
Hence, when considering the subject’s belief about the size of the sun, 
we  must  admit  that  it  is  both  true  and false.  If  this  is  somehow a 
possible reading of the Greek text,279 Aristotle would be pointing out 
that on the mixture view of appearances, in cases like the sun case the 
subject adopts two attitudes towards the size of the sun,  attitudes of 
exactly the same kind – namely attitudes of belief, such that one is true, 
the  other  false.  So,  there  is  one  type  of  attitude  (or  possibly  one 
‘faculty’  exercised),  namely belief,  but  two token attitudes,  one true 
belief that the sun is huge, and one false belief – the one involved in the 
appearance – that the sun is a foot across. This is presumably exactly 
what the proponent of the mixture account of appearances would be 
likely to say. But then it is again unclear how this would constitute a 
point against their view.
On  the  last  two  interpretative  suggestions,  we  need  to  identify 
Aristotle’s  objection.  For  Aristotle,  like  everybody  else,  knew  that 
people can sometimes have (albeit unrecognised) inconsistent beliefs. I 
think  this  challenge  can  be  met.  It  can  be  met  firstly  in  terms  of 
278 Hicks [1907] 466-7. The reading of this and related passages in Everson [1999] 
212-213 seems to have much in common with his interpretation.
279 It is certainly awkward to suppose that “τὴν αὐτὴν [δόξαν]” b7 could mean the 
same faculty of belief, or the same kind of attitude, i.e. belief.
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Aristotle’s dialectic. His criticisms are of Plato. On the Platonic account, 
I cannot (in the same way, with the same part of the soul) believe that 
the sun is huge and believe that it is a foot across.280 And yet, if – on 
Plato’s account of appearance – appearance that things are a certain 
way involves belief  that  they are that  way,  this is  precisely  what is 
entailed.281 Furthermore, even without the dialectic with Plato, there is 
something plausible about this account of Aristotle’s criticism. When I 
believe  something  and  believe  the  negation  of  that  same  thing, 
knowingly and explicitly, I am in an important way irrational. Finding 
one’s self in such a situation brings doubt and puzzlement. But when, 
believing that the sun is huge, I find it nevertheless appears about a 
foot across, I am guilty of no such irrationality and am attended by no 
doubt or puzzlement or conflict of any kind. Common sense suggests 
that it is precisely not the very same kind of stance I take to “the sun as 
huge” as I take to “the sun as a foot across”. In fact, Aristotle wants to 
insist, the whole of my believing about the size of the sun is entirely 
true. There is nothing I am getting wrong here.  For my believing to 
become false, there would need to be some change in the world that 
had  escaped  my  notice  (b8f.).  That  has  not  happened  in  this  case. 
Before I look at the sun, I simply have the belief that the sun is huge. 
Then  I  have  simply  looked  at  the  sun,  seen  it  looking  the  way  it 
normally looks, but have not changed in my belief about its size. In 
fact, there has been neither a change in the facts, nor anything that has 
escaped my notice.  On that  basis,  as  a  result  of  seeing the sun,  my 
belief about it has not become false in any way. This natural picture is 
280 Cf. Republic IV. 439b5f..
281 We might wonder how great a difficulty this would be for Plato. Could he not 
simply accommodate this by supposing here that the two beliefs are held with 
different parts of the soul? Still, on the basis of what we actually have in the Sophist, 
this difficulty stands.
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at  odds  with  a  view  of  phantasia as  being  a  mixture,  or  weaving-
together of belief and perception. Indeed, it cannot involve belief.
This account of the nature of Aristotle’s objection at b7f. is compatible 
with either of the latter two interpretative options proposed. Neither is 
without some difficulty as a reading of the text, but despite this, they 
seem  the  most  preferable  readings  of  how  this  part  of  the  ‘sun 
example’ works as an argument. My preference is for the former.
Applying the DA III.3 arguments about  phantasia   to the passions. 
Supposing this is  right about Aristotle’s  objection to belief’s  being a 
component of perceptual phantasia, we should proceed to the issue we 
highlighted  earlier.  Do  these  arguments  show  that  there  will  be 
something similarly problematic about an account of the passions in 
which  they  are  partly  constituted  by  beliefs?282 An  account  of 
perceptual  phantasia in which one constituent is belief will struggle to 
explain cases where one concurrently has a false  phantasia  in conflict 
with a true belief  about the very same object.  Similarly,  it  might be 
suggested, an account of the passions in which one constituent is belief 
will  struggle  to  explain  cases  where  one  concurrently  has  a  ‘false 
passion’ in conflict with a true belief, both about the same object. The 
kind of case I will consider is where one is afraid of a spider in the bath 
that one knows to be harmless. The fear is false in just this sense: it 
involves representing283 the spider as dangerous, and the spider is not 
in fact dangerous. I propose to contend that Aristotle’s objections to the 
282 Recall that the sense of ‘belief’ in use here is simply taking something to be the 
case.
283 Here, what is in dispute is the kind of representational state involved here, 
whether belief or phantasia. But both of these are representational states that are truth-
apt.
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mixture account of perceptual  phantasia do not count against the view 
that  Aristotle  thinks of  the passions as  partly constituted by beliefs. 
Situations of the kind represented by my fear of a spider I know to be 
harmless, will – on the view that passions involve beliefs – involve the 
holding of incompatible beliefs. My ordinary belief that the spider is 
harmless  is  incompatible  with the belief  involved in my fear  of  the 
spider – the latter belief would be that the spider threatens me some 
harm.  We suggested that  Aristotle’s  point  runs  as  follows.  The sun 
example showed that if belief is involved in phantasia then it would be 
irrational for the sun to look a foot across when we believe it is huge. 
But obviously this is not irrational. So the theory that belief is involved 
in  phantasia must be false.  However,  these last  steps come out very 
different in relation to the involvement of belief in passions. For if belief 
is involved in the passions, then it will be irrational to feel afraid of the 
spider  when  believing  that  it  is  harmless.  And  of  course,  this  is  
irrational!  In  fact  it  is  in  precisely  such  cases  that  we  talk  about 
irrational  fears.  While we do not think that there is  anything wrong 
with how things look to us when the sun looks a foot across, we do 
think that there is something wrong with us when we fear what we 
know to be harmless spiders. So, whereas it is a bad theory that makes 
the sun case irrational, it is a  good  theory that makes the spider case 
irrational. Indeed, this point would seem to count against the ‘phantasia 
view’  of  the  cognitive  contents  of  passions:  on  that  view,  the 
irrationality of fearing harmless spiders in the bath is no greater than 
that  of  the  sun  looking  a  foot  across,  i.e.  there  is  no  irrationality 
whatsoever. But this seems to get the wrong verdict. Fearing spiders 
known to be harmless  is  irrational,  and this  should count against  a 
theory that says it is not.284
284 Besides the way this counts against interpretations of Aristotle’s view of the 
passions, this will be a problem faced by some modern ‘perceptual’ theories of 
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All  of  this  can be  said without  taking up any position one way or 
another  about  whether  the  beliefs  involved  in  the  passions  are  of 
exactly  the same kind as  other  kinds  of  beliefs. In  short,  Aristotle’s 
arguments in rejection of Plato’s ‘mixture view’ of perceptual phantasia 
as involving beliefs do not rule out the possibility that his own view of 
the passions might involve beliefs.
(We should note here an important implication of this objection to the 
‘appearances  view’.  It  is  a  desideratum of  any  theory  of  the  kind of 
representational  states  involved  in  emotional  experience,  that  it 
account not just  for the  occurrence of passions that conflict  with our 
dispassionate  judgements,  but  also  for  their  irrationality.  The 
appearances view fails to meet this  desideratum. Indeed, this looks as 
though it  will  be  problematic  for  any perception-based  view of  the 
passions.  By  assimilating  this  aspect  of  passionate  experience  to 
perceptual representation, the possibility of conflict with dispassionate 
beliefs has been so smoothly allowed for that there turns out to be no 
irrationality  involved in  such cases  at  all.  This  is  clearly  the wrong 
result, and counts against theories of the emotions that entail it.285)
IV
emotions too. For example, Prinz’s theory of emotions as perceptions struggles in the 
face of this difficulty (Prinz [2004] 237-240).
285 This of course touches on a much wider issue in the philosophy of the emotions. 
Cases like the spider case seem to require treatment in a way that recognises that they 
are possible, that they are irrational, but also that the irrationality involved is not as 
stark as that involved in at once dispassionately affirming and denying the very same 
thing. Together, these constitute a very challenging set of desiderata. Cf. Nussbaum 
[1999], [2001]; Roberts [1999]; Sorabji [1999].
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As  well  as  arguing  that  Aristotle’s  position  in  De  Anima III.3  is 
consistent  with  a  view  of  the  passions  as  involving  beliefs,  I  wish 
further  to  argue  that  the  positive  account  Aristotle  offers  there  of 
phantasia could  not  be  applied  to  explaining  how  we  could  have 
emotions in conflict with our (other) beliefs, even though it will serve 
as an explanation of why the sun looks a foot across. On Aristotle’s 
view,  phantasia turns  out  to  be286 a  change  coming  about  from  the 
exercise  of  perception.  So,  the  explanation  of  how  we  can  have  a 
phantasia as of the sun’s being a foot across is as follows. Here I follow 
closely the account of  phantasia offered by Caston.287 On this account 
the intentional content of a phantasma is given by its causal powers to 
affect the person whose  phantasma  it is.  Specifically, the content of a 
phantasma will be whatever an instance of perception with the same 
causal powers would be a perception of. So, often, it will turn out that 
phantasmata are  produced  by  perceptions  of  the  very  objects  they 
represent – my dream representations of my father are caused by my 
waking perceptions of my father. This is taken to be the substance of 
what Aristotle is asserting when he claims that a change that results 
from an exercise  of perception will  be  similar to  the perception that 
produces  it  (428b14,  429a5,  432a9f.)  –  similar,  but  not  necessarily 
identical, since error is possible. On this model, the sun affects our eyes 
and produces a change which has the causal powers that a perception 
of a foot-wide sun would have. Hence, the change, the phantasma, is as 
of a foot-wide sun. The model,  it  seems to me,  needs an additional 
nuance here in order  to  account  fully for  how the sun looks a foot 
across.  After all,  the change brought about by the perception of the 
(huge) sun also has the causal powers that a perception of a huge sun 
286 Aristotle’s positive argument for his own view, I take it runs from 428b10 to 429a2, 
with the conclusion coming at the end. Cf. Wedin [1988] ch 2, Caston [1996].
287 Caston [1996], [1998].
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would have: this is obvious, since it is the perception of a huge sun! So, 
it seems that here, the change brought about when I look at the sun has 
causal powers that are both those that a perception of a foot-wide sun 
would have and those that a perception of a huge sun would have. A 
perception of a foot-wide sun would have those causal powers if the 
sun was seen from fairly nearby, and a perception of a huge sun would 
have  those  causal  powers  if  seen  from  much  further  away,  as  is 
actually the case.  The model therefore needs to account for why the 
appearance to us, when we look at the sun, is that it is a foot across 
rather than huge. 
Standard Perceptual Conditions
It  seems  we  ought  to  say  something  like  the  following.  Any given 
phantasma is a state with certain causal powers. In order to determine 
what content is represented by it, we would need to identify what a 
perceptual state with the same causal powers would be a perception of, 
provided  that  the  perception  was  under  standard288 perceptual  conditions. 
288 What standard perceptual conditions are might vary relative to a subject or group 
of subjects. So, for subjects similar to those Plato describes in Republic VII, who have 
lived all their life in the murk of a cave, the gloomy perceptual conditions inside the 
cave are more “standard” (at least initially) for them than the bright light outside. So 
for a phantasma to represent a sheep to them, it seems likely that it would need to 
have the causal powers that a perception of a sheep in cave-like conditions would have. 
If a phantasma had the causal powers that a perception of a sheep in more objectively  
optimal perceptual conditions (i.e. in brighter light) would have, it seems likely that it 
would represent something else – a heavenly sheep, or a radio-active sheep, perhaps. 
We should note that if this is correct, we can make precise what is meant by 
“standard” perceptual conditions on the basis simply of what was statistically usual 
for the subject among those perceptions that were involved in the subject’s 
development and “calibration” of her ability to have intelligible perceptual 
experiences. (In fact, it is plausible to suppose that a fully developed theory here 
would have to take account of complexities brought by the extent to which this 
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When  we  learn  to  perceive  objects,  as  opposed  to  having 
undifferentiated perceptual experiences, most of the objects perceived 
during this process are fairly nearby, and in many cases we have the 
means to judge their distance, and hence compensate for perspective. 
This, we suggest, is a rough account of why objects do look a certain 
size, and why we are not constantly confused by the effects of distance 
and  perspective.  It  is  a  tiny  minority  of  objects  featuring  in  this 
development  process  that  are  millions  of  miles  away:  there  is  thus 
something distinctly  non-standard to us about perceiving things from 
that kind of distance. This account, or something like it, is required to 
explain why it is that the sun looks quite small, rather than huge. It is 
also clear that there is nothing in this general account of  phantasia to 
yield any difficulty in supposing that things can look different from 
how we know them to be. The physical change that is the  phantasma 
will  happen to someone, and the facts about the causal powers that 
would be  possessed by their  perceptions  under  standard conditions 
will obtain regardless of their beliefs about the actual size of the sun.
If this is right, could this be the correct way to account for how we can 
sometimes have passions that involve representations we know to be 
false? For someone to be afraid of a spider in the bath they know to be 
harmless,  the claim will be that there is a change they undergo that 
constitutes the relevant appearance. The content of this appearance is 
the  spider,  represented  as  dangerous.289 For  this  to  be  a  case  of 
phantasia,  the  change  must  have  been  brought  about  by  perceptual 
development and calibration is subject to ongoing adjustment.) The key point here is 
that standard perceptual conditions can be specified independently of the accuracy of 
the perception that results.
289 Let “dangerous” serve for the moment as a placeholder for how fear’s objects are 
represented.
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activity, and must have the causal powers that a (true) perception with 
the same content, made under standard perceptual conditions, would 
have. So, in this case, the change that constitutes the false phantasia (a 
harmless spider  appearing to be a dangerous spider)  must have the 
causal  powers  that  a  perception  of  a  dangerous  spider  would have 
under  standard  perceptual  conditions.  Now,  there  are  a  number  of 
difficulties here.
If this is to work, there needs to be some account, as there was in the 
sun case, of why the harmless spider appears as a dangerous spider 
and not simply as what it  is  – a harmless spider.  For here,  too, the 
change involved in the supposed exercise of  phantasia  has the causal 
powers that  both would be possessed (we must suppose) by a change 
brought about by the perception of a dangerous spider  and would be 
possessed  (indeed,  ex  hypothesi,  they  are possessed)  by  a  change 
brought about by the perception of a harmless spider. In the sun case, 
appeal could be made to the notion of standard perceptual conditions, 
but that doesn’t look promising here. It is far from obvious that under 
standard perceptual conditions  this kind of change would be brought 
about by a dangerous rather than a harmless spider, indeed the reverse 
seems  more  plausible  –  that  the  kinds  of  perceptions  of  spiders  to 
which  most  (certainly  British)  arachnophobes  are  exposed  are 
overwhelmingly of harmless spiders. Aristotle seems to acknowledge 
(428b21f.) that there can be cases of phantasia in which one mistakes one 
individual for another – where I mistake Cleon’s son for Diares’ son. 
We  might  speculate  that  the  reason  why  someone  who  is  actually 
Cleon’s son looks to me not like Cleon’s son but like Diares’ son is that 
changes of the kind I am undergoing when I look at him are standardly 
caused  in  me by perceiving  Diares’,  not  Cleon’s,  son.  I  am used to 
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registering that kind of experience as a perception of Diares’ son, and 
this is because predominantly when I have had such experiences they 
have  in  fact  been  perceptions  of  Diares’  son.  Presumably  the  best 
option for seeing as phantasia the representations involved in fear in the 
spider case would be to find ways of employing a similar model.  If 
Caston is right that the contents of a veridical perception are its cause, 
and the contents  of  a  phantasma are given by whatever  would have 
caused  it  had  it  been  a  veridical  perception  (an  aisthêma),  then  the 
worry is that the wrong result will be yielded in the emotional case of 
the spider in the bath. After all, in standard conditions, it would be a 
perception of a  harmless  spider that would cause this kind of change. 
Still,  it  had  better  not  be  impossible  for  there  to  be  fear-relevant 
phantasiai, since these will be what Aristotle will need to explain fear in 
children  and  animals.  And  in  general,  it  ought  to  be  possible  for 
something to ‘look dangerous’, and on any view, this would be a case 
of  phantasia.  Probably the most plausible prospect is to suppose that 
there is some feature of the spider (perhaps its shape, colour, hairiness, 
or whatever) that makes it look like a dangerous thing. So, to the person 
feeling  afraid  the  spider  does  not  look  like  anything  other  than  a 
spider,  but  still,  it  looks  (falsely)  like  a  dangerous  thing.  And  the 
explanation for this is that there are causal powers possessed by the 
change brought  about  by perceiving  this  (harmless)  spider  –  causal 
powers related to the spider’s shape/colour/hairiness – that would be 
possessed by a perception standardly of a dangerous thing. On that 
basis,  this  change,  this  phantasma,  constitutes  the  spider  looking 
dangerous. So, perhaps this difficulty can be met: harmless spiders can 
look  dangerous  –  the  kinds  of  phantasia  invoked  in  the  appearance 
view of emotions do exist.
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Nevertheless,  it  still  seems  to  me  that  invoking  an  account  of 
‘appearances’ to explain emotional cases like the spider case will be far 
less  plausible  overall  than  the  way  this  account  serves  to  explain 
purely  perceptual  cases  of  misleading  appearances  like  the  sun 
example.  Firstly,   it  is  not  obvious  that  this  ‘appearance’  view  of 
emotions  will  be  able  to  account  well  for  the  way  in  which  the 
representations involved in our emotions  are  responsive to what we 
believe. In the spider case, for example, it seems to me that invoking 
phantasia rather than belief as the kind of representation involved does 
not make it easy to explain the effect on my fear of an annoying older 
brother  telling  me  that  the  spider  might  have  teeth,  or  might  be 
poisonous, and that  sometimes if  spiders  bite  you your flesh swells 
right up, and so on. For the effect of this kind of teasing is to increase a 
person’s  fear  by making the spider seem more dangerous. If  the kind of 
seeming involved in fear is a matter of how the spider  looks, it is not 
obvious why these remarks should make any difference. Indeed, there 
is every reason to think that they ought to make no difference to how 
things “appear” and hence (on the appearances view) to the fear. Yet, it 
is  obvious that this is  just the kind of thing to make someone more 
afraid, and that it works by affecting how the spider is represented. 
Supposing, on the other hand, that emotions involve belief (i.e. taking 
something to be the case) makes this kind of phenomenon very easily 
explicable. The older brother’s remarks increase our fear because of the 
extent  to  which  we  believe them  –  to  that  extent,  we  are  thereby 
believing  that  the  spider  is  (or  may  be)  more  dangerous  than  we 
previously had thought. The spider thus ‘seems’ more dangerous to us 
in the sense that the spider is believed to be more dangerous, and so 
our fear is increased.
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Similarly, it is clear that in many cases, coming to believe that things 
are not such as to merit emotion of a particular kind does stop people 
from having an emotion of that kind. (Arguably this is a much more 
frequent occurrence than the much-discussed cases like the spider case, 
where emotions persist despite a conflict with beliefs.) When someone 
believes that the person dressed as a beggar is in fact a rather wealthy 
actor involved in a publicity stunt, her pity evaporates. A sense of relief 
at the baby’s calm, peaceful appearance in his cot turns to horror if I 
believe  he is  not  breathing.  The alarm at  not  seeing the car  parked 
outside the house immediately dissipates when you remember that it 
has not been stolen but is at the garage for repairs.  How things  look 
simply does not generally command our emotions above and beyond 
how we  take  things  to  be.  And  our  emotions  are  generally  highly 
responsive to how we take things to be even if this involves little or no 
change to  how things  appear.290 On the appearance  view,  this  is  not 
what one would expect.
There is  a further,  related,  problem for the appearance view, that it 
suggests that emotions are more easily aroused than in fact they are. 
The appearance  view (and perception-based views generally)  of  the 
representational  content  of  emotions  allows  emotions  too  much 
independence  from  people’s  considered  judgements.  There  are  two 
problems with this. One is that such theories will simply prove false 
empirically. It takes more than someone looking successful to arouse 
my envy, if I know these looks are illusory. If I know I am in fact in 
jeopardy, it will not be enough to make me feel confident that there is 
the  appearance  that  deliverance  is  at  hand.  The  seasoned  desert-
290 Aristotle appears to make this or a related point at De Anima III.3, 427b21-4, on 
which see below.
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traveller  is  not  heartened  by  what  he  knows  to  be  a  mirage,  even 
though it still looks like an oasis. 
So, we have sought a careful understanding of Aristotle’s account of 
the sun example in De Anima III.3. On either of the plausible ways of 
understanding his argument against supposing that phantasia involves 
belief,  his  argument  would  not  count  against  the  view  that  the 
emotions involve belief. Indeed, his argument involves some important 
considerations about irrationality that would actually count against the 
appearances  view  of  emotions.  Even  supposing,  despite  this,  that 
Aristotle did hold the appearance view of emotions, we have seen that 
this would not give him the resources – as Cooper and Striker claimed 
– to explain cases where our emotions conflict  with dispassionately-
held beliefs.
The   De  Anima   III.3  sense  of  “ phantasia  ”  does  not  fit   Rhetoric   II  on   
emotions.
We saw earlier in the chapter that linking Aristotle’s use of words like 
“phantasia” to  their  more  technical  use  in  De  Anima III.3  was 
exegetically  undermotivated.  We  will  now  see  from  a  careful 
examination of Aristotle’s positive account of phantasia in De Anima III.
3,  and  his  accounts  of  the  emotions  in  Rhetoric II.2-11,  that  an 
understanding of phantasia from DA III.3 is very ill-suited to elucidate 
what  Aristotle  says  in  Rhetoric  II  about  the  outlook  distinctive  of 
various  types  of  emotion.  Thus  we  should  reject  the  view  that  in 
Rhetoric II,  Aristotle  uses  words like “phantasia” in the kind of  way 
these terms are used in DA III.3.
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Phantasia  in  DA   III.3 
It is an important part of Aristotle’s definition of  phantasia in the  De 
Anima that  it  is  a  change  produced  by  the  exercise  of  perception 
(429a1f.,  also  428b13f.,  25f.;  cf.  also  De Insomn  459a17f.).  While  it  is 
conceivable that this might apply to the way we represent things when 
we fear a spider that we can see in front of us, it is not so obvious how 
this  would  generalise  for  all  cases  of  the  passions.  So,  what  does 
Aristotle means when he says of phantasia that it is a change produced 
by the exercise  of  perception? His central  examples give a clue:  the 
thing before us appears to be a man (428a14), the sun appears to be a 
foot across (428b3f.), things appear to us when we have our eyes shut 
(428a16), and things appear to us in dreams (428a8). In some of these 
cases,  it  is  obvious  that  the  appearance  is  caused  more-or-less 
simultaneously  by  a  perception.  In  other  cases,  Aristotle’s  thought 
seems to be that the stimulation of the sense organs that takes place in 
actual  exercises  of  perception  generates  continuing  movement  and 
change of a similar kind even after perception has itself ceased.291 This 
then accounts for the fact that after looking at the sun for a while, if we 
close our eyes or look elsewhere, we still appear to see it.292 On the face 
of things, this does not fit well with wanting phantasia to be Aristotle’s 
account of how things are represented in emotion generally. For there 
are occasions where the representations involved do not seem to be 
produced by perceptual activity in any important sense. For example, I 
291 We should note that the connection between perceptual activity and the causing of 
a phantasma will clearly need to be much closer and more immediate than the 
connection between perception and thinking generally. For Aristotle, all thinking 
involves phantasmata, as he says at 431a16f. and elsewhere, and hence thinking will 
always have some causal ancestry in perceptual activity.
292 Aristotle gives numerous examples, and expounds this point at length in the De 
Insomniis, cf. especially 459a23-b23, 460b28-461b7, cf. Caston [1996] 46-52
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may  become  angry  at  having  been  outsmarted  in  a  business 
negotiation, as I recheck the calculations: in my anger I represent the 
salesperson as having wronged me by exploiting my mistakes, but it is 
not obvious that this representation is the after-effect of perceptions. It 
seems rather that it is the after-effect of my calculations, and my tardy 
realisation  of  what  has  been  done  to  me.  Still,  it  may  be  that  this 
objection can be met.  Aristotle  does acknowledge that  what  we call 
imagination is a case of  phantasia, and he cites this as an example of 
where phantasia is up to us whenever we want.293 In those cases, it must 
be  that  we are  marshalling mental  images  that  need not have been 
caused immediately before we use them. This might suggest that what 
is happening in my anger at the salesperson is that I am making use of 
stored  phantasmata  that  in fact  were originally caused by perceptual 
activity, as Aristotle’s views on phantasia  require: as with imaginative 
use of mental images, it is no objection to their being phantasmata that 
they were not caused immediately prior to the onset of my anger. Still, 
this is only a partial answer to this worry. It is not clear on this account 
what these  phantasmata  are,  originally caused by perceptual  activity, 
that  are  being made use of  in  how I  represent  things in  my anger. 
Perhaps a more precise account can be given on this point. Still, one 
factor which threatens to make this very difficult is the next point – a 
restriction on the range of objects that an exercise of phantasia can have.
 
In the De Anima, Aristotle specifies that phantasia has the same objects 
as  perception.  This  seems  to  be  a  restriction  that  will  not  make 
phantasia well-fitted to be the kind of representational content involved 
293 De Anima III.3, 427b17-20 “πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν 
τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ  εἰδωλοποιοῦντες.” This should not be taken as an 
endorsement of a general view of all instances of phantasia as involving mental 
images.
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in passions in general. In particular, there are several instances of how 
the contents of passionate representation are described in Rhetoric II, in 
connection with particular types of passion, where it seems impossible 
that this restriction could be met. Moreover, some of these are precisely 
cases  where  Aristotle  uses  the  words  φαντασια and  φαινομαι in 
describing the way in which the passionate person sees things. We may 
recall  that  it  is  the  use  of  these  particular  words  that  has  tempted 
interpreters  to  suppose that  Aristotle  has in mind in relation to  the 
passions a technical use of these words of the kind we find in De Anima  
III.3  and elsewhere  in his  psychological  writing.  Over the course of 
Rhetoric  II.2-11,  the  items  that  are  said  to  be  the  what  a  passionate 
person has a φαντασια of, or of which some part of φαινομαι is used 
are as follows.
Passion Greek Text Purported object of phantasia
ὀργη ὄρεξις  μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας 
[φαινομένης]  διὰ 
φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν
 [Apparent] Revenge
 Apparent Belittling
Πραοτης φανερὸν  ὅτι  καὶ  τοῖς  μηδὲν 
τούτων ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἀκουσίως 
ποιοῦσιν  ἢ  φαινομένοις 
τοιούτοις πρᾶοί εἰσιν.
 Someone  who  apparently 
didn’t do any of these things
 Someone  who  apparently 
did them involuntarily
Φοβος λύπη  τις  ἢ  ταραχὴ  ἐκ 
φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ 
φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ
The  appearance  of  a  future  harm 
that is destructive or painful
Θαρσος ὥστε  μετὰ  φαντασίας  ἡ 
ἐλπὶς  τῶν  σωτηρίων  ὡς 
ἐγγὺς ὄντων
Expectation with the appearance of 
deliverance as being near
Αἰσχυνη λύπη  τις  ἢ  ταραχὴ  περὶ  τὰ 
εἰς  ἀδοξίαν  φαινόμενα 
φέρειν  τῶν  κακῶν,  ἢ 
Bad things – present, past or future 
–  that  appear  to  bring  you  into 
disrepute
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παρόντων  ἢ  γεγονότων  ἢ 
μελλόντων,
ἐλεος λύπη  τις  ἐπὶ  φαινομένῳ 
κακῷ  φθαρτικῷ  ἢ  λυπηρῷ 
τοῦ  ἀναξίου  τυγχάνειν,  ὃ 
κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν ἂν 
παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινα, καὶ 
τοῦτο  ὅταν  πλησίον 
φαίνηται:
 An  apparent  destructive  or 
painful harm
 Whenever  it  appears  near 
that  you  could  suffer 
(yourself or someone close to 
you)  the same thing [as  the 
pitiable person]
Φθονος λύπη  τις  ἐπὶ  εὐπραγίᾳ 
φαινομένῃ  τῶν  εἰρημένων 
ἀγαθῶν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους
The  apparent  flourishing  of 
someone like you
Ζηλος λύπη  τις  ἐπὶ  φαινομένῃ 
παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν ἐντίμων
The  apparent  presence  [in  the 
person  to  whom  one  feels 
emulation] of prized advantages
The  claim  here  is  that  Aristotle  cannot,  in  the  Rhetoric,  be  using 
phantasia in  the  technical  sense  of  that  word  deployed  in  the 
psychological works, for the reason that if it were being so used here, 
the objects of phantasia would include only things that can be objects of 
sensory perception, since that is a necessary feature of  phantasia in its 
De Anima III.3 sense.294 But that is not at all what we find in the Rhetoric 
accounts of emotions. Specifically, here, the objects of phantasia would 
need to include
294 Many of the more recent writings on phantasia in Aristotle convincingly reject 
Schofield’s earlier view that there is no unified account of phantasia in De Anima III.3 
(Schofield [1978]; cf. e.g. Wedin [1988], Everson [1999], Caston [1996], [1998]). But it is 
not clear even if Schofield were right that this would substantially undermine our 
present argument against the particular sense of phantasia appealed to by those 
invoking DA III.3 to elucidate the use of this and other terms in Rhetoric II.
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a. Abstract  objects:  anger  involves  the  appearances  of  slight 
and of revenge; envy involves the appearance of flourishing, 
and confidence can involve the appearance of deliverance.295 
None of these seems to be a possible object  of  aisthêsis,  as 
would be required for phantasia proper.
b. Things  in  the  Future  or  the  Past:  fear  involves  the 
appearance  of  future harm,  pity  seems  to  involve  the 
appearance of one’s own future suffering as possible; shame 
involves the appearance of bad things that bring disrepute – 
things “in the present or the past or the future” (1383b14).
c. Causal Properties of Objects: when one experiences shame, it 
seems that one takes the object of shame to be something that 
will bring you into disrepute.296
d. States of Affairs: at 1385b15f.,  the ‘appearance’ involved in 
pity is of a state of affairs as being near. The state of affairs is 
that the subject (or someone close to them) suffer in future 
the same thing as the pitied person. But this is problematic 
on the view that the kind of phantasia being spoken of here is 
of  the  same  kind  as  is  outlined  in  De  Anima  III.3  –  for 
Aristotle  goes  on  to  say  there  (DA III.8,  432a10f.)  that 
phantasia does not involve asserting one thing of another.
295 This latter may not be abstract – the expression used is “τα σωτηρια”, which 
perhaps can be objects of sensory perception.
296 That this is how we should read “περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν 
κακῶν” at 1383b13f. is confirmed by the resumptive phrase at 1384a21f. “ἐπεὶ δὲ 
περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασία ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη” – what the objects of appearance would 
need to be, on the phantasia view being considered, is not the situation of disrepute, 
but the things themselves (τα ...) and their connection with (περι) disrepute. The 
connection these things are represented as having with disrepute is a tendency to 
bring one into disrepute!
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These things present a problem only to the technical understanding of 
Aristotle’s use of  phantasia in relation to the passions. It is just such a 
use of the word that is being seen in the  Rhetoric’s description of the 
passions  by  proponents  of  the  appearances  view  of  Aristotelian 
emotions.
A related worry is that the content of  phantasia in  DA III.3  is quasi-
perceptual. That is to say, it involves the representation of objects  as  
they would be perceived by the senses.297 So, even if the previous objection 
could be answered,  such that all  objects  of the passions were in the 
relevant  sense  objects  of  perception,  there  might  still  be  a  problem, 
since the  way  in which they are represented in an Aristotelian  pathos 
would still need to be the way in which they could be perceived by the 
senses.  And  Aristotelian  passions  simply  do  not  seem  to  fit  this 
pattern. For example, what ‘appears’ to someone experiencing  praotês 
is a person towards whom they are feeling calm (this much is certainly 
such as could be perceived by the senses),  appearing  as not  having 
done  anything  to  insult  them,  or  as  having  done  those  things 
297 428b14, “It [viz. a change coming about by the exercise of perception, which will 
turn out to be phantasia] is bound to be similar to perception”. That phantasia involves 
representation of things as they would be perceived by the senses is also central to 
what Schofield is highlighting in describing phantaisa as ‘non-paradigmatic sensory 
experiences’ [1978 (1992)] 252-255. Cf. also DA 431a14f. and esp. 432a9f. “States-of-
appearance are just like states-of-perception except without matter.” The point is 
even clearer in the De Insomniis, where Aristotle argues from the nature of phantasia 
as a movement caused by the exercise of perception that its content is sensory in 
character, 461a25-b3. Everson [1999]  157-64, it seems to me, is correct to stress the 
close connection between phantasia and sense-perception: indeed, so closely is 
phantasia connected with aesthesis that it seems to require the physical perceptual 
apparatus of perception in a way that thinking does not, cf. DA 403a8-9; 428b11-13, 
b15f.; De Insomn 459a14-17; cf. DA 429b4-5.
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involuntarily. These just do not seem to be the kind of things that, in 
Aristotle’s view, we simply perceive. This represents a further challenge 
to the view that for Aristotle the representations involved in passions 
generally are exercises of phantasia.
Finally,  and  significantly  against  the  use  of  the  DA-style  use  of 
phantasia  in  Rhetoric  II,  we note that Aristotle himself has some very 
negative  things  to  say  about  the  connection  between  phantasia  and 
emotion at De Anima III.3, 427b21-4.
Furthermore, whenever we believe something terrible or fearsome, we  
immediately  have  an  emotion,  and  likewise  if  it  is  something  
encouraging. Whereas in the case of appearance, we are in the kind of  
state  we  would  be  if  seeing  terrible  or  encouraging  things  in  a  
painting. (427b21-4).
The contrast here is between belief and phantasia, as the context makes 
clear,298  in relation to a similar object. Aristotle’s point is that belief is 
sufficient  for emotion,  whereas  phantasia is  not.  Taken together,  this 
strongly suggests (though it is not explicit) that Aristotle’s position is 
that  belief  is  also  necessary  for  emotion.  If  that  were  correct,  then 
Aristotle’s position here is entirely consistent with the position we set 
out earlier from the  Rhetoric, that it is essential to emotions that they 
involve taking things to be a certain way, i.e. that “beliefs” are essential 
to  emotions.  Interestingly,  Aristotle’s  assertion  about  fear  in  this 
passage is very close to what he says in  Rhetoric  II.5, 1382b33, “those 
who believe they might suffer something necessarily are afraid.” By 
contrast, those who take Aristotle’s view of the emotions in Rhetoric II 
to  be  the  appearance  view,  on  the  basis  of  his  use  of  words  like 
phantasia, will have great difficulty squaring what Aristotle says about 
298 See esp. Hicks [1907] ad loc.
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fear at DA 427b21ff. with his definition of fear in the Rhetoric. “Let fear 
be some pain or disturbance from the appearance (phantasia) of a coming 
destructive or painful harm.” If the same sense of phantasia is involved, 
the  passages  are  clearly  incompatible  over  whether  phantasia of 
something fearsome causes fear. The difficulty is immediately resolved 
if  in  Rhetoric II,  Aristotle  uses  words  like  phantasia  in  their  looser, 
everyday sense, to express his view of emotions as involving (fallible) 
beliefs,  e.g.  that  some  destructive  or  painful  harm  is  (or  may  be) 
coming.  This  seems  a  much  more  obvious,  simple  and  attractive 
understanding both of the De Anima and the Rhetoric passages than the 
manoeuvres that are required by the appearance view. Faced with this 
problem,  the  appearance  view  is  forced  to  say  that  Aristotle  uses 
phantasia in a different sense at 427b21-4 from that used elsewhere in 
the  same chapter,  and that  he  does  so  without  any  indication  of  a 
change in meaning.299 In short, 427b21-4 seems to rule out that Aristotle 
held the appearance view:  at  best  it  is  a  severe problem facing this 
view. It  fits  our proposed “belief” view without difficulty.300 Indeed, 
this passage seems to be a rather general observation about emotional 
experience,  and as such suggests  that  Aristotle  took it  to  be simply 
obvious that emotions involve beliefs.
V
299 This position would find some support from the early article of Schofield [1978].
300 There is perhaps a difficulty about how Aristotle can think that that paintings of 
terrible or reassuring things do not cause emotions, and yet that tragedies cause pity 
and fear in audiences. This difficulty seems to me not insuperable, but a full 
treatment would take us too far afield. Suffice to observe that if there is a difficulty 
here, it relates to the fact that the clause introduced by “hôsper” is clearly intended to 
mean “not in an emotional state”, and will obtain regardless of one’s understanding 
of phantasia in the previous clause. cf. also above n. 273.
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The  conclusion  proposed  here  is  that  the  appearance  view  be 
abandoned as an account of Aristotle’s view of the emotions in Rhetoric  
II. Instead, we propose understanding his view of (for example) fear as 
involving301 taking it that  some destructive or painful harm is coming. 
That is, emotions involve taking something to be the case.
It should by now be clear how the adoption of this position, and the 
denial  of  the  appearances  view  of  Aristotelian  emotions,  poses  no 
special problems for Aristotle in thinking that non-human animals had 
genuine emotions, even though they have  phantasia but not  doxa.  As 
Sihvola  notes,  there  are two possible  contrasts  to  be  made between 
phantasia and doxa.302 One, the contrast he has in mind in denying doxa 
to animals at 428a19-24, is between taking something to be so in a way 
that  is  capable  of  happening  reflectively  (doxa in  humans)  and 
unreflectively  taking  something to  be  so  (phantasia in  animals).  The 
position  we  have  been  defending  is  that  emotions  involve  taking 
something to be the case. Thus it is a second contrast between doxa and 
phantasia that we have employed: namely between something’s being 
taken to be the case, and its merely appearing to be so. In humans, states 
of phantasia fall short of taking something to be the case. But this is not 
so with Aristotle’s non-human animals. Aristotle could scarcely deny 
that  animals  take  things  to  be  the  case.  For  Aristotle,  non-human 
animals do not have a distinction between appearance and reality, and 
301 Fortenbaugh’s ([2002] 11-16) suggestion that the emotional state is merely caused by  
how the fearful person takes things to be seems to me a mistaken interpretation of 
Aristotle’s position in the Rhetoric. Some reasons for rejecting his view are 
summarised in the Appendix.
302 Sihvola [1996] 58. Aristotle’s purposes in De Anima III.3 do not require the careful 
distinguishing of these contrasts. They are of course related, in that in humans it is 
the capacity to reflect that prevents it from being the case that everything that 
appears to be the case is taken to be so.
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thus for animals anything that appears to be the case is taken to be the 
case.  Hence,  insisting that  emotions  involve taking things  to  be  the 
case, presents no special obstacle to animals having them.
We considered  earlier  the  motivation  for  attributing  to  Aristotle  an 
appearances  view  of  emotions  in  Rhetoric  II.  Exegetically  the  case 
seemed  weak,  both  in  terms  of  the  lack  of  evidence  for  Aristotle’s 
supposed  reasons  for  holding  it,  but  also  because  a  superior 
explanation of his use of words like “phantasia” is available. We have 
now  assessed  whether,  irrespective  of  its  exegetical  merits,  the 
appearances view would give Aristotle the philosophical advantages 
claimed by Cooper,  Striker  and Sihvola in relation to  emotions that 
conflict with beliefs. We have argued that it would not. In summary:
1. Aristotle’s  arguments  against  Plato’s  ‘mixture’  theory  of 
appearances  do  not  present  any  obstacle  to  the  view  that 
Aristotelian passions might involve beliefs, even if Aristotle had 
been  concerned  in  the  Rhetoric to  allow for  the  possibility  of 
conflict between emotions and dispassionate beliefs.
2. There are substantial difficulties in applying Aristotle’s use in 
De Anima III.3 of phantasia to explain perceptual error to the case 
of passions that conflict with  dispassionate beliefs.
3. There  are  a  number  of  ways  in  which  the  representations 
involved in emotional experience described by Aristotle in book 
II  of the  Rhetoric do not fit  his account of  phantasia  in the  De 
Anima, despite the use of the words “φαντασια”, “φαινομαι” 
and cognates.
4. Ascribing the appearance view of emotion to Aristotle is sharply 
at odds with what he says about emotions,  phantasia and belief 
at  De Anima III.3,  427b21-4,  which is especially problematic  if 
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ascribing  the  appearance  view  to  Aristotle  is  motivated  by 
appeal to De Anima III.3.
The significance for Aristotelian rhetoric of rejecting the appearances 
view
This conclusion is important. Let us recall why it is important for the 
role  of  emotion-arousal  in  Aristotelian  rhetoric  that  Aristotelian 
emotions involve not mere appearances, but taking something to be the 
case.  If  emotional  appearances  are  completely  compatible  with 
believing or even knowing things to be otherwise than they appear, 
then it is not at all clear how arousing emotions (on this view, merely 
involving appearances)  could  amount  to  providing  a  proof.  On the 
appearance  view  of  emotions,  using  emotion-arousal  to  persuade 
would involve getting listeners to make inferences from how things 
appear – that is, from premises that the listener does not necessarily 
even endorse, and whose use in inference does not seem sensitive to 
whether they are known to be true or misleading. By the listeners’ own 
lights, in making inferences from appearances, they may not have any 
proper  grounds  for  conviction.  This  applies  even  if  listeners  are 
entirely  correct  about  how  things  appear.  Thus,  when  considering 
whether someone is proceeding correctly in drawing a conclusion from 
premises  they believe,  one  needs  to  establish  whether  the  inference 
from the premises to the conclusion is acceptable, and whether they are 
right to believe the premises. However, if one is considering whether 
someone is  proceeding correctly  in drawing a conclusion from how 
things  appear  to  them,  it  will  not be  enough  to  establish  that  the 
inference is correct and the appearance properly formed. This shows 
that  if  the  appearances  view  were  right,  arousing  emotion  (even 
emotions that the subject is correct to have) would not be sufficient for 
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providing proper grounds for conviction. If the appearances view were 
correct,  then  –  on the  account  of  pistis set  out  in  earlier  chapters  – 
Aristotle would face a serious inconsistency in claiming that arousing 
emotions was one kind of pistis.
However,  we  have  set  out  compelling  reasons  for  thinking  that 
Aristotle did not subscribe to the appearances view of emotions, and 
that this is not what lies behind his use of words like  phantasia in his 
accounts  of  emotions  in  Rhetoric  II.  Rather,  Aristotle  seems  to  have 
supposed that human emotions involved a distinctive outlook on the 
world in the sense of taking that to be the way things are. Some of the 
reasons for preferring the belief  view to the appearance view as an 
account of Aristotle’s understanding of the emotions have also brought 
to light good reasons for preferring it as an account of the emotions 
themselves.
The challenge of irrational emotions
Consideration of irrational emotions in relation to Aristotle’s account is 
largely a modern concern – there is scant evidence that when writing 
about the emotions Aristotle even considered cases of conflict between 
emotion and belief.303 Still, it seems that emotions that are irrational in 
this sense are possible. If this is so, then they present a tricky pair of 
desiderata for theories of emotion. A theory of emotion must allow that 
such cases of irrational emotion are possible, but it must not make it 
impossible (as a phantasia view does) to account appropriately for what 
is irrational about them.
303 Perhaps De Anima I.1, 403a21-24 might hint at such considerations in the 
background, but what is explicitly said in that passage concerns a discrepancy not 
between passion and belief but between passion and the absence of an appropriate 
object.
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These  desiderata seem to make trouble for  those theories  of  emotion 
where  the  cognitions  involved  in  emotion  (whether  or  not  there  is 
more  to  emotional  experience  than  these  cognitions  alone)  are 
identified  with  another  kind  of  cognitive  attitude.  The  two  most 
common kinds of such theory are those in which emotional cognitions 
are judgements and those in which they are perceptions.  Perceptual 
theories  will  find  it  hard  to  account  for  what  is  irrational  about 
emotions that conflict with the subject’s  beliefs,304 in just the way set 
out  above  in  relation  to  the  phantasia view  ascribed  to  Aristotle.305 
Judgement theories will find it hard to account for how such emotions 
can be possible in the first place, since they seem to involve situations 
in which the subject simultaneously judges and denies the very same 
thing.306 They also risk overstating the irrationality involved. Perhaps 
these worries can be alleviated by nuanced theories of this kind. But if 
not (and perhaps even if so), there will be a motivation to look for a 
theory of emotion that can accommodate these cases more easily.
304 More precisely, showing that such an emotion is irrational will require the 
fulfilment of some further conditions relating to how well epistemically warranted 
the belief is, and how much better epistemic warrant the belief has than the cognition 
involved in the emotion.
305 Prinz [2004] (pp. 237-240) attempts to address these concerns, in response to a 
much earlier paper by Pitcher ([1965]), but fails to do so satisfactorily. See also Döring 
[2003] and Salmela [2006].
306 Nussbaum attempts to address these worries principally by insisting on the 
possibility of holding inconsistent judgements, by pointing out how difficult it can be 
to eradicate some kinds of judgements, and by allowing for experiences in the 
absence of the relevant judgements that are emotion-like but do not properly qualify 
as emotions ([2001] pp 35-6, [1999]), cf. Roberts [1999], Sorabji [1999].
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We  have  argued  for  rejecting  the  claim  that  Aristotle  holds  the 
phantasia  view  of  the  stance  involved  in  emotions  towards  their 
contents, claiming instead that emotions are ways of taking something 
to be the case.
On this basis, emotions can be ways of accepting premises in a proof. 
Thus, arousing emotions can amount to (or contribute to) providing 
the listener with a proof. The way is clear for emotion-arousal to be 
part of an expertise in providing listeners with proofs: that is, part of 
an expertise in rhetoric.
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Conclusion
The principal claim defended in this thesis is that for Aristotle arousing 
the emotions of others can amount to giving them proper grounds for 
conviction,  and  hence  a  skill  in  doing  this  is  properly  part  of  an 
expertise in rhetoric.
We have set out Aristotle’s view of rhetoric as exercised solely in the 
provision of proper grounds for conviction (pisteis)  and have shown 
how he defends this controversial view by appeal to a more widely 
shared and plausible view of rhetoric’s role in the proper functioning 
of  the state.  We have then explored in more  detail  what  normative 
standards must be met for something to qualify as “proper grounds for 
conviction”, applying this to all three of Aristotle’s kinds of “technical 
proofs”  (entechnoi  pisteis).  In  the  case  of  emotion,  meeting  these 
standards  is  a  matter  of  arousing  emotions  that  constitute  the 
reasonable acceptance of premises in arguments that count in favour of 
the speaker’s conclusion. We have then sought to show that Aristotle’s 
view  of  the  emotions  is  compatible  with  this  role.  This  involves 
opposing  the  view  that  in  Rhetoric  I.1  Aristotle  rejects  any  role  for 
emotion-arousal  in  rhetoric  (a  view  that  famously  generates  a 
contradiction with the rest of the treatise). And it also requires rejecting 
the  view  of  Rhetoric  II.2-11  on  which,  for  Aristotle,  the  distinctive 
outlook involved  in emotions is merely how things “appear” to the 
subject. 
Our treatment of Aristotle’s positive views on the emotions has been 
limited. The appendix summarises some important arguments about 
the  role  of  pleasure  and  pain  which  would  form  part  of  a  fuller 
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treatment. But one important feature of Aristotle’s views defended in 
the body of the thesis is this. For emotions to constitute acceptance of 
premises, they must involve taking certain things to be the case  (i.e. – in 
the special sense in which we have used the term – “beliefs” ). 
The principal claim of the thesis entails that Aristotle thought emotion-
arousal could be a legitimate way of persuading someone to believe 
something, and that he was correct to do so. It should be noted that this 
position gives Aristotle only a partial defence against worries about the 
illegitimate (e.g. manipulative) use of emotion-arousal in persuasion. 
Certainly,  emotion-arousal  will  constitute  providing proper  grounds 
for conviction only where it enables good inferential reasoning to the 
orator’s  proposed  conclusion.  This  is  enough  to  rule  out  many 
illegitimate  uses  of  emotion  in  public  speaking.  But,  as  with  all 
techniques in rhetorical and dialectical argument, it does not rule out 
that  the  practitioner  may  appeal  to  premises  that  the  listener  may 
incorrectly  accept  as  reputable  (emotionally  or  otherwise)  without 
adequate  grounds.  And  there  is  a  further  worry  that  the  emotional 
acceptance  of  considerations  in  favour  of  the  speaker’s  conclusion 
might enable those considerations to count more strongly in favour of 
that conclusion with the deliberating listener than the considerations 
themselves merit, precisely because of the way emotions command the 
subject’s  attention.  Do  such  concerns  significantly  undermine  the 
contribution Aristotle sees rhetoric as making to the proper functioning 
of  the state?  Or to  what extent  are  these concerns  mitigated by the 
structure of (e.g.) Athenian public deliberation where listeners get to 
hear multiple opposing speakers? The investigation of these remaining 
questions must be undertaken elsewhere.
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In the end, Aristotle’s approach to what will count as offering proof by 
emotion-arousal centres round whether the speaker is offering a good 
argument for their case. Because emotions are ways of taking things to 
be the case, they can be ways of accepting the premises in arguments. If 
the premises are part of a good argument, then by arousing acceptance 
of  them,  the  speaker  is  providing  the  listener  with  proof  of  his 
conclusion.  As  such,  emotion-arousal  will  be  no  different  from any 
other kind of proof.
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Appendix  –  The  role  of  Pleasure  and  Pain  in 
Aristotelian Emotions
The main  argument  of  the  thesis  does  not  require  extensive  claims 
about  Aristotle’s  understanding  of  the  emotions.  He  needs  them 
simply to  be  ways of  taking something to  be the case.  However,  it 
might be wondered how, for Aristotle, this feature fits in with other 
features  of  emotions  (and indeed  how they  might  differ  from non-
emotional  ways  of  taking  something  to  be  the  case).  One  issue  of 
particular importance is the role of pleasure and pain in emotions, a 
role  highlighted  in  Aristotle’s  definition  of  the  emotions  at 
1378a19-21.307 Space has not permitted the detailed examination of this 
to be included, but it will be useful to offer a summary of Aristotle’s 
position, and how it fills out his positive understanding of the nature 
of the passions.
A Theory of Emotions
John  Cooper  has  suggested  that,  in  the  Rhetoric,  Aristotle  offers  no 
“overall theory” of emotions, merely “a preliminary, purely dialectical 
investigation”  and  “no  more  than  that”.308 Undoubtedly  Aristotle’s 
account of the emotions in Rhetoric II.1-11 has limitations, but it seems 
to me that this is a rather misleading summary.  There are indeed – as I 
shall  indicate – many areas in which his views are less explicit  and 
exact  than  we  might  wish,  and  some  in  which  they  seem  under-
developed.  Nevertheless,  our assessment  needs  to  take into account 
that this is a work not of psychology but of rhetoric. And it is possible 
307Cf. also the connection with emotions at  EN II.5, 1105b21-23; EE 1220b12-14; MM I.
7, 1186a13f..
308Cooper [1996] 238-9, 251-2.
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that Aristotle thought that what was interesting and important about 
the passions lay not so much at the level of the passions generally, but 
at  the  level  of  individual  types  of  emotion.  Accordingly,  Cooper’s 
verdict seems to me to be too hasty. Given its context, what Aristotle 
has to say seems most remarkable for the detail and coherence it  does 
have. It suggests that his own reflections were well on the way to being 
something  very  like  a  “theory”  of  the  passions,  a  theory  we  see 
reflected  particularly  in  the  definition  at  1378a19-21,  centering  on 
pleasure and pain.
In fact, our proposal is that Aristotle thinks that emotions are pleasures 
and pains.  This  should  not  be  taken  as  a  claim about  the  genus of 
emotions,309 nor as an endorsement  of Socrates’  view in the  Philebus 
that emotions are mixed pains and pleasures.310 His proposed position 
is as follows.
1. To have an emotion is to experience pain, pleasure or both.
2. The  pain  and  pleasure  involved  in  having  an  emotion  is 
pain/pleasure  is  intentional  and  representational:  it  is 
pain/pleasure  at  the  emotion’s  object  or  ‘target’  and involves 
that target being represented in ways that give ‘grounds’ for the 
particular emotion experienced.
Thus, being afraid of the bear is to experience pain, and this is pain at  
the bear  [‘target’],  at  the  bear’s  being a  source of  future harm (i.e.  
fearsome) [‘grounds’].
309On which Aristotle either held no position, or held that this differed between 
emotions. Cf. esp. on anger (not defined as a pain, but as a desire-cum-pain): Topics 
127b26-32., 150b27-151a19, 156a32-33; cf. Rhet 1378a30-32.
310Pace Frede [1996] 258-60. Cf. Philebus 46b-c and 47d-50c.
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Emotions as Pains and Pleasures
The textual evidence for the first claim may be summarise as follows. 
Six  passion  types  discussed  by  Aristotle  are  described  as  being  “a 
pain”  (e.g.  ἔστω  δὴ  ὁ  φόβος  λύπη  τις  ἢ  ταραχὴ  …),  or  “being 
pained” (τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακοπραγίαις …), and 
three  “opposites”  are  similarly  connected  with  pleasure.311 The 
proposed view obviously fits well with these, and it is these that take 
up the bulk of Aristotle’s attention in Rhetoric II.2-11.
What, however, about gratitude and ingratitude, anger and calmness 
and love and hatred, where this kind of expression is not used? And 
what should be said generally about those “opposites” to some types 
of passion where the opposite is most plausibly construed as simply 
the absence of the original passion’s pleasure or pain? In some of these 
cases (anger, love, gratitude), the difficulties are minimised by careful 
attention  to  what  Aristotle  says.312 Of  some  of  the  problematic 
“opposites”, it seems the thing to say is that strictly speaking they are 
not pathê but that they belong in Rhetoric II because the aspiring orator 
needs to know how to dispel as well as how to arouse each type of 
emotion. These strategies do not resolve every detail, but bring most of 
Rhetoric II.2-11 into line with the proposed theory.
Emotional Pains and Pleasures as Intentional and Representational
The claim that for Aristotle emotions are pains or pleasures that are 
intentional and representational is established from careful attention to 
the  constructions  used  to  specify  the  nature  of  the  pain  (and 
311Fear (1382a21-2), shame (1383b12-14), pity (1385b13-14), indignation (1386b10-11), 
envy (1386b18-21), emulation (1388a32-4), ‘righteous satisfaction’ (1386b26-9), ‘happy 
for’ (1386b30-32), schadenfreude (1386b34-1387a3).
312Cf. esp. Konstan [2006] on gratitude.
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occasionally  pleasure)  involved  in  emotions.  The  favourite 
construction is to speak of pain at (epi + dative) something, and this is 
used  sometimes  to  specify  the  emotion’s  target,313 sometimes  its 
grounds.314 A number of other constructions are used, each of which 
has its own nuance (peri + dative; dative on its own;  dia + accusative; 
hoti +  clause):  in  many  cases  this  is  a  matter  of  characterising  the 
subject’s perspective on the circumstances at which pleasure or pain is 
taken.  How Aristotle  specifies  the  pains  and  pleasures  involved  in 
emotions strongly supports the claim that he saw them as intentional 
and representational.
I  thus  reject  Fortenbaugh’s  suggestion  that  for  Aristotle  neither 
emotions  nor  the  pleasure  and  pain  associated  with  them  are 
representational  or  intentional.315 His  view is  that  the  emotions  and 
their  pains  and  pleasures  are  caused  by thoughts  with  the  relevant 
content. Aristotle’s position, he claims, is like his view of eclipses as 
“deprivations of light from the moon  caused by the obstruction of the 
earth.”316 This  view finds  some textual  support  in  two cases  where 
Aristotle does assert a causal connection between an emotion and the 
thoughts  that  trigger  it.317 But  these  are  two  atypical  cases,  and 
Fortenbaugh’s view sits unconvincingly with much of the rest of the 
evidence. Moreover, there is no difficulty for the representational view 
313E.g. pity 1386b12f.; indignation 1387a8f.; righteous satisfaction 1386b27-9; happy for 
1386b30f..
314E.g. pity 1385b13f., 1386b9; indignation 1386b10f.; envy 1386b18-21, 1387b23f.; 
emulation 1388a32f.; schadenfreude 1387a2f..
315Fortenbaugh [2002] 12-13, 110-112.
316An. Post. 90a15-18.
317On anger: apo + gen 1378b1-2; on fear: ek + gen 1382a21-2.
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in allowing that representational pains or pleasures can be caused by 
thoughts with the same content.
Representational  Pleasure  and  Pain  in  Emotion  and  Aristotle’s 
Accounts of Pleasure.
If the above account is accepted, there is an important question about 
whether  Aristotle  has  an  account  of  pleasure  and  pain  that  is 
compatible  with the way pleasure and pain are characterised in his 
account of the emotions in Rhetoric II.1-11.
One general difficulty faced by those seeking to answer this question is 
that Aristotle’s remarks on the emotions focus much more on pain than 
on pleasure, whereas his accounts of pleasure and pain (EN VII and X, 
Rhet I.11) are almost entirely focussed on pleasure. The latter assume 
that pain is  pleasure’s  opposite,  and that an account of pain can be 
inferred from what is said about pleasure.318
The accounts of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics  face the additional 
problem that  they  seem to  be  accounts  of  what  it  is  to  enjoy some 
activity, whereas what is required for the Rhetoric is pleasure and pain 
at  an  object  with  certain  attributes  (e.g.  pain  at  one  who  suffers 
undeservedly,  1386b12f.),  or  a  putative  state  of  affairs  (e.g.  pain  at 
undeserved suffering, 1386b9). It is not obvious how the accounts from 
the  Nicomachean  Ethics can  accommodate  emotional  pleasures  and 
pains  without  distorting  them.  Pleasure  at  another’s  suffering  (ho  
epichairekakos 1386b34-87a3) is not the same as enjoying knowing about 
his suffering. Pain at the success of an equal (phthonos 1387b23f.) is not 
the same as loathing knowing about the success of an equal. There is a 
318Cf. e.g. Rhet I.11, 1369b35, EN VII.11, 1152b1; and for worries about whether pain 
and pleasure are opposites, Ryle [1954] ch.4.
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difficulty in even making this distinction on the accounts in the Ethics.  
They  thus  risk  misidentifying  what  it  is  that  is  found  pleasant  or 
painful. Perhaps these difficulties can be overcome: at the very least, 
there is an interesting challenge to explain how the Ethics  accounts of 
pleasure  are  compatible  with  the  way  pleasure  and  pain  are 
understood in Rhetoric II.1-11.
The account of pleasure in Rhetoric I.11 in some ways is more difficult 
still.  There  are  huge  difficulties  in  finding  an  interpretation  of  the 
definition  of  pleasure  that  is  both  plausible  in  itself  and  makes 
plausible sense of even the first handful of examples of pleasant things 
offered  immediately  afterwards.  Discussion  of  these  cannot  be 
reproduced here.
Nevertheless, the list of pleasant things that occupies most of Rhetoric I.
11 suffices to show that Aristotle needed an account of pleasure (and 
pain) that allowed for these to be felt “at something’s being the case”, 
and where he seems to take it that the pleasure (or pain) itself will be 
representational.319 We  even  find  in  this  chapter  some  of  the  key 
locutions used later for the pain and pleasure of emotions (e.g. “lovers 
are constantly glad about (peri +  genitive) the beloved” (1370b20) and 
that  at  the  onset  of  love  “pain  arises  at  (dative)  the  [lover’s] 
absence” (b24),  and that while grief  involves a mixture of pain and 
pleasure,  “the  pain  is  at  (epi +  dative)  the  fact  that  they  are  not 
there” (1370b26)).
319Some things are pleasant only because we believe them to be so, or because we 
come to view them in a certain way, e.g. winning (1370b32ff.), honour and good 
reputation (1371a8ff.), being loved (1371a18f.), being admired (1371a21f.) and even 
flattery (1371a22ff)!
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Arguably, in  Rhetoric I.11, which is a treatise on rhetoric not scientific 
psychology,  Aristotle  offers  a  quick  and  rather  Platonic  sounding 
definition of  pleasure  (that  clearly  only fits  a  very narrow range of 
cases) plus some gestures in the direction of how it might be extended 
to cover the full range of things he recognises as pleasant. Working out 
the  complex  details  is  not  attempted.  But  it  is  already  clear  that  a 
representational account of pleasure is what would be required.
Advantages of Understanding the Emotions as Pleasures and Pains
If  Aristotle’s  understanding  of  the  emotions  is  indeed  in  terms  of 
pleasure and pain, this has a number of advantages.
Some  advantages  would  depend  on  the  details  of  the  account  of 
pleasure and pain involved. Suppose that emotions are pleasures and 
pains,  and  these  are  representational  in  ways  that  could  involve 
various cognitive attitudes, such that these pleasures and pains might 
be constituted by pleasant and painful sensations, imaginings, beliefs 
or  the  like.  Although  such  an  account  could  not  itself  solve  the 
challenge  of  irrational  emotions  presented  at  the  end  of  chapter  6 
above, it would almost certainly be consistent with whatever turned out 
to be the correct resolution.
An account of emotions as pleasures and pains also seems well-placed 
to  offer  an  appropriately  unified  account  of  various  features  of 
emotions. The features in question are the cognitions and consequent 
rational  and  inferential  relations,  the  phenomenology,  associated 
motivations, and possibly also the physiological changes involved.
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Pitying Colin, on this account, might be the painful judgement320 
that he is suffering undeservedly (where what is painful about 
the judgement is its object: that he is suffering undeservedly).
The fact that this is a judgement means (e.g.) that it is rational if the 
subject  has good evidence that Colin is  suffering undeservedly,  and 
that  pity  for  him  should  cease  if  they  knew that  his  suffering  had 
ceased,  or  was  deserved.  The  fact  that  the  judgement  is  painful 
accounts  for  its  phenomenal  character.  But  additionally,  for  the 
judgement to be genuinely painful probably requires the deployment 
of  some  specific  bodily  apparatus  in  the  way  the  judgement  is 
instantiated.  The  fact  that  Colin’s  undeserved  suffering  is  found 
painful readily explains why pity of this kind constitutes a motivation 
to bring it about that he not suffer undeservedly, i.e. to alleviate his 
suffering.
Conclusion
Aristotle insists on two key features in his account of the passions. One 
is  that they play a role (or are capable of playing a role)  in verdict 
formation. The other is that they involve pleasure and pain. We have 
argued for the view that pleasure or pain is essential to Aristotelian 
emotions,  and  that  this  view  does  not  involve  him  in  strong  or 
implausible claims about pleasure or pain being the genus of any or all 
passions. Nevertheless, this claim does put pressure on an account of 
pleasure  and pain,  since  it  must  be  the  case  that  there  are genuine 
pleasures and pains of the right kind to be involved in the passions. 
This  requires  a  representational  theory  of  pleasure  and  pain,  not 
merely one specified in terms of physiological process.
320Or other cognitive attitude. The rational and inferential relations would obviously 
differ depending on what kind of cognitive attitude was involved.
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Whilst it seems to me correct to insist against Cooper that Aristotle’s 
interesting  and  subtle  account  of  the  emotions  is  not  improperly 
described as a theory, we may still agree that it is not fully worked out. 
The view that the emotions are pleasures and pains seems strangely 
neglected within the recent philosophical literature on the emotions.321 
It seems clear already that working out the details of a theory within 
the framework Aristotle provides in Rhetoric II.1-11 promises to yield a 
rewarding contribution to this field.
321See Goldstein [2003] and Helm [2001] for two exceptions.
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